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durch Politik, Religion, Wissenschaft und Universitäten gelöst werden können? 
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Preface
This book reports on the work of a research group that was established at the Uni-
versity of Bonn in 2013. This group ‘Comparative Research on Democracies’ is a 
part of the ‘Forum Internationale Wissenschaft’ in Bonn, an interdisciplinary re-
search institute that focuses on the functional differentiation of contemporary 
world society. In the Forum we created three departments for the study of con-
temporary religion, for research on the global system of science and for research 
on the world polity. 
In our days, there are many thousands of academic research institutes in the 
world. But the ‘Forum Internationale Wissenschaft’ appears to be the only one 
among them that truly concentrates on the ‘functional differentiation of world 
society’ as its major research problem.1 This special and rare position is for us a 
challenge and an obligation. In this book – the first of two volumes – we do not 
run the whole gamut of functional differentiation of society. Instead, we focus on 
one function system, the world polity, a function system consisting of hundreds of 
democratic and authoritarian political systems. However, we always write from a 
perspective that seeks to compare function systems. In studying features of mod-
ern political systems – patterns of internal differentiation, the duality of repre-
sentation and responsiveness, the dynamics of problem expansion and problem 
retreat in polities – a comparison to similar dynamics in other function systems 
is inescapable. Furthermore, many of these characteristics derive from ecological 
relations among function systems. Thus, though we are primarily interested in 
polities, we have to understand them on the basis of the relations of the polity to 
other function systems.
We do not arrive at an adequate understanding of modern polities if we pri-
marily study them as modern transformations of premodern states. Premodern 
states were at the apex of a stratified, i.e. hierarchical, society. They dominated 
1  One of the authors of this book was part of an earlier, somehow similar endeavor, also related to 
a new research institute. See Renate Mayntz, Bernd Rosewitz, Uwe Schimank, Rudolf Stichweh, 
Dif ferenzierung und Verselbständigung. Zur Entwicklung gesellschaf tlicher Teilsysteme, Campus 
Verlag: Frankfurt/New York 1988. It might be interesting to compare these two books, asking the 
question how far the understanding of functional dif ferentiation has progressed in 32 years.
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society and all its groups and strata. In doing this, they constituted the whole 
of society and included every societal relevance into their domain. Religion may 
have made similar and competing demands on society. It was the only other func-
tion that could claim the whole of society (including the state) as being part of 
its domain and subordinate to it. As long as these interpretations were dominant 
and decisive for societal structure formation, society consisted of the competing 
claims of two totalizing functions, both of which were monistic, not pluralistic vi-
sions of society. This monism embedded into stratification constitutes the radical 
difference between premodern society and modernity.
Modern polities have to be understood through the ecology of relations among 
function systems. They have to find and incessantly redefine their place in society. 
They produce decisions that are collectively binding, but in preparing decisions 
they experience constraints and knowledge deficiencies that are always related to 
the complexity of a functionally differentiated society. This book concentrates on 
six key analytical perspectives that mirror the way modern polities are embedded 
into the ecology of functionally differentiated world society. In the following, we 
summarize these six analytical perspectives.
There is, first, inclusion (Ch. 1), which is a universal imperative in all the func-
tion systems of world society. They are all based on inclusion revolutions which 
begin in the eighteenth century and continue into the present. Inclusion is related 
to the institutionalization of the individual as one of the core inventions of mo-
dernity that connects locality and globality, structures and beliefs. Polities always 
have to balance individual and collective inclusion. How they do this shapes the 
democratic or autocratic or populist regimes they build.
Modern political systems can no longer adequately be described by looking at 
the apex of a hierarchy. To do so was instructive in the premodern world, but it is 
instructive no more. Function systems of the modern world achieve their autono-
my and identity by building complex patterns of internal dif ferentiation (Ch. 2). 
The best way to understand a function system is to understand its milieu intérieur 
(Claude Bernard), that is its internal environment, the practices and imperatives 
built into it, and the way the system is different from all the systems in its external 
environments on the basis of the complex reality of its internal environments. To 
understand autocratic mainland China one needs to study its villages and regions 
and provinces and cities and the immense multi-level governmental apparatus, 
the way decision capabilities are distributed in it, and the way decision alterna-
tives are generated and made use of. Another core question is the interrelation be-
tween the ongoing internal differentiation of a function system and the processes 
of differentiation progressing in its external environments.
What is characteristic for political systems and distinguishes the polity from 
other function systems is that politics is almost never a profession, which can be 
learned by studying a specific knowledge system (Ch. 3) that ‒ as a scientific or 
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intellectual knowledge system ‒ defines the core of what politics is about. In con-
temporary society in most world regions exist a profession of law and a profes-
sion of medicine and often a professionalization of religious core roles, and even, 
in the last decades, a certain amount of professionalization of managerial roles 
in the economy. But there is no profession of politics. The inclusion into political 
public roles (voters and the public sphere) and political performance roles (politi-
cal parties and political offices) is independent of professionalization. The inclu-
sion of everyone with equal rights of participation seems to be so important that 
it conf licts with any professionalization imperative for politics. If one starts from 
this diagnosis there arises the core question of how political processes organize 
the access to the knowledge resources they need in order to work on the ever more 
numerous societal problems that are being redefined as part of the problem set 
in need of collectively binding decision-making by political institutions. For this 
they need advisors and experts and other forms of knowledge import. The study 
of modern political systems will in one central respect be the study of these forms 
of knowledge import.
But how does the political system observe society? If modernity no longer has 
a problem set that defines which problems are the invariable core responsibilities 
of political systems, one has to find out how political systems select the problems 
they work on. For this selection process modern political systems make use of two 
strategies by which they try to affirm and expand their relevance for society. These 
two strategies are representation and responsiveness (Ch. 4). Representation is 
based on inclusion which, via votes, petitions, protests and public opinion allows 
the political system to apprehend the problem perspectives, preferences and in-
terests present in the population. These are then selectively represented in the sys-
tem. Representation already works in small-scale political systems. But political 
systems grow in complexity over time. They build an institutional set of their own 
and this set of political institutions develops diagnostic tendencies regarding rel-
evant societal problems that operate independently of direct inclusion. We call 
these somehow autonomous diagnoses responsiveness. The path from represen-
tation to responsiveness seems to be a general feature of the differentiation his-
tories of function systems: they start as relatively simple machines for the rep-
resentation of environmental features, only over time do they build much more 
complex interpretive schemata which demonstrate cognitive autonomy. But the 
responsiveness of polities is obviously limited, as polities are organized around 
the fight for power, but not around the search for knowledge.
Besides the power structures, ever more organizations and institutions arise 
in complex political systems. These institutions and organizations are specialized 
on functionally defined policy fields and relatively specific problems in those poli-
cy fields. Policy fields are obviously near to the functional differentiation of society 
and they operate as channels for the interaction of the polity and the other func-
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tion systems of society. The institutions and organizations (central banks, con-
stitutional courts, cartel and patent offices and many others) are often endowed 
with autonomous competences for collectively binding decision-making. They are 
functional autonomies (Ch. 5) and as such insulated from power processes, al-
though their decisions can claim the force of collective bindingness, which is only 
available in a political system. Such autonomous organizations are always expert 
organizations and the kind of expertise they represent is in most cases near to 
the problem perspectives of other function systems beyond the polity. The rise of 
these organizations documents the respect for knowledge which is unavailable or 
not sufficiently protected in the power processes of political systems, and it docu-
ments the respect a democratic polity may build regarding the autonomy of other 
function systems. Functional autonomies are the structural form through which 
polities accept the primacy of the functional differentiation of society and operate 
with self-limitations on the basis of this acceptance.
The inclusion revolution at the beginning of modernity is clearly a democratic 
revolution. But in most cases this was a slow process, in which mixed forms of 
government – monarchies, aristocracies, democracies – dominated for most of 
the 19th century and into the 20th century. At least until 1918 (dissolution of em-
pires as a consequence of WWI) and in some respects until 1960 (final decoloniza-
tion) the most important states were empires, what implies that different regime 
types were part of the same empire. Only after 1960 did the modern system of 
the universality of national and territorial states arise. In this modern system the 
bipolarity of democracy and authoritarianism (Ch. 6) becomes the dominant re-
gime difference. Authoritarian regimes mostly do not mean the continuing dom-
inance of traditional aristocratic elites. In some respects, autocracies participate 
in the democratic revolution as most of them call themselves democracies and 
they affirm the universal inclusion of everyone in the possibilities of participation 
they offer. The major differences of democracies and autocracies have to do with 
the way they react to functional differentiation. 
Democracy seems to be the political regime that maximizes the compatibili-
ty with functional differentiation. Democracies are receptive towards a plurality 
of societal values and they limit their Eigenvalues to core values that protect the 
autonomy of the individual. They create the autonomous institutions analyzed in 
Ch. 5, and thereby enlarge the social spaces for other function systems and pro-
cesses of self-organization in other function systems. They identify and fix politi-
cal problems in open search processes that aim for representation and responsive-
ness (Ch. 4). Compared to such structures authoritarianism nearly always means 
the resistance to and a partial negation of functional differentiation. Autocracies 
realize the renewed dominance of a stratum, an ethnic group or a family/dynasty 
in politics and society. In other cases, autocracies institutionalize a prevalence of 
one of the function systems of society over the other functions. This may be reli-
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gion (theocracies or ideocracies of quasi-religious systems), the economy (tech-
nocracy), or the polity itself, if there is a political actor who successfully claims 
a non-negotiable domination (a political party, the military, a dominant person). 
These different claims for dominance are often based on non-contingent values.
The research group that produced this book will continue the work on the an-
alytical perspectives presented here and add further perspectives. We prepare a 
second volume with case studies on Mainland China, Russia, India, the EU and 
the USA. We have to thank the University of Bonn and its rectors who established 
and continue to support the ‘Forum Internationale Wissenschaft’. We are grateful 
to the other members of the democracy group who did not contribute chapters 
here but actively participated in the conceptual work and discussion of these pa-
pers: Lena Laube, Felipe Peréz-Solari, Philipp Rückheim, Anna Skripchenko, Gio-
conda Vallarta-Cervantes, Pascal Goeke and Christine Weinbach. Special thanks 
are due to Jennifer Eggerling-Boeck (Madison/Wisconsin) who contributed lan-








1. Individual and Collective Inclusion and Exclusion 
 in Political Systems
Rudolf Stichweh
I. Inclusion revolutions and the genesis of modernity
Modernity and functional differentiation
Modern society arose after 1750, and the arrival of modern society was closely 
connected to a plurality of inclusion revolutions that occurred around this time 
or since then and that are still going on. The political transformations that are the 
subject of this book are a part of these processes.
Modernity is first of all a temporal concept. It points to a discontinuity that 
separates ‘ancients’ from ‘moderns’ and articulates a strong preference for mod-
erns. The present time is no longer related to a superior past but rather to a future 
we are looking toward with our unfulfilled expectations. Time becomes universal. 
It becomes a standardized and synchronized world time. It seems to be running 
faster or even accelerating. And in our days, in some cultural domains there is 
a switch from modern to ‘contemporary’ (Belting 2009; Belting, Buddensieg and 
Weibel 2013; Stichweh 2016b), which indicates that there are many streams of ac-
tivity running parallel to one another, running fast, and defining a feeling of what 
is necessary for being contemporaneous with one’s time.
From a sociological point of view, the most important aspect of modernity is 
functional differentiation. The pre-modern order of estates or strata in which ev-
ery person was invariably included since the moment of its birth, dissolves or at 
least loses its primary relevance. Instead, there arise macro societal communica-
tion systems such as the economy, religion, education, science, law, and the polity, 
to which individual persons are linked only momentarily, switching their engage-
ments from system to system and defining themselves by the plurality, sequence, 
and cumulative results of these temporary engagements.
Estates or strata were regional and/or local systems, and one cannot imagine 
a global extension of an estate/stratum. These strata and the hierarchical social 
order they established entailed relations of asymmetrical dependence between 
members of different strata (higher/lower strata), which were almost impossi-
Rudolf Stichweh14
ble to control over long distances. Function systems are, from their beginnings, 
potential world systems. All function systems are built on the basis of abstrac-
tions – money, religious beliefs, philosophical insights, behavioral norms – that 
after some time might prove to be of universal relevance. In addition to function 
systems, there are other forms of system formation that are defining for moder-
nity. Most important among these are social networks (especially small-world 
networks, which are often global networks), formal organizations (many of them 
world organizations), and epistemic communities (united by shared cognitive and 
normative expectations), all of which often are subsystems of function systems 
but sometimes transcend the boundaries of function systems (Stichweh 2007). To 
study the political systems of modernity that are part of the world polity as one 
global function system we must also study networks, organizations and epistemic 
communities.
The polity as a function system
The polity is one of the function systems of contemporary world society and it is 
clearly a global function system, a ‘world polity’, a term very much shaped by the 
writings of John W. Meyer (Meyer 2010). In looking at the polity as a function sys-
tem, we must define its function. As is the case for all function systems, the main 
task of a political system is solving social problems, problems that the political 
system understands as social problems that are part of its domain and for which 
the polity (and perhaps only the polity) is responsible.
Is there a possibility of defining the class of genuine political problems? The 
answer is probably negative. Over decades and centuries, problems – e.g. poverty 
and public health, sexuality and marriage, university curricula and the selection 
of the professoriate – move in and out of the domain of political action. While 
there is a history of shifting political problems, there is no logic of political prob-
lems that are inherently identifiable as ‘political’. In one of his last speeches as 
president of the United States, Barack Obama opted to define political problems 
as often being ‘dirty problems’: “… part of government’s job, by the way, is dealing 
with problems that nobody else wants to deal with”1.
If there is no inherent characteristic that defines political problems, ‘the 
political’ may be identified by looking at the way the political system ‘solves’ its 
problems. In the political system this is not done by cognition or diagnosis but by 
looking at alternative problem solutions and choosing one of these alternatives. 
1  Remarks by the President in Opening Remarks and Panel Discussion at White House Frontiers 
Conference, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, October 13, 2016, https://obamawhitehouse.
archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/10/13/remarks-president-opening-remarks-and-panel-
discussion-white-house.
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The decision that is finally made on the basis of deliberations and other politi-
cal processes is then considered binding for the collectivity that defines the social 
boundaries of the respective political system. ‘Collectively binding decisions’ still 
seems to be the best formula for describing the function of the political system (on 
collective bindingness, cf. Parsons 1969). And ‘collective bindingness’ means that 
once the final decision has been made it is binding even for those who preferred 
an alternative course of action before. They can still try to change the situation by 
a later decision that reverses the earlier decision, but as long as this later decision 
has not been made, they must accept what has happened and adapt their course of 
action to align with the decision. The ‘Brexit’ decision, which is now implemented 
by people many of whom voted against it, is a case in point. Further, the Brexit 
process has illustrated again and again that people may doubt the democratic le-
gitimacy of reversing decisions that have only recently been made.
Besides the making of collectively binding decisions, there is one other charac-
teristic that is constitutive of political systems. Political systems and the decisions 
made within them are always and everywhere based on power as a symbolically 
generalized medium of communication (Luhmann 1975; Parsons 1969). Power as 
a medium of communication means the possibility of using threats of negative 
sanctions to motivate others to accept a proposed course of action. Power, in this 
understanding, is a very elementary communicative operation in political systems. 
Elementary power accrues to everyone who participates in a political system. If an 
individual voter expresses that she might not vote again for the party she voted for 
in earlier elections, and if at the same time she points to certain political expec-
tations she wants to be fulfilled, this is clearly a case of communication via power 
– and these communications that point to the potential negative consequences of 
a specific course of action are very much the elementary ‘noise’ occurring in mil-
lions of communications from which the ‘order’ of political systems is continually 
built and rebuilt (Atlan 1979). There is clearly a cumulative aspect to power. If a 
political party reliably represents 10-15% of the electorate, then this number is a 
measure of the power this party can bring to political decision-making processes.
The polity as a world system
Since at least the 18th century, each individual political system has been part of a 
continental (European, Asiatic) and a world system of states (cf. Vries 2015). States 
in this world system observe one another, compete with one another, opt for imi-
tation or differentiation, and experience the rise of normative structures that are 
formative structures for the World Polity. Among these normative structures is 
the law of nations, which first emerged in the Roman world and was later renewed 
in 16th/17th-century Spanish legal theory and in other European countries (the 
Netherlands, the German Empire) (Loh 2019). In addition, a significant corpus of 
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human rights has arisen since the middle of the 18th century, and these rights 
have inspired many of the dynamics in the 20th/21st century World Polity.
If one looks at the history of the World Polity over the last 150 years, one can 
perceive three core distinctions that have functioned as organizing distinctions in 
this system. From 1870 to approximately 1960, there was a political world in which 
the national state was not yet the most prominent feature. Instead the world 
was still dominated by a number of colonial, transcontinental empires (England, 
France, Spain, etc.) and by continental empires such as the Habsburg Empire (un-
til 1918), the Ottoman empire (until 1923), and the Russian Empire. In this World 
Polity, the guiding distinction was probably the distinction between ‘great powers’ 
and ‘regional or local powers’ – to be a ‘great power’ was a status that states ac-
tually strived for and indeed fought for in the ‘Great War’ from 1914 to 1918 (Clark 
2013). After 1945 there emerged for a half century a late- or post-colonial world 
for which the distinction between communism and (democratic) capitalism was 
the most characteristic self-description. In more political terms, the communism/
capitalism distinction was accompanied by the distinction between ‘totalitarian-
ism’ and ‘democracy’, and beginning in the 1970s, the social sciences added the 
term ‘authoritarianism’ (Linz 2000) to describe non-democratic regimes (espe-
cially in Latin America) that could not be characterized as ‘totalitarian’. Around 
1990, communism collapsed and since that time the guiding distinction of the 
World Polity has clearly been the bipolarity of democratic and authoritarian po-
litical regimes. One of the core problems this book addresses is describing and 
explaining this bipolarity of democracy and authoritarianism.
A sociological theory of inclusion as a theory of modernity
For us, the sociological theory of inclusion and exclusion (Bohn 2006; Luhmann 
1981; Luhmann 1995; Parsons 1965; Stichweh 2016a; Stichweh and Windolf 2009) 
is one of the core instruments for understanding modernity, and by implication, 
for understanding modern political systems. In one respect, the inclusion of per-
sons in social systems is a universal phenomenon in the history of human social 
systems. In every social system, people must know who belongs to the system and 
can be considered a member of it (if membership is a relevant category) and will 
therefore be addressed as such. A theory of inclusion becomes especially relevant 
when being included in a social system is no longer a primordial fact established 
at the moment of birth and extending for (potentially) a person’s entire lifetime. 
Instead, in modernity decisions about the inclusion and exclusion of persons in 
social systems have their basis in the ongoing communicative operations that con-
stitute social systems. There are many of these processes occurring incessantly 
because there are many social systems processing parallel to one another. Further, 
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decisions on inclusion and exclusion must be renewed and can be revised and are 
therefore a dynamic feature of the structural reality of modernity.
Inclusion and exclusion as concepts in social science
What are the basic insights built into a theory of inclusion and exclusion? First, 
one must distinguish social systems and psychic systems (persons from the per-
spective of social systems). If one introduces such a distinction, social systems 
will be described as consisting of communications, and consequentially psychic 
systems will be seen as existing external to social systems, but being potentially 
included in social systems via the communications that are ascribed or addressed 
to them. Then, the inclusion of persons becomes a variable and temporary reality 
that can change from moment to moment.
Some inclusions can take the form of membership of the respective persons in 
social systems, however. This seems to be true only for organizations, because an 
organization is the only type of social system that constitutes itself via decisions 
about who is a member and who is denied membership. Most other types of inclu-
sions are more f luid and do not have this stable basis provided by formal decisions 
about membership.
In opposition to inclusion, there is always the possibility of exclusion, which 
means that someone is somehow ‘unwanted’ in a social system. Other participants 
ignore this unwanted person. No communications are addressed to her. Many ex-
clusions are implicit, i.e. are communicated via ignorance and indifference to-
wards those who are excluded. In other cases, there are explicit communications 
in which exclusion is decreed by words or in writing.
Inclusions, which in most social systems do not take the form of membership 
become more stable in nearly all social systems by being transformed into social 
roles. A role is always a set of expectations addressed to someone, and in this role-
based understanding inclusions are couplings of expectations regarding obliga-
tions and rights that realize the inclusion of individual persons by making use of 
this social form of an inclusion role.
The duality of inclusion roles (performers and professionals vs. clients, 
observers, amateurs, and the public)
In many of the function systems in contemporary world society two types of inclu-
sion roles can be distinguished (Stichweh 1988). There are, first, roles that are con-
stitutive for the description and self-description of the respective function system. 
The health system is about illness and healing, and in modern society most healing 
is conducted by doctors and other medical professionals. Therefore, the social role 
of the medical doctor and the other professional roles that have been added in the 
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evolution of modern medicine define the professional core of the health system as 
a function system in society. These professional roles constitute one of two major 
role types by which persons can be included in the health system. Although there 
is an enormous number of medical professionals today, most persons in society do 
not become health professionals. They have other occupations connected to oth-
er function systems. Nonetheless, those people are not excluded from the health 
system. For them exists the second major inclusion role of the health system: If 
they suffer from illness or from other health problems they are included into the 
system as clients or as patients. On this basis, it can be postulated that the modern 
health system, in principle, includes everyone, either as patient/client or as health 
professional, and, of course, health professionals, too, become patients at some 
point during their lives. Therefore, there is one non-selective inclusion role into 
the health system (patients) and one selective inclusion role (health professionals).
This duality of inclusion roles for a function system can be observed in most 
of the function systems of world society. There is often a non-selective role for 
everyone and a selective role for those who contribute constitutive performances 
to the system. It is not always about ‘clients’ versus ‘professionals’; in other cases 
we have ‘observers’ versus ‘professionals’ or ‘observers’ vs. ‘performers’ (in sports, 
the arts, the sciences). ‘Clients’ are always the clients of specific professionals but 
‘observers’ have a more ‘generalized’ role. They observe the ‘system’ and do not 
necessarily observe specific ‘performers’. And, of course, performers are in other 
situations themselves observers in the system in which they are performers, while 
professionals are in other situations clients in the system in which they mostly 
work as professionals.
There are interesting cases in which both role types are non-selective, i.e. both 
role types – even the performance roles – are accessible to everyone. The polit-
ical system seems to belong to this category, although in this respect there are 
remarkable differences between political regimes. We will discuss this point later 
in this chapter. Religion seems to be similar. Sometimes there is a clear profes-
sional/client difference in religious communities, while in other cases religious 
performance roles are accessible to everyone (e.g. ‘universal priesthood’ as a con-
sequence of the Reformation).
For those who are clients or observers there is often one additional alterna-
tive available to them. They can become ‘amateurs’. This is another non-selective 
role option. Everybody can become an amateur in music or science or the sports. 
And as an amateur, one can become a performer (practicing instruments, doing 
some kind of research, practicing sports exercises). In many function systems 
there are ‘bridges’ built that connect amateurs and professional performers: There 
are events in theater and music in which professionals appear on the stage with 
amateurs, and the same is true in some sports (marathon, triathlon). This again 
demonstrates a certain f luidity in the boundaries between types of inclusion roles, 
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and this f luidity is not accidental because a society built on inclusion (as a defin-
ing value principle) generates normative pressures to avoid any devaluation of any 
activities in the system.
A last interesting role variant exists because clients, observers and amateurs 
are often interpreted as ‘the public’. In this understanding they are part of an in-
terpretation of society that always confronts professionals and performers with 
a non-exclusive version of the whole of their societal environment understood 
as ‘the public’. There is, for example, the ‘public understanding of science’ which 
means the collective, internal environment of science that includes everyone. 
There is also the concept of ‘public opinion’, as a collective internal environment of 
the polity again including everyone, even those who did not know that they have 
an opinion.
Inclusion revolutions (1750-2020)
The function systems of contemporary world society are not recent inventions that 
arose unpredictably and late in the history of stratified societies. Rather, religions, 
normative-legal systems, and philosophy (as a precursor of science) are based 
in traditions that are as much as 3.000 years old (Jaspers 1949). And, of course, 
in Europe there have been roles, professionals, institutions, and organizations 
arranged around the meaning complexes of certain function systems since the 
middle ages and even earlier. Since 1200, European universities have served as 
institutions for educating high-status professionals in religion, law, and medicine. 
These same universities were, together with other schools, matrices of an emerg-
ing function system of education (a function system often built from top down, 
that is from universities to secondary schools). Further, since the 16th century uni-
versities, have been an important instrument in the formation of early modern 
European states (Stichweh 1991).
However, all these complexes of functional institutions emerging in a strat-
ified society were clearly elite institutions, including only very small segments 
of the society. Only about 1% of the male population of early modern European 
countries ever experienced a university from inside and the case was similar for 
access to medicine, law, science and the polity (as an active participant in a polit-
ical system).
If one starts from the analysis proposed here it becomes obvious that the fast 
progression of functional differentiation after 1750 is probably related to transfor-
mations in the capability of the emerging function systems to include ever more 
members of society into their functional domains. If this hypothesis can be con-
firmed, the genesis of the switch from stratification to functional differentiation 
as the primary form of differentiation of society should be explained by inclusion 
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revolutions that have occurred in the emerging function systems since the second 
half of the 18th century.
In comparing function systems, there is a plausible candidate for a function 
system that is a likely precursor in the history of inclusion revolutions. This is 
religion. There may be good reasons to hypothesize that European religiosity in 
late medieval and early modern society anticipated and prepared the inclusion 
revolutions of other function systems (Stichweh 2020). Religion may have been 
the earliest function system because religion is the most obvious realization of a 
meaning perspective that has no real alternative to the near complete inclusion of 
everyone into its domain. Of course, there are some religious exclusions. Here-
tics, unbelievers, pagans, and heathens are not included in religion and often are 
excluded in dramatic forms. But from the perspective of medieval Europe, which 
had a totalizing vision of itself as ‘Christianitas’, these objects of exclusion were 
either very rare or lived in far distant regions that were of no real relevance. How-
ever, all other members of society, which really meant nearly all members of soci-
ety, had to possess somehow equal status in the way they were a part of religion 
and were therefore included in society on equal terms as long as this inclusion was 
dependent on religious inclusion.
One interesting indicator of this special status of religion is the way medieval 
Europe looked at poverty or at poor people. In purely social terms, poor people 
would be the best candidates for being marginalized or excluded. In religious 
terms, however, nearly the opposite was the case. The poor were considered near-
er to God and to salvation. Therefore, it became very important for rich people to 
give a significant portion of their property to institutions that helped the poor and 
indigent (Crassons 2010). The poor, and only the poor, could pray with some prob-
ability of success for the rich and this was the basis of a strong religious inclusion.
The reformation and counterreformation (or confessionalization as the pro-
cess is often called today) were the next steps in intensifying religious inclusion 
from the 16th through the 18th century. The early modern situation was not about 
building a bridge between rich and poor via an exchange of property and prayer, 
but rather about building a broader basis for inclusion. Learning to read; priori-
tizing education; and emphasizing work and profession, interiority and individ-
ualization – these were major building blocks of the first inclusion revolution of 
pre-modernity, which occurred in the domain of religion and its transformations.
Even today it is easy to observe, in the favelas and other districts of marginal-
ization in the world, that religion is still the function system – and it is no longer 
restricted to Europe – in which the focus on inclusion is much stronger than in 
other function systems. 
The second half of the 18th century witnessed a progression of inclusion revo-
lutions in other function systems of society. We could start with education, which 
is strongly linked to religious confessionalization. This shift resulted in the uni-
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versalization of the primary school, which had been finalized in some Calvinist 
provinces in Europe (Scotland, Netherlands) by the late 18th century. Parallel to 
this, an expansion of secondary and tertiary education began already in the 17th 
century. A good example within Catholicism is the development of the Jesuit sys-
tem of education, which focused primarily on secondary education in colleges 
(with a few tertiary faculties – law and theology ‒ added to some colleges) and first 
addressed the Catholic nobility, a stratum that had not shown much interest in 
higher education before (Brizzi 1976). The major expansions of secondary and ter-
tiary education occurred only in the 19th and 20th centuries, respectively. In both 
cases, there were countries that approached inclusion rates of 100% at some point 
(late in the 19th century for secondary education in the USA, late in the 20th for 
tertiary education for countries such as New Zealand, Taiwan and South-Corea) 
(Goldin and Katz 2008; OECD 2019).
For the economy (as is true for other function systems, too) there are plural 
indicators of inclusion, for example monetization. How many people participate 
in a money economy and how many are included more indirectly? A major trans-
formation regarding inclusion in the economy transpired in the second half of the 
18th century when, as a result of industrialization, there were the first cases of 
economies that combined the inclusion of a growing population in the economy 
(in terms of work and access to money) with still faster growth of the economy as a 
macrosystem, which meant that population growth was no longer the cause of in-
creasing pauperism but rather became a driver of further economic growth. Thus, 
the growing population was no longer a burden but rather became a resource for 
economic growth (North and Thomas 1973).
In science we observe very different patterns. With regard to the transforma-
tion that occurred after 1760 and that brought about the modern system of scien-
tific disciplines (Stichweh 1984; Stichweh 1992), we can speak about inclusion in 
an understanding that points to the disappearance of restrictions on authorship. 
In the new open and specialized journals that emerged beginning in the late 18th 
century, anyone who could write a paper could publish a paper. There were no lon-
ger privileges for academicians and other elite members. Therefore, the author 
space clearly expanded. However, the inclusion in authorship still encompassed 
only the very few persons who could actively conduct scientific research. Starting 
in the early 19th century, in European cities there were established bourgeois clubs 
and associations that included a bourgeois public in the culture of science. Again, 
the numbers were small and there was obviously no anticipation of the creation 
and necessity of a universal inclusion role in science. The inclusion revolution in 
the modern system of science did not materialize until the 20th and 21st century, 
when a much bigger system of world science became increasingly relevant for the 
way of life of every individual and for the future of world society.
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We will not discuss further cases at this point, although later we discuss inclu-
sion revolutions in different types of political systems. However, we should draw 
an initial conclusion. In stratified societies function systems still only occupy 
niches in the communications of society. They exist but are only small islands in a 
huge sea of inequality and stratification. For the further proliferation of function-
al differentiation one has to wait until the inclusion revolutions beginning in the 
18th century effect a transformation of scale in function systems and bring about 
function systems of universal societal relevance. At that point stratification was 
pushed back and became of secondary relevance. Function systems became highly 
differentiated macrosystems that seek further expansion and actively scan soci-
ety for potential problems and for new relevances. The function systems as they 
are emerging now are highly responsive both to society and to the other func-
tion systems of society. For them there are no longer conf licts between function-
al autonomy and responsiveness to society as function systems have become big 
enough that they no longer fear for their autonomy.
II. Individual and collective inclusion and exclusion
Types of individuality and historical consequences
The forms of inclusion that brought about modernity cannot be examined with-
out considering the modern definition and institutionalization of individuality. 
Questions of inclusion in modern social systems would not have become so cen-
tral if individuality had not been invented and established as a core institution of 
modern society. Since Durkheim we know that the individual is not an anti-insti-
tutional cause of societal disorder. Just the opposite is true, the individual is a very 
prominent societal institution (Durkheim 1898). Parsons and Goffman continued 
this line of thought, stating that the individual is more than an institution. It is a 
value principle and informs a kind of (civil) religion. We all are devotees of the ‘cult 
of individuality’ (Goffman 1972; Parsons 2007).
But what is meant by ‘individual’ or by ‘individuality’? There is a bipolarity em-
bedded in modern individuality. Modern individuality means the ‘equality’ of all 
individuals just as much as it means the ‘singularity’ (German: Einzigartigkeit) of 
each individual. Individuals are both similar and completely dissimilar (Eck 1908; 
Schleiermacher 1800; Simmel 1890; Simmel 1917). The idea of singularity can even 
be formulated in a very strong version in which there is no other individual in the 
world who can be compared to the one we observe at this moment. From this bi-
polar structure of equality/similarity versus singularity/dissimilarity follows the 
corollary that a population of many individuals who are just as equal as they are 
singular will be characterized by microdiversity (Luhmann 1997). Individuals are 
similar in certain general respects and dissimilar in certain specific respects they 
1. Individual and Collective Inclusion and Exclusion in Political Systems 23
do not share with most of the others around them. And this combination of gener-
al similarity and specific dissimilarity can be be described as microdiversity. If in-
dividuals are microdiverse in relation to one another, each social and political col-
lectivity consisting of many individuals can be described as a population, using an 
understanding of this term introduced by evolutionary biology. The populational 
microdiversity of a collectivity functions as the basis for the dynamics of change 
in social systems (Stichweh 2018). Microdiverse individuals in a political system 
are characterized by microdiverse interest articulations. The processes and struc-
tures of a political system specialize in being selective in a way that transforms 
diverse articulations of interest into political decisions supported by majorities or 
relevant minorities.
A further interesting interpretation of the individual is that there is a direct 
relationship between ‘the individual’ and ‘the world’. There are some remarkable 
semantics, mainly in the Romantic tradition, that describe the individual as an 
active entity who tries in its highly individual way ‘to reconstruct the world’. This 
world-reconstructing capacity can be ascribed to collectivities as well as to socio-
cultural systems. In this respect, one might say that collectivities/systems can be 
considered higher-level individualities. It is this ‘world affinity’ that allows us to 
contend – as Simmel already argued in 1890 (Simmel 1890, p. 181-2, 198) ‒ that in 
modernity there is a direct linkage from the individual as a micro-entity to cos-
mopolitanism and to world society as the most extensive context in which an in-
dividual can possibly move.
Political individuality and inclusion roles in political systems
As is true for all function systems of world society, the political system defines its 
own concept of individuality and does so in a way specific to the function system, 
thereby producing semantics and variants of political individuality that are the 
starting point for the definition of inclusion roles in different political regimes. 
The core of modern political individuality is clearly being an individual citizen 
and this idea takes the place of the most important premodern idea of political 
individuality, namely being a (subservient) ‘subject’ of some political regime. The 
change seems dramatic. A subject is defined by a dependency, and thus the in-
dividual as subject is, from the beginning, defined by someone on whom she is 
dependent. In comparison, a citizen seems to be constitutive and autonomous. 
Further, a citizen is not a member of an estate or any other social collectivity, and 
it is being a citizen (not a family member) that is one of the most important ways 
of being an individual, namely not considering oneself primarily a member of a 
family. A citizen must truly stand for himself/herself and define the context in 
which he/she claims to be a citizen. This can be an urban setting (a city), a state, 
or the world. Since the Graeco-Roman world, there has even been the possibility 
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of claiming citizenship in the world, which has been used often since that time, 
whatever its social effects (Coulmas 1990; Stichweh 2008).
The other side of citizenship is conferral. Citizenship is conferred or offered. 
There is a political system that confers or offers citizenship. This is still about in-
dividuality, but as is often the case with individuality, we have to do with a kind 
of individuality based in social expectations to be and to qualify as an individual: 
Citizenship is clearly one of the cases in which a demanding idea of individuality 
is addressed to someone as an expectation. One can deny an offer of citizenship, 
at least as an adult, although usually only if there is another realistic context of 
citizenship that one prefers.
There are two aspects or variants of the citizen as a political individual that can 
always be distinguished. On one side is the political individual as an observer of 
ongoing political events and discussions. As an observer, the political individual 
primarily contributes opinions – either communicated by or inferred from other 
observers – and contributes interests to political processes. Being an observer, the 
individual does not fight for the interests, but these interests are observed by oth-
er observers and are clearly inputs to political processes. Most citizens in modern 
political systems prefer to be observers most of the time because that is what their 
other interests and obligations (in other function systems) allow them to be. The 
other side of political individuality is to be an actor who contributes a willingness 
to act, political passions and engagements, virtues and vices. Under conditions 
of modernity, there may be a certain value-preference for the active individual. 
However, there are many other contexts of potential action in the other function 
systems of society, and for this reason it is much more probable that most citizens 
finally opt for the observer interpretation of political individuality.
These two aspects of political individuality correspond to the two alternative 
and complementary versions of political inclusion roles. In each function system 
in society there are observer roles ( = public roles, client roles) characterized by a 
certain passivity on the part of role bearers. In addition, there are performance 
roles, i.e. roles for producers of the activities that define the outputs of the re-
spective function system. In some function systems only the observer/public role 
is accessible to most of the individuals included in the system. Modern polities, 
especially democratic ones, are clearly different. The idea of democratic political 
individuality and its radical insistence on the equality of individuals seems to 
demand the potentiality of inclusion of each individual in both types of political 
inclusion roles. Every political individual is an observer of the ongoing events in 
their own political system (and potentially of all the other political systems in the 
world) and on this basis can opt for the elementary possibilities of participation 
accessible to observer/public roles: interest based voting, communicating political 
opinions, participating in protests. At the same time, however, every individual is 
considered to be able and legitimized to move to the other side of the political role 
1. Individual and Collective Inclusion and Exclusion in Political Systems 25
spectrum and emerge as an actively engaged, creative, and virtuous political ac-
tor, who, in principle, can access any performance/producer role. Anyone, without 
any exception, can become the ‘President of the United States’ or the ‘Chancellor’ 
of the Federal Republic of Germany – and in both countries, very recent history 
has shown that this is not a far-fetched potentiality but rather a very realistic pos-
sibility (the elections of Trump and Merkel, neither of whom had any professional 
political education). This non-selective universal inclusion in both role types of the 
political system seems to result from the radical equality in modern political in-
dividuality and seems to be non-negotiable in democratic political systems. There 
are, however, alternative structures in other political regimes and we examine 
these in the next section.
The duality of inclusion roles and types of political regimes: 
Aristocracies and democracies
A first interesting type of political regime is a system in which there are no observ-
er/public roles. In such a system everyone who truly intends to be involved in the 
polity must do so in a performance role, i.e. must participate as an active citizen 
endowed with public virtue – which somehow delegitimizes private interests. The 
historical name for this political regime based on activism and political passions 
is republicanism. Its most important historical realizations were probably the 
aristocracies of early modern Europe. An aristocracy is based on the equality of 
all aristocrats who are bearers of performance roles in the respective system. The 
number of these role bearers need not be small but was clearly limited because 
only members of the aristocracy could take on political roles. The Polish-Lithua-
nian Commonwealth in early modern Europe was a paradigmatic case of an aris-
tocratic regime. The early American republic from the signing of the Declaration 
of independence (1776) until the election of Thomas Jefferson as the third pres-
ident of the United States (1801), was still an aristocratic republic with a strong 
preference for reserving performance roles for a type of aristocracy based more 
in education than in wealth (Wood 2009). Of course, the early United States was 
more a mixed form of government with strong democratic elements (popular elec-
tions and a rapidly intensifying public opinion) and even monarchical tendencies 
(relating to the presidential role) than it was a classical and pure aristocracy. Ar-
istocracies no longer exist in the present-day world. They are clearly incompatible 
with the inclusion imperative of modernity and the dual role structure it implies.
A very important structure that only emerges on the basis of the inclusion 
revolution of the political system is a regime that realizes universal inclusion in 
observer/public roles and in performance roles, too. This is democracy – and, of 
course, there are many variants of it. There are some democracies in which the 
move from an observer/public role to a performance role is more an idea than a 
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reality – an idea rarely realized at a later point in the life of a citizen. The other 
extreme case of democracies consists of direct democracies of which Switzerland 
(and perhaps California) are the only cases at present. Direct democracies design 
all performance roles in a way that role-taking by non-professionals is realistic 
and compatible with the other obligations and roles people hold. Switzerland in-
vented or generalized the ‘Milizprinzip’ to solve this problem.2
Authoritarian universal inclusion
A third interesting type of political regime are autocracies or authoritarian politi-
cal systems. These regimes are distinct from democracies in that they do not have 
universal inclusion in performance roles. This type of universal inclusion would 
represent a risk they cannot take. In autocracies performance roles are limited to 
a small segment of the population that is perceived as consisting of the guardians 
of the value principles on which the authoritarian regime is based. This can be a 
party, a kind of clerisy (religiously or otherwise ideologically unified) or any other 
social structure apt to take this guardian role. 
At the same time authoritarian regimes are undoubtedly modern in that they 
allow and are based on the universal inclusion of everyone in observer/public roles. 
These regimes claim to act in the interest of everyone, and the available paths of 
exercising inf luence in and on them (elections, petitions) are accessible to every-
one, except members of stigmatized and therefore excluded populations that con-
f lict with the value principles of the authoritarian system.
Regarding the inf luence and power processes that guide the relationship 
between observer/public roles and performance roles, authoritarian regimes in 
many cases invert the direction of f lows of inf luence and f lows of power. These 
regimes often conduct mass mobilization from the top of the political system and 
in this way substitute strategies of control over the population via mass mobili-
zation for the possibilities of participation by every individual. This shift from 
individualized participation (starting with individual role bearers) to processes 
of mass mobilization – trying to include each and every individual in these mo-
bilized masses – is one of the reasons authoritarian regimes prefer the modern 
collectivities (i.e. nation, people) to which all individuals are supposed to belong 
2  A ‘militia’ is an army consisting of non-professionals and this structure can be transferred to other 
domains of political action. A good description was of fered by a Swiss banker: “Typisch schweize-
risch war: die Erledigungskompetenz auf hierarchisch sehr tiefer Stufe.” Hummler, Konrad. 2004. 
“Im Geruch von Schnapsmatrizen.” Pp. 51 in Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 8. Dezember 2004. (“Typical for 
Switzerland was: the competence to do and decide everything on the lowest hierarchical level 
imaginable”.)
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rather than collectivities in which inf luence potentials rest on individual role 
bearers and their initiatives.
Of course, mass mobilization means something different in different authori-
tarian regimes. Only in the case of totalitarian types of authoritarianism (e.g. Fas-
cism, Stalinism, Maoism) is mass mobilization actually based on the obligatory 
inclusion of everyone. Modern authoritarianisms do not need everyone. They can 
tolerate a certain amount of indifference, and even pluralism. In addition, they 
shift their mode of legitimation from the mobilization and participation of the 
entire population to the inclusion of everyone in the outputs of political processes. 
It is this legitimation via outputs and inclusion in outputs that is very character-
istic of modern authoritarianism. In other words, in the case of modern author-
itarianism, while access to performance roles remains largely restricted, there is 
equalized inclusion in observer/public roles (for example, as receivers of welfare 
benefits), which makes the inclusion imperative institutionalized in modern soci-
ety visible once again.
Populist political inclusion
A fourth type of political regime, one that falls between democracy and autocracy, 
is populism. This is the remarkable case of a temporary (not permanent) political 
regime that claims to be based on the populus – which is undoubtedly a collectivity. 
All members of the populus are bearers of an observer/public role. However, the 
emphasis is not on the diversity or microdiversity of the individuals included, but 
rather the commonalities that unify the populus, making it a collective entity. At 
the head of this collective entity are populist leaders who claim to effect a direct 
and complete representation of the will (‘conscience collective’ in the Durkheim-
ian understanding) of the populus. Given that populism is, for the most part, an 
anti-elite political system, one of its notable features is that it is a political regime 
without a very pronounced need for performance roles. In this respect populism 
is a kind of inversion of aristocracy.3
Collective inclusion in democratic and authoritarian systems
In a functionally differentiated society, the function of the political system is the 
production of collectively binding decisions. The political system can claim socie-
tal primacy for decision-making that is collectively binding. These decisions made 
by a political system distinguish among values and regard the distribution of re-
sources.
3  Cf. on populism Ch. 6.
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In this functional description of the political system there is no prejudice re-
garding the form of government or the form of political regime implied. The func-
tional characterization is compatible with autocracies, democracies, monarchies, 
aristocracies and other government and regime types as long as they reliably pro-
duce collectively binding decisions. But one must know the constitution of the 
collectivity that is supposed to be bound by these collective decisions. How does 
the collectivity come about? What does its internal social structure look like? Why 
and how long does it accept the decisions that are produced? And what does ‘ac-
ceptance’ mean?
Societal modernity is rooted in a fundamental transformation of the collectiv-
ities on which political systems are based. A person is no longer a member of the 
respective political collectivity via inclusion in the estates and strata of pre-mod-
ern (European) society. It is no longer membership in social categories (nobility, 
peasantry, bourgeoisie, clergy) that guarantees inclusion in the political system. 
Instead membership is based on individuality, which means it is based on a par-
adoxical property: Individuality is something everyone shares with everyone else 
as all humans are individuals and no exceptions are imaginable. However, indi-
viduality distinguishes every individual from all other individuals, each of whom 
realizes their individuality in a different way and must be different as an indi-
vidual in order to be an individual at all (Ghosh 2013). This paradoxical structure 
of individuality seems to guarantee both the unity and the internal diversity of a 
political system and it generates these two effects via the same institution: the in-
dividual as a core institution of modernity (Dumont 1987; Parsons 2007). Similar 
structures arise in all the other function systems of modernity (education, science, 
economy, religion). These function systems are all based on the inclusion of indi-
viduals, and each one has a completely different take on individuals.
Political systems invent new terms or redefine old terms to describe them-
selves as an inclusive collectivity of individuals: The ‘people’ and the ‘nation’ are 
the most prominent of these terms. Both are concepts that refer to collectivities 
that may include a significant number of individuals, even millions of individuals, 
and neither term directs attention to any social structure internal to the collectiv-
ity. What distinguishes the two semantics in a first approximation is that ‘people’ 
is more clearly dominated by political connotations, although it is not devoid of 
references to other social domains. In the case of ‘nation’, the political, cultural 
and ethnic implications of the term have approximately equal weight.
Both terms are egalitarian and as such they formulate a semantics of inclusion. 
All individuals are part of the people and part of the nation. However, both terms 
are not necessarily tied to democracy. They can become prominent, decisive terms 
in either a monarchy or an authoritarian system. It is possible for the individual 
governing the collectivity to say: “This is my people, this is my nation”. The promi-
nence of these two terms reveals the shared semantic basis of modern democracy 
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and modern authoritarianism. Both types of regimes typically claim to be based 
on an inclusively interpreted collectivity. In the case of democracies this takes the 
form of self-government by the people, while in monarchical/authoritarian sys-
tems it will be understood as government for the people, for the welfare of the 
people, and in the best interest of the people, all of which are indirect forms of the 
representation of the people and the nation. The study of these forms is the study 
of authoritarianism in modernity.
Contemporary political systems have a bipolar structure that includes, on 
the one hand, the individualizing of inclusion in the political system, and on the 
other hand, the different collectivities to which all included individuals belong. 
Democracies typically focus on the individual pole of this bipolar structure and 
emphasize the individual exercise of participation in political processes, whereas 
autocracies accentuate the collectivity that is the context for the belongingness of 
individuals, and focus on exercising authority in the name of the collectivity. In 
autocracies there is someone outside the collectivity who has authority over the 
collectivity (a hereditary monarch, an irreplaceable party, a charismatic personal-
ity with innate qualities, a cleric from a religious role structure, a military person). 
In democracies any leadership roles are derived solely from the self-organization 
of the collectivity as a collection of individuals. There is no individual in the collec-
tivity who could not, in principle, take on the most powerful political roles in the 
political system. In other words: both regime types realize the complete inclusion 
of all members of society in some possibilities and roles of participation in the 
political system (‘public roles’). Only in democracies there is a complete inclusion 
of everyone, even in the possibility of taking the highest political offices in govern-
ment (‘performance roles’) (Stichweh 2016a).
It is instructive to look a bit more closely at differences between ‘people’ and 
‘nation’ as the two major terms for the modern political collectivity based on inclu-
sion. From the perspective of a theory of inclusion, ‘people’ signifies an inclusion 
from below. People were originally the ordinary, simple people who had no claim 
at all to a privileged place in society. If, in the current times, ‘people’ becomes a 
universal term that includes everyone into ‘the people’, this means the inclusion 
of the higher strata in a collectivity to which for centuries they did not want to 
belong. With ‘nation’ a shift in the opposite direction occurs. The original usage 
of ‘nation’ primarily meant the higher strata of society, as in ‘Holy Roman Empire 
of the German Nation’ where clearly the ‘Nation’ referred only to those who were 
the politically independent estates of the empire. In this case inclusion is from 
above. The concept of the nation expands and ever more people from ever more 
social strata and stations become part of the nation, and finally the idea of the na-
tion becomes a kind of political program that seeks to include ever more persons, 
for example by ‘national education’, which has established itself as a Europe-wide 
program since approximately 1770 (Schriewer and Caruso 2005).
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Another dimension of the distinction is related to scope. ‘Nation’ is the more 
global of the two semantics. Inclusion in the nation is the inclusion of regions, 
provinces and other smaller groups and units in an encompassing concept of the 
nation. Eugen Weber’s well-known formula “Peasants into Frenchmen” (Weber 
1976) is a good illustration of this. Another interesting variant is ‘National People’s 
Congress’ (People’s Republic of China), a formula in which ‘people’ establishes the 
universality of the inclusion of everyone and ‘nation’ adds the global extension of 
inclusion to all regions of the respective country.
To speak of ‘the people’ or simply ‘people’ does not refer to transregional or 
global circumstances but is more closely tied to locality and local circumstances. 
Martin Luther’s famous “dem Volk aufs Maul schauen” (“to listen to what people 
really say”) (Luther, Sendbrief vom Dolmetschen 1530 in Luther 2012) contains 
both meanings discussed here: to listen to simple people and to observe local vari-
ants.
A last difference is related to exclusion. The two core concepts for the modern 
political collectivity (or ‘community’), ‘people’ and ‘nation’, are both clearly cou-
pled not only to ideas of inclusion (mainly the complete inclusion of all individuals) 
but also to ideas of exclusion. There is again an asymmetry. In the case of ‘people’ 
exclusion is comparatively rare. A person can become an ‘enemy’ of the people or 
can be a ‘stranger’ to the people. In the latter case he or she probably belongs to an-
other people. This once more affirms that ‘people’ is a strongly inclusive term that 
is observed in many variants such as ‘People’s democracy’ (‘Volksdemokratie’), 
which is a tautology because ‘demos’, too, means people). Regarding ‘nation’, ex-
clusions are much more likely. In a political system (democratic or autocratic) it 
may be declared that certain groups do no longer belong to the nation – and this 
may result in variants of political exclusion.
III. Internal differentiation of political systems    
 and the diversification of inclusion
Internal Differentiation of Political Systems
As is true for all function systems in modern society, the historical dynamics of 
political systems is characterized primarily by ongoing internal differentiation. 
Between 1750 and 1800, most European states and the emerging United States 
had no elections, only a small number of ministries with a limited bureaucratic 
staff, only very few embassies in other states, no political parties, no politically 
relevant mass media or no mass media at all, no social movements (although there 
have always been petitions and rebellions), no labor organizations or movements 
or other organized interests (besides some organized groups of artisans), almost 
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no state-based welfare institutions, and no technical and organizational means to 
contribute to and observe public opinion.
From this perspective, states in the second half of the 18th century were rel-
atively small-scale phenomena with little institutional differentiation. They did 
not constitute an autonomous function system of society with a complex internal 
differentiation of its own. Instead they were based in the stratified orders of pre-
modern society and were instruments by which the dominant strata – in Europe 
mainly the aristocracy and the clergy and some other groups based in property 
(landowners) or learning (lawyers) or control of violence (military people), most 
of whom were aristocrats ‒ exercised their prerogative to dominate all the other 
groups in society.
From this point of view premodern states can be understood as structures 
that balance the claims and prerogatives of the dominant societal groups.  Mod-
ern states are, for the first time, autonomous function systems in society that do 
not consist of groups and power balances among these groups, but rather con-
sist of institutions, the ongoing differentiation of institutions, the attribution of 
responsibilities to institutions, and the creation of checks and balances of power 
among these institutions. The state as a function system in society emerges as a 
new system, which did not exist in premodern Europe, by enacting the internal 
functional differentiation of the institutions that constitute it.
Inclusion and the Internal Differentiation of Political Systems
The internal differentiation of political systems is relevant to the understanding 
and historical development of political inclusion. Until now this paper has fo-
cused on the duality of inclusion roles (performance roles vs. observer roles) and 
the forms of collective inclusion. However, as soon as the internal differentiation 
of polities is seriously considered, the inclusion picture becomes more complex. 
There are now a multiplicity of roles for political inclusion. The duality of roles is 
relevant to some of these roles and not relevant to others.  The internal complexity 
of the modern state becomes visible in the emerging complexity of inclusion roles.
First, citizenship is the elementary membership role that demonstrates that 
the modern state (unlike all other function systems) is an organization or consists 
of organizations and is therefore based in membership. Citizenship is not a dual 
or split role. It seems simple: a person is either a citizen (inclusion) or a non-citizen 
(exclusion). If an individual is not a citizen of any nation (‘statelessness’) this indi-
vidual is excluded from the political system of world society. The picture becomes 
more complicated with the emergence of plural citizenship (which accentuates the 
differentiation of individuals and states, and allows individuals to become some-
what independent from states) as well as with the return or emergence of ‘deni-
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zenship’ (Zolberg 2000), i.e. having multiple institutions of residence (each with 
different packages of rights and obligations).
The next relevant context of inclusion that is added in the modern state com-
prises elections and voting rights. In medieval and early modern Europe there 
were some elections, e.g. sometimes for kings, but voting rights were strictly lim-
ited to the highest ranks in the stratification of estates. Modern republican ‒ and 
after some decades democratized ‒ states, were primarily characterized by the 
rise of elections and the long-term expansion of voting rights. Into elections is 
traditionally built the dual structure of inclusion. There are electors or voters and 
there are those who are via elections chosen for performance roles. The related 
rights are called ‘active’ and ‘passive’ voting rights and the so-called passive rights 
enable the more active political participation via performance roles. In addition 
to the implementation of this role structure, it becomes important that elections 
are competitive, i.e. that there are alternatives between which electors can choose 
and that these choices are real choices for electors. If this is not the case ‒ if in a 
non-competitive election voters have no choice ‒ elections only affirm an asym-
metrical dependency. Even in this case, participation in an election implies an 
act of inclusion, but it is an involuntary inclusion in structures of authoritarian 
control. Elections in the so-called ‘people’s democracies’ in the former communist 
world are a good illustration of this.
In the early republican-democratic regimes there were generally no parties, 
parties were even perceived as illegitimate because they were seen as the orga-
nization of partial interests, which conf licted with an orientation towards the 
commonweal. But without parties it would have been difficult for states to tran-
scend a local level of political organization. At the local level individuals can vote 
for people they know personally. However, when elections are organized at the 
regional or national level, individuals must vote for parties, which substitute a 
multiplicity of political (party) programs among which individuals choose for the 
particularity of persons who cannot be sufficiently known on a national level. As 
soon as there are parties in a political system a new form of political inclusion 
is added. Citizens can now become a member of one of the political parties, and 
by being a party member can increase their opportunities for political inf luence. 
Party membership is an organizational inclusion role that is ambiguous regarding 
the difference between public and performance roles. In one respect individual 
party members become participants in events and elections that may be decisive 
in a political system (for example, in the summer 2019 in the United Kingdom, 
120.000 members of the Conservative Party, or 0.18% of the population, chose the 
next prime minister of the United Kingdom). In other respects, party membership, 
in principle, makes any performance role in a political system accessible to any 
party member.
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Additional core structures of any political system include the public admin-
istration and the judiciary and other expert organizations. Each of these struc-
tures can be perceived and institutionalized in different ways. They are, in one 
respect, service organizations of the political system (and, potentially and si-
multaneously, of other function systems) that are staffed by professional experts 
whose expertise is separate from political opinions and interests. Insofar as this 
is the case, staffing these organizations has nothing to do with political inclusion 
but is based solely on professional education and expertise. Of course, there are 
inclusion aspects even then, although these may relate to other function systems 
in society (higher education, law etc.). However, from another perspective (and 
these two opposite perspectives may be compatible), the staffing of these roles 
can be – at least partially – perceived as acts of political inclusion. In this case, 
elections and other selection procedures that guide the staffing of these positions 
will be institutionalized as selection processes based in political choices (selec-
tion from a limited population of qualified professional experts). The selection of 
judges for the ‘US Supreme Court’ or the German ‘Bundesverfassungsgericht’ are 
pertinent examples of this. In other cases there may even be popular votes, elec-
tions in which all electors of a political system participate, as is the case for some 
judicial positions in the United States.
A second aspect – still referring to public administration and other expert or-
ganizations – pertains to collective inclusion. From the perspective of a political 
system it may be important to ensure that a representative number of people from 
certain social groups have access to professional positions in the respective orga-
nizations. This type of representation articulates collective inclusion; the groups 
included may be regional communities, linguistic or ethnic communities or other 
subcommunities of the people/nation of the respective state. The Indian public 
service setting quota for members of scheduled tribes and lower castes illustrates 
this type of collective inclusion, as do other forms of political affirmative action.
There is a third aspect of political inclusion in administration and expert orga-
nizations. Everyone – including those who would never compete for professional 
roles – has access to these organizations as much as they involve the individu-
al’s interests. The affected individual must be able to address the organizations, 
petition them, get answers from them, and litigate against them. This necessity 
demonstrates that there is a political public of administration and expert orga-
nizations that includes everyone who is a member of the respective political com-
munity.
Another central organization in every state is the military. In premodern 
societies the military organization was often nearly identical to the state (cf. on 
Sweden Scott 1988, esp. Chapter VII-VIII), and the leadership of the military was 
entrusted to the dominant estate, i.e. to the aristocracy. This is what aristocrats 
were supposed to be able to do: lead incessant wars, to defend and expand their re-
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spective countries. Normal soldiers were often foreigners, i.e. mercenaries, slaves 
or foreign settler populations (e.g. Cossacks, Kollmann 2017). These foreigners 
were often offered a kind of political inclusion (citizenship, landownership) as 
long-term payment for their service. In modern political systems it is exactly the 
other way around. Political inclusion is not a reward for military service; rather, 
military service is one or even ‘the’ core obligation for those, who, as citizens, are 
included in the political system. This obligatory military service has disappeared 
in many modern states. The military has become an organization of military pro-
fessionals. This raises another question: Can all societal groups enter the military 
(e.g. LGBTI-people)? Once more this problematic may regard foreigners who once 
again exchange military service for later political inclusion.
A remarkable invention of recent political systems are social movements. For 
the most part they are not organizations. Instead, they are based on the modern 
principle of ‘free association’ (Parsons 1971) and as such demonstrate the f lexi-
bility of political inclusion in liberal democracies. Interests that are not included 
in the several ways described above, or feel insufficiently included, can form a 
social movement. In addition, the principle of social movements can be inverted, 
becoming mass mobilization from above and taking the form of centrally admin-
istered campaigns. This pattern is characteristic of authoritarian systems, espe-
cially authoritarian regimes emerging after a populist takeover.
Social movements were made possible by an invention that is highly defining 
for modernity: the Public Sphere (Habermas 1962; Stichweh 2007). The invention 
of the public sphere demanded the development of mass media, first newspapers 
with regional as well as national distributions, and later the whole range of com-
munication media of modernity. The most important step was the transformation 
from an interactional, conversational concept of the public sphere that was mostly 
based on the limited inclusion of a few well-educated people to a global concept 
of Public Opinion that is not local but is rather vast, global, impersonal and fun-
damentally democratic (Wood 2009, p. 311). Public opinion is no longer an elite 
consensus worked out via conversation. Now it is really “the people’s opinion, and 
it could be trusted because no one controlled it and everyone contributed to it.” (Wood 
a.a.O.). Public opinion is based on neither individual inclusion, nor collective in-
clusion but rather on the inclusion of microdiverse, extensive populations.
Input Inclusion and Output Inclusion: 
The Internal and External Growth of Modern States
The modern state based on the differentiation of institutions and the differentia-
tion of levels of government is a state that derives its legitimacy from an increas-
ing plurality of outputs, performances and services. This development highlights 
a final form of political inclusion. All the forms of inclusion discussed thus far 
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are mainly forms of inclusion that regard the inputs to political processes and the 
structural possibilities of individuals and collectivities to shape the inputs to po-
litical processes. But looking at the state as primarily a producer of outputs, per-
formances, and services reveals another perspective. There arises a complementa-
ry form of inclusion that should be called output inclusion (Stichweh 1998). This is 
not something new; indeed, it is probably older than the focus on input inclusion, 
which only occurred with the rise of republicanism and democracy beginning 
in the eighteenth-century world. Before this focus emerged, states had always 
sought the sources of their legitimacy and stability in the outputs (performances, 
services) they were able to produce for their constituents who were still considered 
as subjects and who only in modernity are perceived as citizens.
Finally, one further twist has arisen in modern society. The emergence of citi-
zenship and the enormous internal differentiation of the modern state generates 
the many new forms of input inclusion analyzed here. Parallel to this, the dis-
tinction between input inclusion and output inclusion becomes visible as a very 
relevant distinction that may be helpful in analyzing differences between political 
regimes (e.g., authoritarian regimes likely prefer output inclusion), and in iden-
tifying differences between populations living within the territory of the same 
state. The new reality of ever-widening input inclusions is primarily describing 
the expansion of rights accruing to citizens and often only to them. At the same 
time, in a rapidly globalizing world ever-new populations of denizens and resi-
dents emerge. For these groups, a certain prevalence of and preference for output 
inclusions, which are the only inclusions they are usually granted, is one of the 
main factors that motivates their actions and shapes their lifestyles in a global 
world in which they often cannot live in the states of which they are citizens. That 
is, the genesis of the modern state can be described as the parallel and concurrent 
emergence of ever-new forms of input inclusion and ever-new forms of output in-
clusion. In other words, one has to say: the genesis of the state is a combination 
of internal growth, i.e. the differentiation and multiplication of inclusion roles, 
with external growth, i.e. the differentiation and multiplication of societal fields 
to which the state contributes outputs.
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2. The Rise of Complexity:     
 Internal Differentiation of Political Systems 
Anna L. Ahlers
Introduction
The previous chapter described the evolution of the political system and of individ-
uality as the guiding principle for the emergence of democracy – the embodiment 
of the imperative to include the individual in the political system. In this chapter, 
we take a closer look at how these and other developments are linked to political 
systems’ milieu intérieur. A political system – and thereby the whole population of 
political systems – adjusts to the dynamics of modern society and the challenge 
to hold ready collectively binding decision-making capacities by constant inter-
nal functional differentiation. This multifaceted and continuing internal differ-
entiation over time, and, as a result of it, the rise of the enormous complexity of 
modern polities, are the focus of this chapter. To facilitate a detailed analysis and 
attain the research interests pursued in this book, we make a heuristic distinc-
tion between two dimensions of internal functional differentiation of political 
systems – vertical and horizontal – and we study these dimensions separately, to 
the extent possible. 
The first dimension we examine is the emergence of vertical levels of decision 
making in a political system. Traditionally, polities – from small city states to 
hegemonic empires – have featured levels that vary greatly in size, number, and 
complexity, from simple to multilevel structures. Various types of polities and 
divergent ways of internally organizing these polities have co-existed over the 
course of pre- and early modern world history. However, since the establishment 
of the Westphalian international order in the 17th century and, at the latest, in 
the aftermath of the two world wars in the 20th century, countries (often nation 
states) have come to represent the dominant form of global political segmenta-
tion (Meyer et al., 1997). In the process, the polities in the current world society 
have come to look intriguingly similar. Countries are now the standard notion of 
a modern polity and they constitute the most crucial ordering unit in the popula-
tion of political systems in modern world society. Comparative analyses of polit-
ical systems, therefore, usually focus on countries’ characteristics as represented 
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by the properties of their state organization at the national level, an organization 
that emerged to represent the political system’s decision-making organization 
and core self-conceptualization (Luhmann, 1995). However, to grasp modern po-
litical systems in all their complexity, it is not sufficient to study the nation-state 
level alone. Indeed, multiple other levels are relevant for collectively binding deci-
sion making, from local communities to global governance, and these levels must 
be integrated into both the study of political differentiation in general and com-
parative analyses in particular and over time. Therefore, the first half of this chap-
ter brief ly traces the evolution of forms of multiple levels of political rule before 
concentrating on an analysis of the multilevel differentiation of polities found in 
contemporary world society. The text then reviews the common structure and 
(inter)relations of government and governance at different levels and discusses 
recent trends of decentralization that now compete with the formerly sacrosanct 
status of country-level polity formation. 
Notably, with regard to vertical level structures, today’s world displays a re-
markable continuity or path-dependence. Whereas segmentation at the country 
level, as well as attempts at supra-level decision-making structures, is a rather 
new and sometimes forced phenomenon that often results in artificial and rather 
unstable ordering units, smaller-scale (i.e., regional and local) segmentation is a 
much more sustainable phenomenon that is hardly ever altered at a later point, 
even under conditions of regime change or revolution. We discuss both how this 
pattern may explain the existence of a dichotomous plurality of political regime 
characteristics within a single polity, and why this may further justify, heuristi-
cally and analytically, regarding vertical differentiation as (sub)system building 
per se. We opt to treat these all as empirical questions and we discuss why and 
how we do so. 
The second dimension of internal differentiation the chapter explores is the 
horizontal differentiation of political systems into functional subsystems, institu-
tions, and organizations. Beyond what is understood as “the state”, which compris-
es institutions of ultimate decision making at a given level of the polity, there are 
many additional elements constitutive of a political system. These elements in-
clude, for instance, the internal structures of the modern state, most prominently 
government, including political leadership roles, ministries and parliaments, and 
administration across different levels, but also organizations, such as parties, mass 
organizations, and lobby groups; crucial political processes, such as elections and 
diplomacy; and forms of a political public from which a public opinion is derived 
and channeled into political decision making. We brief ly discuss some of these 
constitutive elements of modern political systems and highlight some striking ex-
amples of their ongoing differentiation and other recent dynamics affecting them. 
Our examination of horizontal differentiation produces several significant 
findings: Modern political systems in today’s world society, both democratic and 
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authoritarian variants, adhere to a basic global set of subsystems and institutions, 
a specific semantics, a repertoire of procedures and symbols, and formal inclusion 
roles. Arguably, this similarity developed and continues to develop in coevolution 
with vertical differentiation, although horizontal differentiation appears to be 
the more dynamic variant. Moreover, while the convergence of polity properties 
is noteworthy in and of itself, it also seems to generate further challenges. Over 
the course of internal differentiation of political systems during the last century, 
a double conceptualization and semantics of democracy emerged: The political 
system in modern society with all its internal horizontal differentiation came to 
be treated as equivalent to democracy and has been termed democracy. At the 
same time, given the evolution and resilience of modern autocracies that are also 
grounded on an adherence to forms of functional differentiation, democracy has 
become a regime type, implying the degree of differentiation and the values that 
steer political decision making in a polity – an aspect discussed in more detail 
in Chapter 6. We refer to this convolution of converging differentiation and di-
verging regime characteristics in our description of the contemporary internal 
properties of political systems and we discuss how this complex relationship can 
inspire future in-depth empirical research. Finally, some very new pathways of 
horizontal differentiation emerge in the 21st century, which seem to already have 
a tangible impact on the constitution of political subsystems, organizations, in-
stitutions and processes and on how political decisions are made. These pathways 
include, for example, the increased internationalization of political organizations 
and their activities, the virtualization of public opinion, and the jolting of tradi-
tional party systems by new expectations and a global wave of populism. 
The theoretical focus in this chapter lies in the observations and resulting hy-
pothesis mentioned above, namely, that we find globally reproduced (i.e., stan-
dard) and ongoing forms of internal differentiation and related semantics of 
the political system and that, arguably, these patterns of rising complexity are 
in the first instance widely independent of regime types, which can range from 
democracy to authoritarianism. One natural caveat to this conclusion is that the 
existence of multiple levels of decision making and a specific set of political insti-
tutions, organizations and other features in the world today does not necessari-
ly represent true functional equivalence, or the global diffusion of institutional 
models (Stichweh, 2000), but rather might be a type of irrelevant nominal or for-
mal copying. Thus, in addition to describing the internal differentiation of politi-
cal systems, the chapter incorporates analyses of the degree of autonomy of deci-
sion making as well as the available inclusion roles (performance and public roles 
as introduced in the previous chapter) and the access to these roles at the different 
levels and in the different domains of the political system. Altogether, this chapter 
contends that the existence of differential inclusion roles at different levels and in 
different subsystems of the political system increases the chances of the co-exis-
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tence of diverging forms of inclusion (and exclusion) and bipolar regime features, 
democratic and authoritarian, in one and the same polity – an observation that 
Chapter 6 will take up again. While this is not a new phenomenon, it seems that 
a modern, functionally differentiated society and – maybe counter-intuitively – 
the persistent internal differentiation of the modern political system make this 
coexistence more likely. 
I. Pre-modern Polities: Unique, Stratified, Unintegrated 
Before we turn to the vertical and horizontal differentiation of the political system 
in two separate approaches, some brief deliberation about the evolution of poli-
ties over the course of pre-modern history seems warranted. The previous chap-
ter explicated the evolution of the political system as a function system in society. 
Here, we provide a short overview of the major features of yet “un(der)differen-
tiated” polities. This is, by necessity, an extremely general and abstract depiction 
that does not claim to be either exhaustive or valid for all possible cases and the 
whole variety of polities in ancient and pre-modern history. For example, we do 
not provide an accurate and comprehensive explanation of the history of (nation) 
state building;1 neither does this section discuss different types of government 
or regimes (e.g., monarchies or republics), which are touched upon later in this 
chapter, and again in Chapter 6. This brief analytical synopsis is rather meant to 
substantiate the argument that the evolution of the system of nation states, which 
became the principal idea of a modern polity and the common self-conception of 
the organization of political systems in contemporary world society, was a dra-
matic development that is immediately relevant for many of the other analytical 
observations that form the core topics of this chapter. 
1  Even the concept of the state itself remains highly amorphous and contested in the social sciences. 
Some claim the concept is analytically applicable to all forms of the organization of rule in a po-
lity that are somewhat more complex than ancient chiefdoms, while others apply it more strictly 
to the increasing self-conceptualization of the organization of rule and especially the monopoly 
of the legitimate use of physical force that emerged in the Middle Ages and underwent signifi-
cant transformations in the following centuries; see the reflections of Durkheim, for instance, as 
edited by Giddens, 1986, and also Elias, 2000; Mann, 2012. The same contestation exists for the 
term “nation state” and its suitability for describing the development and type of polities that 
exist today. Tilly (e.g., 1975), for instance, introduced the dif ferences between national states and 
nation-states. Here, however, as the intricacies and explanation of state building are not our main 
interest, we use the more common terms “nation state” and “country” to denote the predominant 
type of polity in world society in the last 400 years and especially the last approximately 75 years.
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The diverse populations of traditional polities 
Historically, there were large differences between polities. In pre-modern times, 
there was no standard size and form of polity: Everything and everyone rulers 
had the means to claim and defend, by, for instance, the extortion of material or 
religious/civilizational power or marriage, belonged to their sphere of reign. Prin-
ciples of rule by domination over subjects and over territory co-existed and often 
overlapped. In fact, absent universal principles of law and integrity, the concept 
of sovereignty did not yet exist, and expansion as well as loss of territory and peo-
ple was always possible. The size of a polity was therefore f lexible and units var-
ied greatly, while in addition, for ages, small city states could coexist with a huge 
trans-regional empire in the same or another region of the world. Even un-ruled 
or unruly “gray areas” in-between were a possibility. At the same time, rule over 
a given polity conf lated several functions; there was no functionally differentiat-
ed political system. States were rather a system of all-out domination by a ruling 
group in one society, which was usually small and exclusively defined, by, for ex-
ample, religion and divinity, nobility, charisma or ethnicity. 
With the possible exception of ancient city states, patterns of political rule 
were the most important bearer of the stratified order of society: The hierarchy 
of authority – including the whole state’s administration – ref lected the social 
stratification of the time, and vice versa. In a monarchy or empire, for instance, 
the king or emperor was at the top of this imagined pyramid and represented the 
richest, most knowledgeable, best trained (in law or religion, for instance), most 
advanced and cultivated element in society. The ruler assembled only a small 
“state” of almost equally equipped persons, mostly high aristocracy, who filled the 
most important offices, possessed the most land and other valuables and had the 
most privileges. At the lowest level of the social hierarchy were peasants, individ-
ual households and slaves or other unfree labor. The latter were usually in no way 
an imagined part of or had any direct links to the state (see below). Social and eco-
nomic or religious status and state offices were intrinsically connected and often 
interdependent in pre-modern states. In Europe, these structures prevail until 
the early 20th century, and some would argue that in other world regions, espe-
cially in authoritarian settings, the situation has still not changed (Wimmer, 1996, 
Ch. 7; Brennan, 2015; Geertz, 1963, pp. 105-157; Luhmann, 1991; 1997, pp. 678-706). 
This meant also that the authority and “responsibility” these rulers claimed 
over their jurisdictions was usually considered absolute, but could range in de-
gree, from very little or no duty and sometimes even outright predation, to the 
organization of rites, markets, security, and later public welfare. Other issues that 
a pre-modern polity was occupied with – often conf lating the domains of reli-
gion, economy, general public order, and others – included, for instance, taxa-
tion (spontaneous or regular), organization of labor (partial or full; slavery, feudal 
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structures, etc.), weapons and military, monopolies (such as salt, grain, alcohol, 
or later money [coinage]), roads and waterways. Altogether, before the establish-
ment of representative politics and public law, this set of issues, i.e. the subject 
matter a ruler or a state felt responsible for, was surprisingly limited and relatively 
stable over time and across geographical areas – even across world regions. 
Internally, the way that pre-modern polities were structured varied greatly as 
well. Some, especially ancient smaller polities such as segmentary and early strat-
ified societies (i.e., tribes, chiefdoms, early feudal states), as mentioned, could 
have a rather simple hierarchical structure, often comprising basically one level 
of uni-centric rule and decision making, representing a simple binary relation-
ship, i.e., rulers and ruled, center and periphery. Domination was rarely incurred 
voluntarily, and rather was established and upheld by violent and f lexible, even 
arbitrary, top-down interventions implemented by an unsystematic array of local 
agents and/or an army, or, as the size of the polity increased, princes or non-kin 
wardens and later governors and other types of proxy rulers. In other cases, poli-
ties, often in larger territories, had several levels of rule and a sophisticated struc-
ture of institutions and offices. These structures, however, could take on different 
characteristics: They could be rather f lexible, as in the kinship- or nobility-based 
personal union states of the early Middle Ages (Stammesherzogtümer; Personen-
verbandstaat), in which case a ruler’s reach extended as far as there were vicege-
rents upholding the rule; they could be relatively static and spatially defined, as 
in the Chinese empire (especially in the form of its vast bureaucracy stretching 
across its entire realm2); or they could fall somewhere in between, like the Ro-
man Empire or European feudal states in the late Middle Ages. That is, at least 
some pre-modern states already featured a differentiated structure of social stra-
ta interrelated with a complex system of political offices, a difficile law code im-
plemented by highly trained elites, and a system of government with a structure 
of ministries and offices and complex bodies of administration (Durkheim, 1964; 
Ertman, 1997; Parsons, 1977; Stichweh, 1991; see also the latter half of this chapter). 
However, internal differentiation was not systemic in these earlier variants 
of states. The limited differentiation just described was usually only observable 
at the center, in other words, at the highest level of rule and government, and was 
not projected downward. At lower levels in the government hierarchy, the state’s 
complexity was usually not replicated, rather, power and decisions were simply 
extended. Most often, what unfolded at lower levels of traditional government or 
in peripheral provinces entailed something more like a decentral exertion of the 
2  This bureaucracy was coupled however with a system of tributary relations and suzerain peri-
pheral entities, which enabled the Chinese court to establish quasi-domination over external 
communities and to reap the material benefits connected to this influence, without having to 
conquer, claim and defend these communities territorially; see, for example, Gernet, 1996.
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center’s power than a differentiated or even autonomous decision-making pro-
cess. Of course, some decisions were made “locally” and some of those that came 
in the form of top-down mandates were adjusted to conditions on the ground, but 
there was rarely any equivalent to the framework of legally defined intergovern-
mental or multilevel relations that exist today. One could object that in earlier and 
later forms of empires and federations, for instance even in the Roman Empire, 
under conditions of less unitary rule, subaltern units were sometimes only loosely 
connected to the ultimate center of power. As long as obligations were fulfilled 
(mostly taxes and military duties) and no secessionist activities were entertained, 
decentral and peripheral units possessed significant discretion or self-govern-
ment over their own local affairs. While that is a valid qualification, this type of 
internal ordering is still very different from a completely formally institutional-
ized and constitutional arrangement in which almost all aspects of political re-
lations between different levels of government are regulated and meant to both 
avoid conf licting responsibilities and safeguard equality and peace between the 
governmental subdivisions and among all citizens. Even when constitutions ex-
isted in pre-modern polities, they usually meant the codified law of the land that 
prescribed some sort of social morality and governed rights and obligations in the 
relationships between the ruler and the ruled/the population, the relationships 
among the ruled themselves, and – for instance, at the earliest, in the case of the 
Roman law of nations – the relationships between polities (e.g., laws of war and 
peace). In the later Middle Ages in Europe, with the rise of the territorial state, the 
reliance on “cooperation” between otherwise self-governed communes was shift-
ing to a more unitary reach of the central state throughout its entire jurisdiction 
on the basis of unified laws, norms and other regulations – with varying degrees 
of success (Landwehr, 2000). However, this was also very much based on the gov-
erning of interpersonal relationships (for instance, king – duke/governor – village 
community) and the aforementioned norms, rather than on multilevel gover-
nance. Even under conditions of early constitutional representative government, 
which embraced institutions of parliament and delineated relations between the 
heads of government, lords, and commons, for instance, these relationships were 
of a personalized nature, linking representatives of selective social strata and the 
regent. Under all these circumstances, it is difficult to identify a standard model 
of regulating the relationship between the central authority and political subdi-
visions, and of governing multilevel relations in pre-modern polities and states. 
Any that did exist followed widely different patterns. Systematic regulation of the 
relationship between different levels of decision making and between different 
branches of government was an early modern concept that arose only gradually 
with the birth of the international system in the late 17th century and the Enlight-
enment, ideas of individual political representation and modern constitutions in 
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the 18th century (Stollberg-Rillinger, 2000; Wormuth, 1949), and it was not univer-
sally applied before the post-imperial age in the 20th century. 
What and who is a polity? 
Closely linked to the above aspect and, arguably, more importantly, pre-modern 
states were not necessarily an integrated and essential element of the societies in 
which they were found. Thus, even within a somewhat defined polity, confined 
territorially or otherwise, the individual – although formally a subject of a cer-
tain ruler or government – was not necessarily in any way directly connected to 
the ruling patron. Although certain interactions and events may have made it un-
mistakably clear that the individual was in some sort of relationship with, was 
answerable to, or was bluntly subject to some authority, or even several compet-
ing authorities (e.g., “feudal anarchy” [Hintze, 1970]), theoretically, it could just 
as well be that these interactions or contacts never materialized. Full inclusion of 
every individual in the sphere of politics did not exist.3
Furthermore, the general principles governing who was a subject to which 
forms of rule varied enormously. In the majority of cases, especially in Europe-
an empires and kingdoms, this question was answered by referring to territorial 
principles: whoever stayed in a certain territory was subject to those who could 
claim a prerogative there. In other cases, such as the lands governed by Chinese 
imperial rulers until the intrusion of imperial powers in the late 19th century, rulers 
tolerated diverging or temporary loyalties and were more lenient toward “foreign 
subjects” on their soil. In the Chinese case, aliens were exempt from the absolute 
claim and reach of the court as long as they had no hostile intentions and did not 
destabilize the Chinese state (Gernet, 1996).   
Notions of universal membership did not exist in pre-modern states, or only 
very weakly so. The broadly defined question of whether membership in the sense 
of simply “belonging to” a polity (i.e., being under the authority of XYZ) was of pri-
mary importance at all, is interesting. Who counted? For a ruler or government, it 
was beneficial to know not only the extent and properties of the territory, but also 
the size of the population that fell under one’s authority, in other words, how many 
3  Since this is a very broad-brush description of phenomena across dif ferent epochs, it is at certain 
points necessary and revealing to state some caveats. For instance, Wimmer (1996) described 
graphically how in ancient city states (Sumerian, Egyptian and Greek, for instance), local temple 
bureaucracies “regulated almost all aspects of residents’ lives”, in that all means and all fruits 
of production were pooled by them and distributed again collectively. Bookkeeping related to 
all these details and all involved men was a crucial task of urban (public) administration. Later, 
however, in pre-modern empires, these structures and the pervasiveness of bureaucracies was 
limited to the center and never really reached all the peripheries, especially not rural areas, ac-
cording to Wimmer (1996, pp. 227-228, 291-292).  
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heads and, even more importantly, households belonged to it. The history of the 
census, as the institution embodying this act of counting, demonstrates the value 
of this information. While censuses were conducted almost everywhere, includ-
ing in the ancient city states, the Incan and Chinese empires, India and the Middle 
East,4 its early purposes seemed to be almost exclusively “economic’” – knowing 
how many subjects held what property and could be taxed accordingly or could be 
conscribed. Consequently, it is possible that only those relevant in these regards 
were counted. Later, with the development of public health, prosperity and wel-
fare as a goal of state action, and finally the rise of the idea of representative gov-
ernment, censuses were systematized and included more and more information 
about the surveyed individuals in order to define needs and constituencies.5 In 
earlier times, however, not every individual was counted, nor was there the idea 
of a single overall collectivity, equivalent with the exact sum of people under one’s 
authority. The public interest, if we accept a predecessor of this idea for pre-mod-
ern polities, was always abstract, was determined by the ruler or central authority, 
and did not usually require a collection of individualized bottom-up information.
Citizenship in a narrower sense, understood as membership that allowed for 
participation in political affairs, in other words decision making (such as referen-
da, senate/parliament elections, running for public offices), was a concept known 
and practiced to varying degrees in some traditional polities, mostly early “repub-
lics”, e.g. the smaller city states of ancient Greece and Rome. Later and in larger 
polities, the concept applied mostly to the population immediately surrounding 
a political center.6 However, this was not a common principle across all types of 
polities: One struggles, for instance, to find even faint traces of this ideas in (East) 
4  Censuses are even described in the Bible, but primarily as something suspicious and evil: In 1 
Chronicles 21, for instance, Satan incites David to conduct a census, and when he does, Israel is 
stricken by God in revenge. Interestingly, a distinction was made between “aliens” (2 Chronicles 
2:17) and “non-aliens” equivalent to “those who drew their sword”. This is not described for censu-
ses in other (real) contexts.  
5  Intriguingly, even in modern states where regular censuses are institutionalized, their underly-
ing rules and scope are a topic of fierce debate. See, for instance, the current massive conflict in 
the United States over the upcoming 2020 census and whether it is legitimate to include a “citi-
zenship” question. Time and time again throughout earlier and contemporary American history, 
it has been considered to be non-constitutional, as the constitution only requires that “all people” 
be counted. At the same time, the category “race” is no longer a highly contested issue in the 
United States. See, for example, Hobson, 2019; Michaelson, 2019.  
6  On ancient Greece and Rome (civitas), see Morris and Scheidel, 2009; Edwards and Woolf, 2003. 
There are no commonly shared and accepted concepts of citizen and citizenship in the social scien-
ces, as there are wide dif ferences between citizenship as an empirically observed phenomenon 
and citizenship as a normative notion; see Gosewinkel, 2001; Janoski and Compion, 2015. Besto-
wing and taking on the role of a citizen in a voluntarily organized political public (civil society), is 
not what is meant here, but the topic will be dealt with later in connection with horizontal dif fe-
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Asia (Loewe, 2006). Further, no matter how inclusively or universally these forms 
of codified citizenship were formulated and conceived of at the time, they (and the 
rights and obligations attached to them) usually still applied to only some, maybe 
most, but never all subjects or individuals in a given polity. Throughout history 
until quite recently, in addition to conditions such as being “free” (i.e., not a slave), 
a man, and an adult, we find prerequisites, such as military merits or land own-
ership, that served as a basis for citizenship (Wilsher, 1983). In a stratified society, 
given the already highly selective group of persons directly included in political 
affairs, these prerequisites further emphasize the non-universal nature of both 
membership in the polity and participation in or inf luence on decision making 
for the polity. 
Intriguingly, ascriptions and categories that later became the basis for “imag-
ined communities” that nation states rally around, such as ethnos or religion, did 
not serve as primary principles of inclusion or exclusion of individual members in 
most traditional polities.7 Rather, submission or allegiance – coerced or voluntary 
–  to the ruler(s) while on his or her turf, seemed to be the norm.8 Whereas this 
may not be true for all epochs and regions, and was probably most inconsistent 
in European and Middle Eastern history, this generalization may render the exis-
tence and self-conceptualization of large, diverse, multiethnic and multicultural, 
but relatively stable and long-lived political entities (Egypt, China, Arabia, Rome, 
and even Habsburg9) throughout history more comprehensible. One way of distin-
guishing this form of membership definition, or authority over political subjects, 
is via the use of the term “resident” or “denizen” instead of citizen. We will later 
see why this distinction may continue to make sense even in modern political sys-
tems. Thus, whereas this chapter is not primarily about citizenship in particular 
or about inclusion in general, this excursion is warranted as it will soon become 
clear why the internal differentiation of political systems and the change from 
rentiation. Neither is citizenship used here in the broad sense that today would denote a full set 
of legal rights, or “civil rights”.
7  This is not meant to gloss over the existence of brutal exclusion or expulsion from a social commu-
nity on the basis of religious af filiation, other crucial categories, or general public morale. Here, 
the focus is on the relationship of subjects/persons to a ruler/government of any kind.
8  In liberal political theory à la Locke, Rousseau, or Kant, this would be the “social contract”, in other 
words, a voluntary conceding of authority to a Leviathan for the goal of pursuing the common 
good, survival and reproduction. Even in Aristotelian logic, this type of agreement constituted 
the political community. How decisions were to be reached varied widely across these schools 
of governance, but the principles guiding who belonged to the community (beyond primary ca-
tegories such as gender or age) can arguably be said to have been more open for these theorists, 
before the dawn of the nation state era; see, for example, Treisman, 2007:
9  See, for instance, the interesting description of related dynamics in Austria-Hungary in von 
Hirschhausen, 2009. 
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subject to citizen, or in a broader sense, the emergence of the imperative of indi-
vidual (and equal) inclusion in the modern polity, are intrinsically linked.      
Altogether, this brief historical summary highlights the wide variety of forms 
of polities, which are vastly different and relatively f luid in size and internal orga-
nization. In the absence of an identifiable, sufficiently differentiated political sys-
tem, what was decided upon, how binding these decisions were, and where and 
to whom they were applied were not only often contested in the polity itself, but 
also must be answered completely differently for each polity, when compared dia-
chronically and synchronically in retrospect. Even more interestingly, the chang-
es that occurred with the transition to modernity gradually led to more similarity 
and even standardization of the answers to the questions of what is decided upon, at 
which levels, and for whom in a polity.10 These shifts are usually thought to be most 
clearly represented by the establishment of the international structure of coun-
try-level states, most often nation states, and the following section will again em-
phasize why. However, we also show that ordering the world into relatively stan-
dard units of polities that, in general, feature similar internal constitutions and 
establish basic rules for conduct between them does not come close to ref lecting 
all these changes. Indeed, the characteristics that constitute the modern political 
system extend well beyond these features, and it is both interesting and beneficial 
to explore these characteristics by analyzing internal differentiation in both the 
vertical and the horizontal dimension, as we do now. At the same time, this brief 
historical sketch is worth keeping in mind, as there may be interesting residuals 
of traditional polities and forms of authority and decision making even in today’s 
political systems that may inform our discussion of political regime differences 
at a later point.
II.	 Vertical	Levels	of	Decision	Making	in	the	Political	System
Initial observations: Today’s world of countries — an amazing convergence
One of the main phenomena described in the previous section is that one is hardly 
able to identify standard forms of polities and standard ways of organizing au-
thority within a polity in pre-modern societies. With the rise of a functionally dif-
ferentiated society and the inclusion revolution of modernity (Stichweh, 2016a), 
this scenario changes completely. It seems that there is now a common form of 
ongoing vertical functional differentiation that constitutes the modern political 
system, which we describe in the following sections. We use the term “vertical dif-
ferentiation” to describe the ongoing creation of a plurality of levels of collectively 
binding decision making. We are not interested in providing an exact explanation 
10  The questions “by whom” and “how” will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 6. 
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of the break between pre-modern and modern polities and the evolution of a func-
tionally differentiated political system in modern society, as this has been done 
exhaustively in the extant literature and has been discussed in Chapter 1. Neither 
do we address the debate on whether what is observable has its origin in the global 
diffusion of one model or represents an independent but functionally determined 
isomorphism.11 An impressive body of literature has contributed to the rather de-
ductively focused theory-building on state formation (see, e.g., the concise sum-
mary in Wimmer and Feinstein, 2010). Here, a more inductive route is pursued, 
and arguments are built on the basis of abstraction from contemporary empirics. 
We take the above-mentioned conditions of modernity for granted in our analysis 
of modern political systems. 
It is a welcome peculiarity that the break that came with the establishment of 
the post- Westphalian landscape of states has created a much more “manageable” 
population of polities for scholars interested in systematization, especially when 
compared to the wild array of polities observed before that time. As Tilly noted, 
“Around the year 1500 one could count circa 500 more or less sovereign political 
units in Europe, while in the 20th century, there were only 25-30 left” (1975, p. 15). 
Currently, there are about 50 sovereign states within the area commonly defined 
as Europe. Intriguingly, these shifts occurred in a relatively short amount of time 
– at least compared to several thousand years in the history of polities – and they 
occurred globally. In fact, as many observers have noted, the emergence of the 
idea and then the system of nation states was a global one, a “co-evolution” (Wim-
mer, 1996; Waltz, 1979; Meyer et al., 1997; Stichweh, 2000). Putting it brief ly, due 
to the “segmentary differentiation” of the political system in world society (Luh-
mann, 2002, p. 227), scholars now deal with a landscape of relatively stable units 
and can concentrate on their internal make-up. In the following, we will certainly 
not do justice to the extremely exciting and dynamic period of the roughly 300 
years between 1648 and the mid-20th century, but we try to avoid being overly con-
fined by phenomena observable in the European case. In the empirical analysis, 
we will therefore focus mostly on the contemporary phase, that is, we will pri-
marily address the political divisions of world society as they have existed since 
roughly the end of World War II and the abolishment of most colonies in the 1960s. 
Most remarkably, the configuration of polities as it has existed since the mid-
20th century has remained relatively unchanged. Although their number f luctu-
ates a bit, the overall tendency is an expansion of this pattern, and over time even 
11  For instance, while the nation state concept, sovereignty and the importance of borders seem to 
have clearly originated in Europe, constitutionalism appears to have been only really nurtured 
af ter its export to the New World in the United States of America, while a rational bureaucracy 
was standard in imperial China long before it was seen as the feature of early modern European 
states (UK, Prussia, etc.).   
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the numerical changes appear rather insignificant (Wimmer and Feinstein, 2010). 
Possibly the most crucial rupture in the entire epoch was the end of the Soviet 
Union, which resulted in the rebuilding of the political order across an entire re-
gion of the world. In short, the main ordering criterion for polities in the world 
today are countries, and they must be congruent with sovereign states. Whenever 
this status is unresolved, it is at that very moment contested – and often extreme-
ly contentious (e.g., in the case of Taiwan, Palestine, Kashmir, Krim, etc.). Because 
discernible addresses in the form of countries are necessary in the world political 
system, the disintegration or dissolving of countries and state sovereignty is im-
mediately met with international efforts at “nation/state building”, as this seems 
to be the only way to safeguard functioning political communication in the cur-
rent world society (Luhmann, 2002, pp. 225-226). Despite myriad differences in 
detail, nation states attempt to look the same “from the outside”. That is, their 
functional isomorphism is accompanied by an intriguing omnipresence and uni-
formity of symbols that are meant to signal – and sometimes try to anticipate 
– state-ness vis-à-vis each other. Every country has a national f lag, an anthem, na-
tional holidays and ceremonies (including recurring parades), and – with very few 
exceptions – constitutions that mostly follow a standard form,12 as well as many 
other symbolic elements.13 This is true even for the abovementioned cases of con-
tested sovereignty. 
Notwithstanding the multi-level structure of polities, the national level is still 
where the center of political power lies, even in federal states and even in times of 
global governance, as we discuss later. As far as the way international political co-
operation in many problem areas has evolved (climate, health, trade, etc.), most of 
the decisions made at these levels are not collectively binding and can be overrid-
den by national sovereignty. For example, no matter how fiercely the global com-
munity demands specific action, the Brazilian government still decides how to 
deal with fires in the Amazon that endanger the world’s largest rainforest and one 
of its most important “carbon sinks” (Andreoni and Londono, 2019). The European 
Union may be the only exception so far, as by today it can, on a supranational level, 
decide on policies and enact laws that then become effective in all member states; 
12  See for example, Ragnhild Zorgati’s (2017) interesting study of the emergence of contemporary 
Tunisia’s constitution, which is basically a history of convergence in form and content, modelled 
af ter a prevalent international standard and aligned with the United Nations Human Rights 
Convention. This approach required the authors to tone down the parts of the constitution ba-
sed on religious rules. 
13  The same is true for most regional and local political communities, but less so for supranational 
ones. However, local insignia and regional holidays do not share the collectively binding sta-
tus that the national ones enjoy, in the form of bank holidays, flag rallies, and other events and 
symbols.
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although these laws and policies still need to be ratified and implemented in and 
by each state individually, and monitoring their compliance is not always easy. 
This is closely connected to the final interesting observation: the country as a 
polity unit is also crucial for defining modern universal membership in the po-
litical system, even in times of cosmopolitanism and virtual means of participa-
tion. In this regard as well, a country marks the most crucial defining unit for 
collectively binding decision making. That is, every individual is assigned at least 
one country’s citizenship. So-called “statelessness” is regarded as a problem that 
cannot be accepted (Batchelor, 1998) and for which solutions must be found. Also, 
exclusivity, that is, the fact that dual citizenship is treated as an exception rath-
er than the rule (i.e., one must have one and can often only have one nationality 
as membership in a crucial polity) bespeaks this status and its importance (Low, 
2015; Spiro, 2011). Immigration and asylum rights further indicate how fiercely 
these principles are upheld. Visa rules (i.e., approaches to temporary residence in 
a polity) may be an additional indicator (Mau et al., 2015; Laube and Heidler, 2016). 
The political system therefore, more than any other function system in society, re-
quires and even enforces membership of each person within one given, mostly ter-
ritorially defined jurisdiction – although for most members this remains a passive 
one (observer role). The ambition of modern “direct authority” (Luhmann, 2002, 
p. 212) necessitates that each individual must register, even in the local state, in 
order for the authorities to gauge the scope of their responsibilities and in order to 
be included in the outputs of the political system – compare this to the discussion 
of censuses above.   
Altogether, a country (in most cases a nation state) has come to be the only 
surviving unit of crucial importance to circumscribe a polity. Empires, kingdoms 
(for our purposes meaning territories that overlap with family structures), tribal 
and nomadic states, and all other pre-modern types of polities no longer exist, at 
least not as alternatives. There are of course absolute and constitutional monar-
chies and the Commonwealth, among other examples, but these do not overrule 
the system of countries and the necessity to declare the country status. Further-
more, observers sometimes widely diverge on how to characterize a given modern 
polity internally, that is, its political regime type, ways of political operation, and 
other aspects. For instance, there is an ongoing debate on whether modern Chi-
na should still be described as an empire rather than as a nation state, due to its 
definition of secondary membership criteria and its attitude toward the rest of the 
world (e.g., Shue, 2018).14 However, it is equally true, empirically, that the People’s 
14  See also the arguments brought forward in debates about China’s “empire-like” contemporary 
foreign policy, for example, the debate held at the Free University of Berlin in December 2018 
[in German]:  https://www.einsteinfoundation.de/en/veranstaltungen/meetingeinstein/gunter- 
schubert-imperiales-china/. 
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Republic of China adheres to the world system of states and formally fulfills all the 
criteria observers would apply to define a modern country.
Finally, formal equality or levelling in this case does not mean the absence of 
(functional) asymmetries between countries. Obviously, some countries are seen 
as rather dominant in a region or even globally, meaning that they have the power 
to enforce their will upon other countries, or they claim to have or are bestowed 
with more say in institutions with regional or even international decision-making 
capacity. It seems that this power is often related to a country’s size, but even 
more importantly, its access to and use of resources and its resulting economic 
weight and military might. These differences coagulate, for example, in insti-
tutions such as the G8 (currently G7) and G20, or the United Nations Security 
Council. These selected groups of countries can make or initiate decisions with 
potential effects for all other countries, in other words, the whole of world society. 
Observations of this asymmetry have been included in more historical studies of 
colonialism and post-colonial studies, and they have inspired the world systems 
analysis of Wallerstein (1976), as well as the various other strands of dependency 
theory (Chase-Dunn, 2015). Recently, scholars in the field of International Rela-
tions are debating whether we see the end of US hegemony and a shift towards 
a new “Asia-Pacific century”, implying, in particular, the rise of China to super-
power status and its increasing ambition and ability to inf luence global affairs 
(Wilkins, 2010). In system theory, the “inf lation” and “def lation” of power as a 
medium in the world polity has not yet been treated exhaustively though (Stich-
weh, 2000). In addition, there may also be somewhat more “hidden structures” of 
asymmetry at play among the different segments of the world polity. For instance, 
smaller countries often rank highest in global democracy and human develop-
ment indexes, among other comparisons.15 They probably benefit from the fact 
that horizontal functional differentiation results in a shared standard repertoire 
of modern polities, including a set of state institutions, expectable public services 
and forms of inclusion (Stichweh, 2000) that may be easier implemented in small-
er and more homogenous contexts; a notion that the following section will take 
up again. These and other aspects are fascinating phenomena and obviously im-
portant points of departure for empirical studies in order to further understand 
political differentiation at a global scale. 
Hence, although it can be argued that country-level polities, or nation states, 
are the globally preferred unit of segmentation and, even more importantly, are 
the most decisive political unit in today’s world society, students of political sys-
tems must delve deeper. In the following, we will continue by analyzing the levels 
15  See, for instance, the United Nations’ Human Development Reports, http://hdr.undp.org/en 
(accessed 10 November 2019), or the Freedom House Freedom in the World Reports, https://
freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2019 (accessed 10 November 2019).  
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and forms of vertical differentiation in and of a polity. Are they just extensions 
of central authority, or can they, for instance, form political (sub)systems of their 
own? 
Consequences of the global preference for country-level segmentation 
for vertical differentiation
Above, we have stressed the status of countries as the decisive modern polity and 
the dominant self-conceptualization of political systems. More than that, seman-
tically, a country is now associated with a specific size and – more importantly 
– complexity. In other words, a certain degree and form of internal functional dif-
ferentiation is expected for county-level units. Thus, it seems odd that units such 
as Brunei, Lichtenstein, the Vatican or Singapore exist at the same level as other 
countries, since in the common understanding a country – although varying in 
size – usually displays multi-dimensional complexity and features several dis-
cernible subunits. Small city state-type countries may appear strangely one-di-
mensional and at the same time overloaded, as they must feature all the elements 
of a country-type polity – including offices and ministries of all kinds, a diplomat-
ic apparatus, an army (of some form at least) – in order to be recognized as such 
and to take part in the “international community” (see below). This scenario again 
highlights the amazing convergence of today’s polities, as in this formal realm 
even these exceptional cases did not simply preserve a form of organization that, 
arguably, would likely fit their conditions (including geographically, demographi-
cally, socio-economically, etc.) “better”. 
At the same time, one could be equally surprised by countries that appear 
“huge” in terms of territory and population as well as internal heterogeneity, and 
that want to and manage to preserve integration as countries, instead of disband-
ing (e.g., Brazil, Russia, China, India and maybe even the United States). How can 
such a country hold ready the capacity to make collectively binding decisions that 
ref lect all necessities and demands, and the ability to safeguard the implementa-
tion of these decisions? The same questions might apply to a very sparsely populat-
ed and large country such as Norway, where the state seeks to reach even the ex-
treme periphery, instead of simply pooling everything in and around a center, or 
settling for an easy two-pronged structure (e.g., center plus one level of peripheral 
“garrisons”). In cases such as these, enormous resources are dedicated to estab-
lishing authority and upholding and reproducing the crucial organizations, roles 
and processes (see the section on horizontal subsystems) of the political system 
across different levels within these “boundaries”, while potentially encountering 
decisive counter-tendencies (Rokkan and Urwin, 1983). While it may seem tauto-
logical or entirely unconnected at first, the establishment of the global system of 
states gave rise to certain ways of answering to these challenges by facilitating, 
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or even requiring the internal vertical differentiation of polities, while the ongo-
ing evolution of this multilevel differentiation created a shared global repertoire 
of institutional solutions that in turn reinforced the idea that what constitutes a 
modern political system is equivalent with a country-level polity (Gellner, 1983; 
Meyer et al., 1997). Yet, as we discuss below, the synchronization of vertical inter-
nal differentiation in contemporary world society is an ongoing and eventually 
relatively open process. 
Modern multi-level polities: Nation state building as centralization
Works in the history of state formation provide functional explanations of the dif-
ferentiation into units of varying size and a governmental organization, mostly 
a bureaucracy, that could take care of the basic operations (e.g., tax collection to 
uphold defenses such as an army; the management of the latter and the drafting 
of military personnel; other obligations stemming from interrelations with a cler-
gy), and was observable even in the case of pre- and early modern polities (Tilly, 
1975; Wimmer and Feinstein, 2010). As mentioned before, however, this differen-
tiation into political offices and operations usually played out in the horizontal 
dimension that the latter half of this chapter explores, and its results and effects 
were highly particularistic. The central authority’s relations to subdivisions in the 
polity were usually volatile, malleable and often personalized, and membership 
and participation in political operations was stratified and non-inclusive. Also, as 
Wimmer aptly summarized, early political differentiation resulted in a specific 
type of both hierarchically stratified and politically decentralized society, which 
was mainly self-organized at the local level and often went without a state-typed 
organization (1996, p. 331). This changed with the establishment of the modern 
polity and a functionally differentiated political system, which retains the princi-
ple of local self-government but established the full internal integration and pene-
tration of the state as well as inclusive membership in a given polity.16
The factors conditioning this development are manifold, they cannot all be iso-
lated from each other, and some of them go back in time, to the beginning of early 
modern states. While we do not aim to provide explanations for the emergence of 
these conditions here, it is necessary to name them as part of the environmental 
factors that produce and act upon political systems in today’s world society. To 
16  As mentioned before, we are not pursuing an explanation of state formation in this chapter. 
There are several excellent studies on this topic that do not need to be paraphrased here; see, 
for instance, a review and summary of the most seminal studies in Wimmer, 1996 and James, 
1996. Rather, we take the existence of modern states as the main organization of a functionally 
dif ferentiated political system for granted and are more interested in an analysis of the latter’s 
internal functional dif ferentiation. 
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recapitulate (some of this was discussed in Chapter 1), a country-level polity in 
today’s world involves 
• autonomy and sovereignty, including the integrity of the state’s territory and 
therefore the maintenance and protection of physical borders vis-à-vis an 
international environment; the maintenance of public order internally;17 and 
readily obtainable revenue (often collected and generated through taxes) to 
finance public government administration and services; 
• determining a people/the population as a collectivity (in many but not all cas-
es this is equivalent to a nation); granting and enforcing citizenship, which is 
the imperative embodiment of individual equality, inclusion, and protection; 
and providing the means and institutions for representing this people (direct-
ly, indirectly, or abstractly in terms of a public interest and common good) in 
collectively binding decision making;18
• (to support the operations in the second point and because modern states are 
now usually welfare states) providing certain goods, services and other outputs, 
such as health care and primary and secondary education to all citizens – of-
ten including all residents; sometimes, but only in extreme exception, even all 
individuals currently in the purview of a polity –, and providing the grounds 
for making binding decisions for them (see the parallel development of the 
function system of law that is discussed again in Chapter 5).
Many, if not all, of these aspects are also intimately related to the horizontal dif-
ferentiation of political systems, which we discuss again in the next section. Let 
us first examine the consequences this development had in a vertical perspective.19 
Scholars have shown that the establishment of the nation state in early mod-
ern Europe, and later all units worldwide, meant a centralization of authority to 
fulfill most of the above-listed functions. Determining a territory and defining 
and securing its borders was one challenge, but integration inward was also a dif-
ficult task – not least in order to maintain exactly this territorial sovereignty and 
autonomy. The example of Norway is once again illustrative. Another example is 
17  While invasion (and war) is still a lurking danger, mutual acceptance of sovereignty is the domi-
nant rule. Border protection therefore has become much more a question of population control; 
see Laube, 2013. However, there are regions where this is reversed, and martial border protec-
tion co-exists with relatively loose mobility control; see Plümmer, 2017; The Economist, 2019. 
18  Previously, this was based on the principle “no taxation without representation”, which only in-
cluded those that could pay taxes. 
19  One might object that this is a “chicken and egg” type question, in other words, an analogous 
process for which there may be other explanations of what came first or has resulted in the other. 
Here, the decision is to take the emergence of the (nation) state system in Europe between the 
17th and 20th century as a point of departure and to explain a major part of the vertical (maybe 
even horizontal) dif ferentiation starting from this basic assumption.   
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the case of Chinese nation-building at the beginning of the 19th century, when pe-
ripheral communities somehow had to be redefined or even created anew. Fixed 
borders were something alien to China, which had been operating on the basis 
of a civilization-defined empire with concentric circles of inf luence and tributary 
relations extending from its center, and an extensive degree of tolerance for f lu-
idity and obscurity in its periphery (if it was seen as such at all). With the forced 
drawing of border lines and the establishment of sovereign state power under the 
new Republic of China in 1912, there was increased activity in the borderlands, es-
pecially registering and securing resources, fostering defense and avoiding insur-
gencies (Opper, 2019). However, central authority in Republican China was weak 
and so was the attempt to stabilize rule everywhere. With the founding of the Peo-
ple’s Republic in 1949, borderland occupation and permeation were taken to the 
extremes. Even today, the nation’s major political goals include the directed set-
tlement of people, especially Han Chinese, along the borderlines and the enforced 
peopling of the entire country (Hansen, 2006). With such enforcement, however, 
comes the necessity to uphold communicative integration, in other words, infor-
mation f low, new decision-making requirements, and other developments that 
preserve political operations. 
Furthermore, creating a supra-unit, a country, seems to make sense, as de-
fense and other resource-heavy and vital operations can be organized more effi-
ciently for a given community; similarly, locating responsibilities such as garbage 
collection and policing, as well as other elements of upholding public order at the 
very local level does. Under the constitutional arrangements of modern polities 
(see below), different responsibilities could be – and had to be – organized at dif-
ferent levels. Yet, what used to be delegation became differentiation.   
At the same time, the centralization of territory, resources and power in mod-
ern countries, and the parallel differentiation into different levels was accom-
panied by the need to meet increasing membership claims from the (former) pe-
riphery and the collectivity of the included. It seems to be widely accepted that 
in social communities, deciding on the issues in a specific subunit as well as the 
issues concerning the polity as a whole, requires some sort of “closeness” or “prox-
imity”. The idea of representative government only magnifies this. It is therefore 
not sufficient to have organizations, such as parties or mass associations, or in-
stitutions such as a parliament, through which interest representation in a mod-
ern polity is supposed to work, as well as different political performance or public 
roles, in only one dimension and only at the most central level (see below). In order 
to hold ready the potential to make decisions and to address all and everybody in a 
given polity in a timely manner and at any time, these functional bodies and roles 
must be replicated at more or less regular intervals.
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Integration, or: How many levels? 
How are these intervals defined? There is no rule of thumb, but there seem to be 
certain historical patterns. In many cases the subdivisions in today’s polities are 
historical subdivisions that were either relatively independent or existed in a loose 
form of federation or union before they (were) gathered under a type of modern 
central authority. What previously were often hierarchies of personalized rela-
tions or volatile dependencies through coercion and extraction, for instance, in 
the phase of centralization now grew into one organism. Interestingly, as research 
on the nation state has shown, the creation of an entirely new structure of subdi-
visions is the exception. Especially in contemporary Europe, while questions of 
“nationality” may be contested at the level at which countries (national states) were 
defined at some point in time,20 there is still a remarkably stable patchwork of 
sub-national administrative subdivisions that were (re)defined along the lines of 
older cultural or linguistic boundaries, former duke- or kingdoms, and the like 
(Hooghe and Marks, 2016; Wimmer, 1996). However, the same can be said for other 
world regions, such as China, where subnational units, from provinces down to 
counties and villages, are mostly the same as they were thousands of years ago un-
der imperial rule (Chung, 2016; Opper and Andersson, 2018). Post-colonial states 
are an exception that in some way corroborates this observation. Here, former 
patterns that were eradicated in the course of initial artificial state building are 
frequently evoked again when countries undergo further re-division following an 
often unstable phase after their liberation. Based on this observation, one could 
possibly go so far as to claim that the segmentary differentiation as it exists within 
most countries today, is often a more long-term and sustainable process and phe-
nomenon than the often artificial, forced and much younger definition of coun-
try-level polities as the main segmentary differentiation in the political system of 
world society.  
One does not have to take sides in this discussion and can simply conclude that 
historically defined units are often assembled under a (new) centralized author-
ity. For some this means a gain in resources and even autonomy, while for others 
it means a loss of resources. As a whole, however, this pattern implies a leveling 
20  Tilly contested that European nations are actual nation-states, in which ethnicity, linguistics 
and cultural borders are equivalent with borders of sovereignty and authority as embodied by 
a country (1975). The same claim is made in quantitative studies of Europe and other world regi-
ons that show how division lines (e.g., language, traditional institutions) rarely overlap with na-
tional state borders and of ten run across many of these borders (e.g., Connor, 1972; Lopés-Alves, 
2011). If this is true for Europe, an examination of post-colonial national state building provides 
an even stronger case. In the latter, however, these inherited lines were of ten not reflected in 
the new polity, not even in the definition of its subdivisions, with grave consequences, as is wi-
dely known.   
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of the differences that potentially existed between the formerly diverse units in 
different world regions. Compare, for instance, the former asymmetries between 
the strong position, even autonomy, of medieval European cities, which had, for 
example, their own codes of conduct and law (“Stadtordnung”) for residents and 
the treatment of aliens, legislation, police, and markets in a patchwork of feudal 
order, and the rich but powerless Chinese cities under imperial rule, which were 
embedded in a predominantly rigid bureaucratic network and therefore, strictly 
speaking, only another outpost of the imperial court (Mumford, 1961; Hanagan 
and Tilly, 2011).
Finally, almost all countries now display subdivisions around a 3-plus level 
structure (national – regional – communal/grassroots). That is, in a country of 
average size and population, there is never just a dual structure (central – com-
munal), and most countries even have something like counties or prefectures that 
constitute a fourth level (Hooghe and Marks, 2016). This structure seems to be-
come a type of path dependency that is not altered again, even under conditions of 
regime change or revolution. There may be upscaling and downscaling of the size 
and number of entities at one of these levels, but rarely is one of the levels in the 
governmental hierarchy completely abolished. That is, there is a lot of re-scaling 
(Denters et al., 2014) but usually no re-shuff ling, and this seems true in all world 
regions.
Multilevel relations
If sub-dividing and re-combining was an issue among and in polities all along, 
what is different now? As mentioned, subdivisions are now integrated in a cen-
tralized and differentiated structure of a country and nation state. With this 
arrangement arose the necessity to formalize the relationships between units in 
ways that could ensure they would not overlap, conf lict and destabilize the over-
all polity. Chosen solutions to this challenge vary from more hierarchical to more 
collaborative forms of ordering these relationships.
The two dominant models found worldwide are country-level polities that are 
organized as unitary or federal states. The historical research on nation state for-
mation tends to choose either bottom-up or top-down explanations of the prefer-
ence for either one or the other (Wimmer and Feinstein, 2010). We do not have to 
engage in these speculations as they are not ultimately relevant for our approach. 
However, it makes sense to note that it seems to be a rather uncontested obser-
vation that unitary state structures usually rest upon and are reminiscent of old-
er, traditional forms of governing in a previously existing polity. This is probably 
clearest in cases in which a relatively strong bureaucratic state was previously in 
place and permeated a given territory, as in China. In contrast, newly founded 
countries that merge formerly independent units tend to be federal states. As of 
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yet, however, there are no large-scale worldwide studies that could convincing-
ly explain this observation.21 The two models differ regarding the organization 
of the relationship between the various levels of government, mostly in terms 
of finance and budgeting, authority over legislation and the implementation of 
policies, often judication, and the successive organization of representation (e.g., 
composition and filling of chambers, formal voting authority on national level leg-
islation, etc.) to reproduce proximity as mentioned above. Furthermore, neither 
the unitary nor the federal structure work without friction, and all polities expe-
rience inter-level conf licts. One such conf lict is the constant information prob-
lem, as described by two governance scholars: “For central government, relying on 
subnational government for policy implementation means bringing in street-level 
professionals with close proximity to policy targets while at the same time creat-
ing a principal-agent problem” (Peters and Pierre, 2016, p. 129).
However, these aspects are more relevant for governance studies after all. For 
us, it is probably more interesting to note that there seems to be no clear division 
between these models that would overlap with the existence of more tradition-
al-authoritarian and democratic regimes, that is, in terms of their preference for 
one or the other model. A federal model in the first instance seems to suggest – 
formally-legally – much more decentralized authority and autonomy, and – nor-
matively – usually implies more tolerance for “diversity” within the polity. The 
early modern monarchy versus republic divide does not imply a preference for one 
or the other and neither does the current autocracy/democracy divide, although 
authoritarianism is often associated with more unitary structures and this may 
be supported empirically, especially looking at more than just the formal insti-
tutions. How do autocracies deal with the control-effectiveness dichotomy just 
mentioned, for example, that is built into the differentiation of levels of decision 
making? Having plural levels of decision making always involves a loss of control 
potential that might be problematic in autocracies. On the other hand, a plural-
ity of levels seems to promise greater effectiveness in the realization of policies, 
based on the ability of more adequate local adjustment: something that appeals to 
autocracies as long as they try to win legitimacy by claiming to be effective policy 
makers. Hooghe and Marks, based on their study of regional authority in democ-
racies and new democracies, hypothesize that “democracies (…) have higher lev-
els of regional authority than dictatorships”, since “a dictator strives to centralize 
authority in his own hands to sustain his power and extract rent” (Hooghe and 
Marks, 2016, p. 65). But again, this assumed bias “is not a black-and-white phe-
nomenon” (Hooghe and Marks, 2016, p. 33) and must be empirically tested. At least 
in their self-description, authoritarian regimes also evoke the “federation” and 
21  Neither are studies completely congruent on the nation-state development question; see Tilly, 
1975; Wimmer and Feinstein, 2010. 
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decentralization theme, and this seems to be an aspect worth examining, even if 
just for the issue of the diffusion of modern political semantics. 
What is now important is to connect the long-term evolution of formal-insti-
tutional vertical differentiation in the modern state organization with most con-
temporary observations. There are two main trends that emerged over the course 
of the last few decades that provide new theoretical stimuli: decentralization to-
ward the local and toward the global level. How does this finally tie in with our 
overarching interests, for instance, the question of how new forms of ongoing ver-
tical differentiation square with the previously uttered hypothesis that a country 
is (still) the most decisive polity in today’s world society?
Decentralization 2.0 and system building
The smaller, the better? Thickening of sub-national politics
Polities have always experienced periods of centralization and decentralization 
over the course of history, but there has been a clear global tendency toward de-
centralization since the later phase of the 20th century. There is wide agreement 
that one of the most obvious processes of differentiation in contemporary politi-
cal systems is the yielding or concession of decision-making authority to a subor-
dinate (usually most communal) level or entity. The burgeoning “local governance” 
literature of recent decades ref lects this conclusion. Scholars have widely noted 
that “the relative importance of subnational governments has been on the rise” 
internationally (Weitz-Shapiro, 2008, pp. 286-287), that local and regional gov-
ernments’ authority has increased in recent decades (Hooghe and Marks, 2016), 
and that more and more actors engage with local authorities and are involved in 
different forms of local politics (Peters, 1998; Tang and Huhe, 2014). 
While the observation appears to be uncontested, it is difficult to come up 
with a convincing explanation for this development. One factor may be the glo-
balized Eigenwert of the “local”,22 which is also linked to the proximity and rep-
22  Compare also how local and regional identity is increasingly evoked in current political deba-
tes, for instance when populists and especially far-right parties and groups in Europe cite the 
value of traditional local and regional identity and thereby homogeneity and its meaning for 
“better” policy making in opposition to national and supra-national decision making (which is 
in fact coupled with an anti-immigration stance). This “localism” approach is also observable 
in other contexts, although not necessarily as a party politics issue. In China for instance, there 
is an ongoing discourse about local or provincial cultures that form the basis for economic and 
political path-dependencies, over time and independent of the form of government and rule 
(imperial, Republican era – Guomindang •[KMT], People’s Republic – Chinese Communist Party 
[CCP]). Today, for instance, this runs counter to major CCP rhetoric and results not only in the 
uneven implementation of administrative reform (“compatible” vs. “not compatible with the lo-
cal culture”), but also dif ferential economic policies and support for entrepreneurship. Localism 
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resentativeness aspect introduced above. The semantics of “subsidiarity”, which 
finds its strongest expression in the European Union (Peters and Pierre, 2016), is 
one illustration of this idea. In general, subsidiarity denotes not only the practical 
conviction that decisions can be made more efficiently at the local level, but also 
a normative drift favoring autonomous decision-making as often as possible and 
in the “smallest” possible – that is (in many cases) the most decentralized – units. 
Interestingly, this seems to be a globally shared norm; at least, the inclusion of the 
semantics of “decentralized” and “local governance” is observable in the self-con-
ceptualization of political systems across regime boundaries. However, whether 
this norm can compete against others or is curtailed in practice is highly depen-
dent on other circumstances. For instance, some observers note that the shifts 
observable in autocracies should be called “deconcentration” instead of “decen-
tralization” (Hooghe et al., 2010, p. 59). We revisit the regime aspects below. 
Scholars also point to the decline of the traditional welfare state model, or at 
least a transformation of how welfare is usually organized: Traditionally, a cen-
tral authority is also the source of funding for all the polity’s core performances 
(policies, services), for which it further delegates implementation and oversight 
responsibilities. Instead, these authors now call attention to an evident global 
tendency toward austerity and business-style conduct (“management”) of public 
administration since roughly the 1990s, which has led to a down-sourcing of many 
public services to lower-level governments, combined with the need and expecta-
tion that they allocate their own resources to fund both these delegated mandates 
and new ones (Peters and Pierre, 2016; Tang and Huhe, 2014). The “New Public 
Management” logic was accompanied by a transformation of local public admin-
istrations, in which they became more accessible, their operations became more 
transparent, and the relationship between the incumbents of performance and 
audience roles was further levelled (e.g., via the “one-stop-shop” logic) (Ongaro, 
2004; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004; Wiggan, 2007). Not only does this mean that 
the relationship of administrative bodies to their publics is converted from sub-
ject handling to client services, but also that reforms of public administration and 
local governments introduce new secondary performance roles,23 such as those 
can, for example, result in a strategy that bets on state-level enterprises in one region and on 
private companies in another, or defines exclusive new experimental zones solely on the basis 
of the perceived dominant “local innovative and entrepreneurial spirit”. See, for example, the 
works of Sonja Opper, who studied the socio-cultural evolution of entrepreneurial culture and 
politics in China and has shown the stability of these patterns over a period that stretches from 
the beginnings of larger human settlement clusters until today (Opper and Andersson, 2018; 
Opper, 2019). 
23  Secondary performance roles are performance roles assumed temporarily or partly by laymen/
amateurs or non-professionals. They can also be defined as activist alternatives to purely public 
roles, see Stichweh, 2016a, Ch. 1. 
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generated by expert and public hearings, etc. Finally, connected with the decen-
tralization of many issues, there also arose new inclusion demands by members 
of the local public. New forms of environmental-related NIMBY protests, for in-
stance, often steered by locally differentiated organizations (as discussed later), 
are now more than ever facilitated by the digitalization of information, organiza-
tion, participation chances and other elements.
Adding to the surprising continuity and stability of subnational units over 
the course of history, a new “thickness” seems to have emerged. Together with 
trends we describe in our discussion of the horizontal dimension later, subunits in 
a polity (country) seem to be able to form ever more autonomous units and there-
by potential political systems of their own. The emerging forms of new problem 
processing can potentially usher in a generation of new problems that are only 
observable and only relevant for a given level. This seems to be the case where 
there exists, for example, enough information to autonomously decide on issues 
and to distribute values in a given community, which were traditionally pooled at 
the national level (expertise, finances, etc.), or when new political issues are pro-
duced and considered to be specific for this particular community.24 Furthermore, 
individual members as well as incumbents of both performance and public roles 
at the local level may also become better equipped and informed in order to decide 
on the issues at stake than was previously possible (via information technology, 
education, mobility and experiences, for instance), and there are new dedicated 
and independent local organizations, such as exclusively local parties; for exam-
ple, “Freie Wähler” (independent voters) in certain communes in Germany, or the 
CSU as a party only for the state of Bavaria.
When the perceived value of the issues that are decided upon locally finally 
overrules the importance and status that an individual member or given collec-
tivity assigns to membership in a country-level polity, the old idea of a central au-
thority that gravitates toward the highest level of government in a country may 
fade or become much weaker than in the former phase of modern nation state 
building. 
24  Take for example the attraction of investment (including especially foreign direct investment) 
and new sources of revenue via business taxes at the communal level – a problem that applies 
to communal units in Germany as well as China. This may not be a topic for the levels above or 
below in the hierarchy, but maybe at that specific level, for a county-level government, for in-
stance, it is crucial. There are then of fices and agencies that are created specifically to take care 
of this issue, which are not replicated at other levels in that country, and may even conflict with 
the other levels’ interests and principles (e.g., political restrictions on accepting FDI from certain 
countries [as in the case of Germany vis-a-vis China]).
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The larger, the better? Polity-independent problem governance 
Something similar is observable in the opposite direction, in other words, in the 
decentralization toward autonomous problem identification and decision making 
at higher levels, or better, in larger units and collectivities. While not intending to 
paraphrase the impressive body of literature on regional and global governance 
here, from our perspective, however, it is worth noting again that what appears 
to have happened is the following: The creation of the modern country-polity in 
the last 400 years seems to have brought with it a relatively inward orientation, 
one could also say restraint – a population of political systems that have a spatial 
reach because of a defined, most crucial level of membership and thereby an ulti-
mate scope and reach of the binding decisions made. There have long been issues 
that required regional (i.e., transnational) processing, such as transportation, 
including rail and water ways, post, and bilateral tariffs, but they were mainly 
practical, regulatory issues that in some way emerged from a basic decision that 
had already been made. Relatively similar is the more modern variant of this situ-
ation that Peters and Pierre (2016) and Hooghe and Marks (2016) called “multilevel 
governance” and that is largely independent of the countries as a unit, in other 
words, a form of governance stretching across a “region” that includes units at 
different subnational levels (for instance, across several counties, together with 
another province and maybe even across borders to similar units in another coun-
try). These occurrences are somehow still spatially bound and clearly polity-linked, 
based on geographical conditions or a softer “identification” with a region and its 
specificities and perceived needs. In the end, this form of differentiation based on 
issues does not seem to be so different from the decentralized local governance 
described above.  
Then there is, however, the intensification of global issue governance, that has 
occurred since the end of World War II and the renaissance and actual institu-
tionalization of organizations such as the United Nations and other global forums. 
This, first, includes the identification of problems that appear to be of global con-
cern. These could be issues that have long been processed in the political system 
of some countries, but are receiving new attention, weight and diffusion at and 
via the international level. Beyond that, however, it also entails the identification 
of genuinely new and, one could say, truly global problems, such as international 
large-scale migration, epidemics, and, possibly most strikingly, resource protec-
tion and climate change, which seem to transgress the problem-solving capacities 
of existing polities. Under this aegis, and overriding even ideological and regime 
differences,25 completely new political structures arose, especially in the last 30 
years. Different from the traditional regulatory issues and procedures, these is-
25  Autocracies, however, appear to be more selective in their commitment to global governance 
arrangements than democratically ruled countries. Furthermore, there are indications of an in-
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sues now also have global publics, with specific opinions and globally inclusive 
activities (including protest), which are increasingly considered. 
As is widely documented, these developments have led to norm and value dif-
fusion that now impacts problem definition and decision making at many dif-
ferent levels and transgresses the usual polity boundaries. The newly emerging 
global “issue contexts” and epistemic communities that develop around a problem 
that may come to be defined as a political problem, for instance, may force a na-
tional polity to address issues such as minority protection or control of specific 
pollutants that were not previously defined as falling within the purview of the 
political system.
What further distinguishes the global problem arena from within-polity de-
centralization is that non-contingent values seem to impact the definition of po-
litical problems in a different way here. The orientation toward scientific results 
or the appeal to human rights and fully equal valuation of every individual, even 
somehow planetary values (conservation, sustainability, etc.), often form the 
basis for the decision to regard an issue as a political problem, as well as for the 
measures chosen or suggested to address the issue. These values may be very dif-
ferent from the values that, either contingent or non-contingent, are formed by or 
impact on country or local polity-based problems and solutions, and which poten-
tially never would have become relevant at all at the latter level.
This all suggests a type of system building around issues at the global level, but 
the readiness to make collectively binding decisions here is much less palpable. 
Global “responsibilities” seem much more retractable: the issues once considered 
the responsibility of subnational levels in a given polity (e.g., education, health 
care) seem to “stick” there much more strongly than issues that were addressed 
at regional and supranational levels (e.g., EU, NATO, Middle East/African Union; 
non-proliferation politics; greenhouse gas emissions). While organizations such 
as the UN represent global institutions, they, at least to date, do not form polities, 
and as such lack the institutional thickness described above. Membership at the 
individual level is less clear (it is usually established by the fact that the country 
of which one is a citizen is itself a member of these organizations) and is less con-
sequential. On the one hand, beyond being human, there are no inclusion crite-
ria, but on the other hand, because everyone is an inclusion address, any appeals 
or claims become murkier. Thus, whether we see a weakening of the meaning of 
membership and inclusion via national citizenship here is much less tangible. 
In a nutshell, there is now an undeniable tendency toward the identification 
and handling of political problems at different levels in and beyond “constitu-
tionally” defined polities. Whether this is in every case equivalent with genuine 
creasingly stronger intra-autocracy collaboration at the global level; see, for example, Erdmann 
et al., 2013. 
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system building is an empirical question. For the time being, it seems that in an 
era of nation states and as long as binding national level citizenship exists and 
represents the institutionalization of the imperative of equal and individual inclu-
sion, an array of vital decisions remain undeniably bound to country-level polities 
and politics.26 In the end, however, this bond may also depend on the evaluation of 
the importance of certain issues at the individual level. 
Level differentiation, inclusion and regime bipolarity 
So far, the question of system building has mainly been approached by focusing 
on the problems that are identified and processed by the political system. There 
are some further observations that may advance our analysis, namely, the related-
ness of multilevel differentiation, inclusion and regime bipolarity. 
The conf lict between norms and “procedural values”, which is inherent in de-
bates about whether smaller and more direct or larger and more aloof equals better 
outcomes, runs through the history of polity building. This conf lict is, however, 
also directly linked to the regime question, and here inspires equally ambiguous 
arguments, ranging from concern with functionality and efficiency to normative 
preferences for universal and equal individual inclusion. The size, representative-
ness, and responsiveness nexus is, for example, ref lected in Robert A. Dahl and 
Edward R. Tufte’s seminal work, which took up the strands found in traditional 
political philosophy and asked, “How large should a political system be in order to 
facilitate rational control by its citizens?” (Dahl and Tufte, 1973, p. 1) and “What 
is the appropriate political unit for expressing one’s identity as a member of a 
community” in times of increasing complexity and diversity in an urbanizing and 
globalizing world (Dahl and Tufte, 1973, p. 3)? At the time of their study, the au-
thors’ empirical approach, a comparative analysis of different countries, offered 
no clear answer to these theoretical questions, as they found that “[n]o single type 
or size of unit is optimal for achieving the twin goals of citizen effectiveness and 
system capacity” and “[i]n the extreme case, a citizen could be maximally effective 
in a system of minimal capacity for dealing with major issues (e.g., international 
violence) or minimally effective in a system of maximal capacity for dealing with 
major issues” (Dahl and Tufte, 1973, p. 138). As indicated above, more than 40 years 
after Dahl and Tufte’s seminal publication, these questions linger and translate 
26  Take, for instance, abortion laws in the United States. While it is still up to each state to decide 
whether to allow abortion, it is ultimately the US Supreme Court (with judges appointed by the 
president; Cottrell et al., 2019) that provides the basic ruling. It appears that the current trend 
in Supreme Court decisions may ultimately lead to a revision of the overall legislation, shif ting 
a once relatively liberal legislation to a much more conservative one. See also Chapter 5 on the 
concession of autonomy.  
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into research on community participation and local self-administration, suitable 
design for constituencies, representation in and control of transnational and in-
ternational organizations, and many other aspects (see, e.g., Denters et al., 2014).
Complementary research on preferences around the world, including in 
non-democratic contexts, may add an interesting perspective. In China, for ex-
ample, where there is a long tradition of favoring centralized authority combined 
with decentralized governance and a strong valuation of the local (因地制宜), po-
litical regime characteristics play an important role. Public trust in the central 
government is surprisingly strong in China compared to other countries27 and is 
always significantly higher than trust in local authorities. While the lack of dem-
ocratic decision making and oversight applies to every level of the polity, central 
authorities in China are, to a surprising degree, believed to be more willing and 
able to act in accordance with the overall public interest than corrupt local incum-
bents.28 Still, this does not necessarily mean a preference for democratic decision 
making and equal inclusion – it could also ref lect a preference for non-contin-
gent values, such as knowledge/science (technocracy) and elitism (expertocracy), 
which is probably believed to rather be present at higher levels. Interestingly, this 
is somewhat reminiscent of arguments that appear, with an opposite direction, 
in discussions about the “democracy deficit” of decision making in the European 
Union or in other regional and international contexts.29
Beyond a normative perspective, the general experience seems to be that the 
more local in the political hierarchy the unit of analysis, the more inclusion into 
collectively binding decision making is found (and vice versa), even if it “only” 
means more information, an expansion of public roles (e.g., the number of in-
dividuals addressed by a policy) or new secondary performance roles that arise 
through administrative reforms. After all, under conditions of modernity and 
differentiated levels of decision making, the individual is included in more than 
one political system. Furthermore, while there is maybe one main polity today 
in which ultimate membership still makes a crucial difference (i.e., citizenship 
in a country as described above), multilevel differentiation can mean inclusion 
at one level under conditions of exclusion at another. For instance, as a citizen 
of the European Union and the European Economic Area, an individual can par-
ticipate in local elections in another member state after some time (usually three 
27  Other countries, especially democratic ones, usually show the exact opposite; see e.g. Hibbing 
and Theiss-Morse, 2002; Lewis-Beck et al., 2014; Li, 2010; Li, 2016. 
28  Tang and Huhe (2014), in a large-scale quantitative analysis of several Asian countries, showed 
how more political interaction at the local level in the course of recent political decentralization 
increased individuals’ access to information and overall activity in local af fairs, but also fuelled 
concern about problems such as corruption and further diminished trust in local governments.
29  See, for example, the collection of studies on the legitimacy of regional integration in Hurrel-
mann and Schneider (2015).  
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years of residency) and can vote for the representatives of this other country in the 
elections for the European Parliament, but cannot take part in national elections. 
However, a person could become a member of Greenpeace, or a local interest or-
ganization, for instance, and lobby heavily for a reform of specific environmental 
policies in this country. In China, while the individual does not have any say in 
national-level politics, as a registered resident in a village he or she can participate 
in direct elections of the local leader and the members of the village administra-
tive committee, who in turn usually decide on the distribution of collective land 
and revenues, which are some of the most crucial resources for rural residents. Or 
residents can protest a waste incinerator scheduled to be built in the vicinity that 
might seriously impact the locality’s developmental planning, but cannot vote on 
the course of energy politics at the national level in China. 
Regarding the polity as a whole, moreover, multilevel differentiation and the 
existence of differential inclusion roles also increase the chance of an open, di-
chotomic plurality, meaning that there can always be oscillations between the 
two poles of democracy and authoritarianism at different levels within a national 
polity and beyond (e.g., in the form of enclaves) – observations that Chapter 6 dis-
cusses in more detail. There is, in fact, research that points to this phenomenon 
in different contexts. The “deep south” paradigm in the United States is a par-
ticularly strong example, showing that there can be authoritarian structures at 
the local level in an overall democratic country (Mickey, 2015). Augustina Giraudy 
(2015) explored what she called “pathways of subnational undemocratic regime 
continuity within democratic countries”, in her research on Argentina and Mexico. 
Other studies, in turn, have corroborated the finding that autocracies especially 
tend to distinguish between different tiers of the political system, which are then 
related to different principles and degrees of inclusion in collectively binding de-
cision making. For instance, whereas the national political leadership is unchal-
lenged and inaccessible and governmental outputs are determinate in the first 
place, modern variants of outcome-oriented “adaptive authoritarianism” often 
rely heavily on local (sometimes experimental) adjustments or even alterations of 
policies – processes that include different forms of participation by the “affected” 
parts of the population. This scenario has been described for the case of Russia 
(see, e.g., Moser, 2015; forthcoming) and the People’s Republic of China (see, e.g., 
Florini et al., 2012; Schubert and Ahlers, 2012). Finally, it is possible that tradition-
al traits of authority or even types of independent sub-polities, in the form of, for 
example, clans, dynasties, castes, clientelism, or mob/gang structures, survive at 
individual levels; or that there are different value bases or preferences (Catholi-
cism; xenophobia) that impact decision making at one level or in one unit, which 
may completely differ from that observable at others levels in the same polity.   
Comparative research on political systems in general, and on political regimes 
specifically, could definitively make use of approaches that focus on multilevel 
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differentiation and decentralization. Altogether, while there are plenty of empiri-
cal insights into the dynamics of internal differentiation and trends of decentral-
ization based on studies in democratic contexts, there is no comprehensive body 
of research on authoritarian contexts, possibly due to the tendency to treat autoc-
racies as monolithic units. In fact, large-scale studies usually use characteristics 
at the country, i.e. national, level as a unit of comparison and then abstract to all 
other levels from there. 
One way to analyze multilevel differentiation from the perspective of our 
overarching research interests, is, as mentioned in the introduction, to empirical-
ly explore the following questions:
• Are there issues that are or become an exclusive domain and responsibility at a 
specific level, (e.g., at the communal level or the supranational level)? Does this 
level have the authority to make autonomous decisions, make these decisions 
collectively binding, and organize their implementation?
• Are there particular inclusion roles ([secondary] performance and public) that 
form at this level? Are they independent of roles at any other level? 
• What are the principles and processes guiding how decisions are made (in-
cluding contingent and non-contingent values; see also Chapter 6)?
This matrix can be applied to any level and for any institutional configuration in 
which collectively binding decision making occurs, for example, at the grassroots 
and community, regional, trans-regional and trans-boundary, national, interna-
tional and global levels. In research on the bipolarity of authoritarianism and de-
mocracy, such an approach could help distinguish between superficial or nominal 
institutional isomorphism and real functional equivalents in today’s world society.
These ambitions also motivate the observations and questions that form the 
basis of the following section. Examining the vertical differentiation of levels 
helps us to transgress the limitation of the country unit and the nation state level 
in research. However, there are more, and more complex, structures in a political 
system that should be considered. In addition to examining multilevel variation, 
we need to identify and precisely describe the relevant subsystems and other in-
stitutions and elements of horizontal dif ferentiation in modern political systems.
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III.	 Political	Subsystems,	Horizontal	Structures	 	 	 	
 and Institution Building
The simultaneous emergence of universality and regional specificities  
of political systems 
As described in the previous section, pre-modern polities were usually built around 
a centralized system of rule and domination, often conf lating the domains of re-
ligion, economy, warfare, control of the general public order, and others. If the 
given rule was not merely tyrannical or completely predatory, authorities were oc-
cupied with almost all matters pertaining to steering community life, for instance, 
taxation (spontaneous or regularly scheduled), internal and external security and 
order, organization of labor (partial or full; slavery, feudal structures, etc.), judi-
cation, weapons/military, monopolies (such as salt, grain, alcohol; or later money, 
i.e. coinage), roads and waterways, and religious and cultural activities. Decision 
making was highly centralized and traditionally limited to the discretion of the 
solitary ruler, with limited external deliberation. More complex polities, however, 
also had institutions such as councils, ministries or other types of consultants to 
the ruler (see also Chapter 3 on knowledge). The information that formed the ba-
sis of these decisions was usually derived from a paternalistic evaluation of the 
conditions in and of the realm, and from limited bottom-up reports and petitions. 
As mentioned before, states emerged as the common form for a political organi-
zation that can be distinguished from primeval and simple forms of rule such as 
chiefdom. From their early variants onwards, states came to be identified by the 
following functional areas and elements (Wimmer, 1996, pp. 227-229): 
• bureaucratic administration: to help with processing information, including 
keeping archives, calendars, other measurements, values, currencies and 
prices, managing correct script and written communication throughout the 
polity, and other related tasks;
• jurisdiction/judicature: to overrule self-help and complement local community 
mediation and arbitration, and to advance public order and stability by seek-
ing to avoid or end violence/feuds; in pre-modern times not necessarily inde-
pendent from the ruler/government and the collective administrative organs;
• taxation: to absorb “free-f loating revenues” beyond infrequent gifts and trib-
utes or predation, based on a system of regular collection, and, especially in 
pre-modern times, not linked to reciprocal benefits but as a means of patri-
monialism; and
• an institutionalized army: to defend the polity against external threats as well 
as internal instability, often as a standing army (especially in empires, to se-
2. The Rise of Complexity: Internal Differentiation of Political Systems 71
cure garrisons and borders), and often but not always distinguished from the 
unarmed majority of the population (as in Egypt or China).   
The set of issues and institutions varied, of course, but once established, the prob-
lems or subject matter for which authorities felt responsible was surprisingly lim-
ited and relatively stable over time and across geographical areas – even taking 
different world regions into account.
In the history of Europe, some degree of differentiation emerged in the pol-
ities of the later Middle Ages and the early modern era, which in other regions 
was only triggered by state building in the 20th and 21st century. In Europe this 
included, for instance, the gradual differentiation of societal estates and their po-
litical representation; the formal separation of the central authority and the state 
from institutions of the clergy, which for long periods continued to assume exclu-
sive responsibility for issues such as education, medical care, and poverty relief; 
private publishers; and early forms of assemblies and parliaments. Self-conceptu-
alization and legitimation of state action became increasingly oriented at public 
welfare and the common good, and later also “(the pursuit of) happiness” for ev-
eryone in the polity. The normative and practical ideal of the separation of power, 
executive – legislative – judicative, took root in early modern Europe (Wormuth, 
1949), and a process of the juridification of politics emerged that was meant to 
safeguard the universal validity and application of authoritative decisions in the 
polity, and allowed citizens to not only solve conf licts among themselves, but to 
increasingly provide avenues to claim their eligibility for political goods and ser-
vices vis-à-vis the state and individual authorities. In the period of transition from 
the late Middle Ages to early modern times, the police force developed as the em-
bodiment of the application of the monopoly of the legitimate inward use of force 
by the state. Over the centuries, the police came to represent the enforcing insti-
tution for all sorts of responsibilities (“policy”) the government took upon itself 
as the ordering organ of society (Stichweh, 1991). Outwards, manifest structures 
emerged around the necessity to identify and to communicate with other nation 
state-type addresses. A polity no longer dealt with another polity only occasional-
ly in the form of, for instance, war, marriage among the nobilty, or trade, but the 
emerging equalization of segments of the world polity created a pressure to estab-
lish constant “foreign relations”. Therefore, a country’s army came to be f lanked 
by a whole apparatus overseeing foreign affairs, which not only included foreign 
offices and the institutionalization of routine diplomacy (Hennings and Sowerby, 
2017), but also institutionalized intelligence services and espionage. Furthermore, 
over the last roughly two centuries, trade unions, political parties, and other or-
ganizations emerged and diversified political structures and the political process 
as well as the addresses included in this process.
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Interestingly, while all these early forms of horizontal political differentiation 
are exhaustingly described in accounts of European and North American history 
(see theoretical foundations and summaries of the literature in Luhmann, 1997, 
2002; Stichweh, 1991; Wimmer, 1996), we know less about how these processes 
materialized in other regions of the world. For instance, while separation of state 
institutions from the clergy has been either less relevant in primarily secular con-
texts such as China, in other cases it was a later development or is still an absent 
phenomenon. The same might apply for transformations of social stratification 
and the related differentiation of the political status of members of a polity. While 
estates in Europe became meaningless, a clear system of social stratification (e.g., 
castes, lineages) may have never clearly existed in some societies or may contin-
ue to be inf luential for political inclusion in others. In addition, the emergence 
of a differentiated police, separate from the military and meant to safeguard the 
state’s collectively binding decisions, may not have followed the same route as it 
did in Europe. While there are plenty of excellent and comprehensive studies of 
individual countries, it is probably fair to say there are not sufficient comparative 
historical analyses of the differentiation of the political system and of further hor-
izontal differentiation across world society.30 
However, although this process may have looked, and may still look, vastly dif-
ferent in different regions and even in each individual polity, all modern political 
systems, democratic or authoritarian variants, seem to currently feature a basic 
global repertoire of subsystems, semantics and symbols, as well as inclusion roles. 
Since the mid-20th century and at the latest after the Cold War with the end of 
the merely two-dimensional ideological block confrontation, this repertoire has 
become ever more similar. Arguably, there are differences and there are cases in 
which very particular institutions or inclusion roles remain (such as the Guardian 
Council and the Council for Discernment of Expediency in Iran [Schirazi, 1997] or 
the People’s Political Consultative Conference in China [Sagild and Ahlers, 2019a]), 
but even these outliers coexist alongside the full array of standard political orga-
nization(s) that seem to be replicated in all political segments, i.e. countries, of 
world society. Other observers have noted this isomorphism on a macro scale and 
demonstrated how “through both selection and adaptation, the system has ex-
panded to something close to universality of the nation state form” (Meyer et al., 
1997, p. 158), resulting in a similar set of nation-state properties. However, these 
analyses rarely include detailed accounts of these internal properties and their on-
going differentiation. 
30  Intriguingly, almost all existing seminal studies at some point refer to the same limited set of 
examples from Non-European societies, for example, the Tokugava Shogunat in Japan, based 
on the same limited selection of case studies literature (e.g., Eisenstadt, 1993, 1996).
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Before we embark on such an endeavor ourselves, one last preliminary remark 
and potential caveat to our argument seems worth mentioning: The only clear 
notable exception to isomorphic formal representations of both vertical and hor-
izontal functional differentiation are probably the enduring versions of (hered-
itary and elective) absolute monarchies, of which a small group remain, including 
Saudi Arabia, Vatican City State, Brunei, Oman, Qatar, Eswatini, and the United 
Arab Emirates. These countries constitute some form of unitary, religiously legiti-
mized concepts of rule reminiscent of traditional, pre-modern polities. Due to the 
pseudo-religious political ideology and leader cult on which the Kim dictatorship 
is founded (Lankov, 2013; Fifield, 2019), North Korea is sometimes also labelled a 
quasi-absolute monarchy. In these remaining examples of absolute rule, there is 
very little vertical multilevel differentiation, as instead of implementing auton-
omous regional or local tiers of government, these polities usually install family 
member or other loyal kin as governors who extend the reach of the royal court 
into all subnational entities (see, e.g., for the case of Saudi Arabia, Al-Rasheed, 
2010, Champion, 2003). Like in the historical variants of authoritarian rule out-
lined above, horizontal differentiation is also limited here, and the number of po-
litical performance roles beyond ruler, for instance, is kept to a minimum, while 
there are support and consultation structures, such as a state bureaucracy and 
advisory bodies with no decision-making power surrounding the center. Existing 
responsibilities and functional units, such as ministries, diplomatic missions and 
other governmental posts, either fall within the immediate domain of the ruler 
himself, or are staffed with kin and clients – a phenomenon that also occurs in 
modern democracies but is there considered deviant and to be avoided, and is 
either legally prohibited or at least perceived and labelled as a violation of a widely 
shared modern political norm (“clientelism”, “nepotism”). Even in modern author-
itarian systems, such as under the rule of the Communist Party of China, open 
nepotism in recruitment procedures for political offices is pro forma prohibited 
or must be especially legitimated; favoritism is no longer a sufficient condition, 
and an incumbent’s qualification for a specific political performance role must be 
publicly established. Altogether, these very special cases, we would argue, do not 
significantly contradict our overall observations and arguments. They, to the con-
trary, add weight to the aforementioned pledge for meticulous empirical research 
that encompasses the diversity found in different world regions and the value of 
diachronic studies when approaching internal differentiation and the evolution 
of democratic and authoritarian political systems.
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To decide, or not to decide: 
Approaching the dynamics of horizontal differentiation
In modern society, the function of the political system is to hold ready the capacity 
to make collectively binding decisions. Accordingly, we suggest using “to decide/
not to decide” on something as the major distinction informing differentiation. 
Defined so broadly, it may help explain how complex the political system in the 
ever more complex environment of modern society became, and how it constantly 
needs to further differentiate its subsystems and institutions in order to observe 
or even mirror the complexity of other function systems of society, and anticipate 
dynamics in these other function systems in order to safeguard the continuous 
capacity to make collective binding decisions for society (Luhmann, 1989; Easton, 
1967; see also Chapter 4). Although the basic set of these institutions has remained 
relatively stable for the last few centuries, new institutions arise for almost every 
issue or problem area that comes to be defined as something the political system 
should decide on. This already implies that beyond what is usually termed “gov-
ernment”, or “the state”, which comprises institutions of ultimate decision mak-
ing at a given level of the polity, there are many more elements constitutive of a 
political system. Yet, the classical description and conceptualization of horizontal 
differentiation of the political system is arguably somewhat constraining when 
attempting to gather and understand the entire range of contemporary empirical 
observations. In other words, against the background of continuous horizontal 
differentiation, there is also a constant need to refine the possible range of sub-
systems, organizations and institutions that constitute today’s political systems. 
For example, it appears that non-governmental organizations and social move-
ments, the shifting nature of political parties and parliaments, the virtualization 
of public communication and opinion, and a range of other potential candidates 
should be considered when studying the structures that are relevant for political 
communication, decision making, inclusion roles and responsiveness in a given 
contemporary polity. This attention is also justified if scholars attempt to include 
empirical findings from autocracies. Altogether, looking at the horizontal dif-
ferentiation of political systems, it seems fair to say that there are formal func-
tional standards of the institutional make-up in the world population of political 
systems. Yet, as mentioned earlier, scholars must always accommodate regional 
(and otherwise founded, e.g., ideological, regime) differences between political 
systems, including, for example, differences in individual elements or processes 
that are part of the subsystems or institutions of modern political systems (see 
Volume II of this book). 
In the following section, we discuss those elements that are unique to the po-
litical system and constitutive of its autonomy, with no claim of completeness. A 
later chapter specifically examines structural coupling and concessions of auton-
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omy that involve other functional systems of society. Again, the goal here is not 
to meticulously explain the genesis of subsystem and institution building or to 
paraphrase the existing literature.31 We limit our account to presenting selected 
observations of contemporary horizontal differentiation in political systems that 
we believe can provide the foundation for future empirical and theoretical explo-
rations.
Some spotlights on continuous horizontal differentiation: 
political institutions, organizations and processes 
Government and ministries
Historically, government structures and ministries were chief ly organized 
around a handful of responsibilities, such as taxation, policing and defense/
warfare, deemed important for maintaining the integrity of the collectivity and 
for sustaining a system of rule. Today, the complex structure and array of min-
istries, agencies and other governmental bodies ref lects the scope and nature of 
the issues the political system is now responsible for, that is, is supposed to decide 
upon. While in democracies, some of the decision-making about these issues is 
further outsourced to non-majoritarian organizations (see Chapter 5), in general, 
the structure of ministries gives a relatively good impression of a government’s 
priorities and the career of policy issues. There are several core functions always 
present and usually separate, such as trade and economy, defense, and justice; 
but beyond that, there is usually no rule or constitution prescribing a specific 
structure of ministries. See, for instance, the history of ministries such as “so-
cial affairs”, “labor/employment”, “environment(al protection)”, or “consumer 
protection” worldwide. Furthermore, with each new incoming cabinet and often 
at any time during a government’s term, ministries can be rearranged, merged, 
dissolved and relabeled. While this is often explained by changes in the public 
budget, it can also hint at shifting priorities and trends in the conceptualization 
of political problems. Is “energy” (production and security) an individual entity, 
or does it fall within the realm of the ministry of commerce or the ministry of the 
environment, for instance, and which of those units is responsible for the regu-
lation of “whaling” in certain countries where that is an issue? Is “nuclear safety” 
a prominent issue and why is it a part of the Ministry for the Environment and 
31  For Luhmann, “state-ness” entailed the classical trias: parliament, government and public admi-
nistration, and the system of law which he described as a function system of its own. Before this 
dif ferentiation, “states” according to his understanding did not exist. As subsystems of the po-
litical, he identified politics (meaning political decision-making, usually by the executive), party 
politics, and the public sphere (“Öf fentlichkeit”) (1997, 2002). Altogether, his theory of internal 
functional dif ferentiation of the political system is not exhaustive and has sometimes been cri-
ticized for being merely based on his observation of democracies. 
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Nature Conservation in Germany? And why was “Heimat” (the official English 
translation used is “community”) suddenly added to the German Federal Ministry 
of the Interior in 2018 (and both merged with the Building Department, which 
had so long been a part of the Ministry of Transportation)? The same is true for 
the vertical allocation of issues and ministries in a polity: while autocracies tend 
to be more unitary and rather replicate a functional pattern found at the central 
level, with a few exceptions that are seen as national matters (e.g., defense), in 
democratic systems, especially federal ones, subnational tiers can – to a certain 
degree – decide on their own ministerial or departmental structures, combina-
tions of responsibilities, and even denominations.  
Organizing government around problems is, in itself, not a characteristic of 
modern political systems. The relatively uniform global establishment of subdivi-
sions that build capacity for collectively binding decisions in specific fields, how-
ever, should be seen as part of the “worldwide cultural and associational process” 
(Meyer et al., 1997) surrounding the constant evolution of modern nation states, 
regardless of regime differences. At the international and global level, these pat-
terns are not replicated. There are a range of international organizations and enti-
ties of the United Nations Organization that address issues of general concern and 
of specifically global or planetary concern. However, these organizations are not 
as interdependent as the parallel issue-bound units within countries are, nor do 
they usually make binding decisions that can be enforced in a defined collectivi-
ty. For all polities at the country level and below, however, government below the 
immediate leadership level is organized around collective problems. This arrange-
ment not only facilitates, internally, the processing of difficult policy issues, but 
also helps to identify counterparts when countries (or other levels of government) 
deal with each other. For instance, during bilateral state visits, details of trade 
agreements or defense collaboration are not discussed by the two heads of state, 
but rather by the relevant ministers and their specialized staff – and, increasingly, 
governmental-external or non-governmental actors (see below).
Overall, how a polity arranges its functional responsibilities, ministries and 
departments may vary, but there is always such a structure and elements of this 
structure look alike to a certain degree. Interestingly, it is within this structure 
that performance roles of very different provenience meet and merge. This is most 
obvious in the governmental bureaucracies of democracies, where, commonly, 
elected representatives and often party candidates (who are “fremdreferentiell” 
[Luhmann, 2002]) and appointed professional officials (who as bureaucrats are 
“selbstreferentiell”) come together (see also Chapter 5).
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Public administration and bureaucracy 
In general, political bureaucracy and public administration in different areas 
and at different levels of the political system is seen as a “corrective” between 
the legislative branch (that produces political decisions), and existing laws, the 
expectations of the population, and the values and norms of society as a whole. 
Ideally, this is where political decisions are finally made “feasible” (Weber, 1922) 
and where their effective implementation is prepared and organized (Parson, 1937, 
1966). Scholars have also found that this sphere is a realm of irrationality and ar-
bitrariness, conservatism and inefficiency (Merton, 1940), and “useful illegality” 
(Luhmann, 1964).  
In traditional polities, e.g. in the large historical empires, bureaucracy already 
involved professionalism and specialization, but was usually congruent with the 
mere exercise of centralized authority across space and different levels based 
solely on the interpretation of top-down verdicts. Today, this pattern often sur-
vives in authoritarian contexts, especially absolute monarchies. However, even in 
current autocracies, forms of a modern bureaucracy coexist (see the example of 
Saudi Arabia [Hertog, 2011]). Modern public administration can be regarded as a 
subsystem in and of itself that includes structural coupling with other function-
al systems of society. This arrangement involves a considerable degree of agency 
among the incumbents of performance roles, which usually leads to decisions that 
are factual and pragmatic decisions (“Sachentscheidungen”) and not necessarily 
majoritarian/democratic ones (see also Chapter 5).
At the same time, another trend that seems to be a fruitful basis for more em-
pirical research is the evolution of bureaucratic performance roles themselves: 
worldwide, political offices and a professional civil service often co-exist in a bu-
reaucracy. This means that there are non-permanent elected and non-elected, i.e. 
assigned political leadership positions coexisting with non-elected – and often 
permanent – departmental staff. Take, for example, local attorneys general, their 
chief prosecutors, and the rest of a state’s or county’s department of justice in the 
United States. Access to performance roles in the political administration can 
thereby look very different in different countries, as well as at different levels of 
the same polity in a single country. How exactly does this affect how decisions are 
made and implemented in each case?
Finally, access to performance roles in the administration as well as interac-
tion with these roles on the part of audience roles is increasing, while at the same 
time the asymmetry of these two role types is becoming less pronounced. Treut-
ner described this dual trend as the shift from “subjects” to “clients” (1994). The 
shift seems to be affecting both the general structures of administrative commu-
nication as well as the inclusion of administrative clients in specific processes, for 
instance, via practices of public deliberation (see, e.g., Dryzek, 2006) and thereby 
the creation of secondary performance roles. Interestingly, this dynamic appears to 
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be largely independent of the political context (i.e., the regime type) and occur-
ring across the globe, as self-descriptions and the repertoire of modern public 
administration have become more similar over recent decades (see, e.g., Pollitt 
and Bouckaert, 2004; Treutner, 1994).32 Promising areas of relevant empirical and 
comparative research include continuing and often globally synchronous admin-
istrative differentiation as well as the worldwide emergence of secondary perfor-
mance roles, access to these roles, and how all this is in each case related to forms 
of political inclusion and responsiveness.
Political leadership roles 
A similarly interesting type of political performance role is the role of the “leader” 
of a community, especially the leader at the top of a national polity. Democracies 
and democratic constitutions, in particular, institutionalized the distinction of 
and differentiation into office and incumbent as well as term limits and, in gener-
al, an orderly leadership change. Theoretically, the distinction between office and 
person is also a characteristic of modern autocracies, but in their case, the specifi-
cation of the top office(s) as well as leadership change is a more volatile aspect. The 
Communist Party of China, for instance, has practically abolished the personal 
cult after the era of Deng Xiaoping in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and has held 
on to this principle, together with the institutionalization of term limits, for the 
last roughly 30 years. Someone had to fill the office of the general secretary and 
state president and this person was found through a nomenklatura system and 
party-internal elections. Until very recently, with the second term of Xi Jinping, 
which began in 2018, the CCP was even openly committed to the idea of “collective 
leadership”, that is, the promotion of a team, consisting of president and premier 
(prime minister), as is common in other countries. During the term of Hu Jintao 
and Wen Jiabao (2003-2013) and the initial years of the term of Xi Jinping and Li 
Keqiang (2013-2018), this arrangement worked. Recently, however, developments 
in China appear to have reversed this reform, as term limits for Xi as president 
were abolished in March 2018 and at the same time Premier Li Keqiang began to 
withdraw from the public eye in propaganda and press reports. A similar reversal 
occurred in Russia, with the re-emergence of Vladimir Putin as president in 2012, 
after he had served as prime minister under interim president Dmitry Medvedev 
to circumvent the limit of two consecutive terms, which was in place at that time. 
It is now unclear when Putin will step down, if ever, who could be his successor 
and what this leadership change would look like.     
Coming back to the fact that polities differentiate between political perfor-
mance roles, it is interesting to note that the terms currently used to refer to heads 
32  Arnstein (1969) provided some helpful heuristic approaches for distinguishing “tokenism” and 
genuine accessibility of and public participation in local administration.
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of state worldwide have remarkable semantic similarity:33 presidents, prime min-
isters, chancellors, and their combination (Helms, 2005). The mere denomination 
alone does not reveal anything about the actual distributions of power or – in 
countries where there is a combination of these two top offices, usually republics – 
the functional division of labor between these offices. Compare, for instance, the 
office of the president in Germany with its counterparts in France or the United 
States. As diverse as democratic constitutions are regarding the details of govern-
mental procedures and interrelationships, top political offices are labelled very 
similarly. Modern autocracies nominally model their leadership offices around 
the same semantics. A remaining alternative to the dominant designations is the 
highly personalized “supreme” or “great leader” category, which was traditionally 
used in fascist, far-right and communist systems. This label has recently been and 
still is used in some contexts, for instance, in Iran, Croatia/Bosnia and Herzego-
vina (1990s), Kazakhstan, North Korea, for Chavez in Venezuela, and in Turkmen-
istan – thus, the label now denotes pseudo-communist, Islamic-fundamentalist 
regimes and some individualist-kleptocratic rulers of the totalitarian kind. But 
even where this label is used, it usually applies only to the national-level leader 
role. How power and political functions are distributed beyond that is an empir-
ical question in each case. While this title is a signifier of a surviving traditional 
form of rule and types of authoritarianism, it can still be accompanied by other 
(formally) functionally differentiated levels and performance roles below the top 
leadership level.
Furthermore, as Chapter 6 discusses further, it is interesting to analyze the 
merits or qualifications necessary to be elected or selected for a leadership office 
in a polity, or even for any other political office. Is it charisma, general abilities 
and performance record, or professional knowledge and capability that makes a 
difference? And are these values stable over time or highly f luid? Is there societal 
consensus that a political leader ought to be a political “lay” person with other 
persuasive qualities, or a highly educated or seasoned professional or performer 
with specific but reproducible experience in certain fields (i.e., law, engineering, 
or administration) deemed important for the job? The answers to these questions 
are usually intimately connected to the observable notions of regime legitimacy 
found in a polity. Even among democracies the relevant shared values may vary; 
for example, there are differences between Switzerland (where incumbents of 
offices are usually not even full-time on the job), France (which has a special-
33  See, for example, the semantic analysis in Elgie, 2019. For subnational and supranational of fices, 
there is a bit more variety, it seems. The EU has presidents of the European Commission, the Par-
liament and the Council. Heads of international organizations are secretaries general, heads, or 
chairs; while locally, heads of government are governors, first ministers, or chief executives, for 
instance, followed by even more variance: mayors, prefects, magistrates, and others.  
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ly tailored and exclusive education system for politicians) and the United States 
(where having early success in raising funds for an electoral campaign is an offi-
cially sanctioned attribute that candidates must exhibit) in this regard. In modern 
autocracies, charisma is usually reserved for the top leader, while specialists are 
preferred for other offices in the leading government positions. Absolute kleptoc-
racies, of course, do not need specialists in any field other than predation, as gov-
ernment is not expected to work efficiently at all.
Finally, what all these different observations reveal is that although there are 
historical forms of co-rule, often termed “diarchies”, and though many if not most 
countries today use a combination of an overall head of state and a head of the ad-
ministration/executive, there is always a power asymmetry and usually everyone 
within the polity knows which performance role, i.e. which office is the most pow-
erful one. There can always be only one top authority; there is almost never real 
“collective leadership”. And as differentiated as other political performance roles 
may be – extending infinitely in a horizontal dimension – given the stability and 
constraints of the polity as such, it seems there is always an element of asymmetry, 
as there is always one leadership position, one leadership role needed. Someone 
ultimately has to decide. Sometimes, when so much power is accumulated in one 
leadership role and by a particularly charismatic incumbent – often coupled with 
a crisis through which he/she leads the country – this power role may even cul-
minate in a “quasi king” status, as, for instance, in the cases of Charles de Gaulle 
(France) and George Washington (USA) (Ahlers and Stichweh, 2019, p. 822). In 
democracies, this asymmetry is ideally mediated by the fact that parliament, for 
instance, counts as an equal branch of government (see below), and that actual 
decision-making practices (checks and balance) depend on whether authority is or-
ganized in a presidential system or a parliamentary system, and on the power of 
the judiciary to interfere in the case of constitutional violations, or on the leader’s 
embeddedness in a party to which they must remain loyal, at least to a certain 
degree, among other things. Ultimately, in a democracy, the demos ought to be 
in the most powerful position as it can oust the incumbent of even the most su-
perior leadership position through a vote. However, as Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018), 
among others, impressively demonstrated with the help of historical analysis, and 
as the events of recent years have made clear, these checks and balances of pow-
er do not come about automatically and there is no guarantee of ultimate demo-
cratic resilience. Part of the explanation may be that these checks and balances 
come into play at different times during the political process and during a polit-
ical term, and they (especially the democratic vote) follow a certain schedule and 
certain regularities. For instance, in a larger polity, general votes of confidence 
cannot be held any time this confidence seem to have eroded or is shaken. In the 
meantime, power asymmetry and asynchrony among political performance roles 
and the fact that there is always one leader can make a crucial difference. Most 
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often, it is not institutions, but “procedural norms”, in the words of Levitsky and 
Ziblatt, that help constrain these asymmetries. For the last five decades, it seems 
that the existence and the application of such norms could be taken for granted in 
the democratically ruled countries of the world. Recently, however, especially the 
21st century versions of populism have appeared to revert value structures and 
dissipate these procedural norms, as Chapter 6 will discuss. Almost immediately, 
populist administrations set out to particularly undermine checks and temporal 
constraints on leadership power and thereby existentially endanger democracy. 
Parliamentary bodies 
All modern polities institutionalize some sort of parliamentary body or repre-
sentative assembly and replicate these at several levels of their political system. 
In some world regions, these representative bodies have a long tradition. Cur-
rent-day Afghanistan, Pakistan, Mongolia, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan still 
have a Loya jirga (“grand assembly”) that originated in Altaic cultures and was 
institutionalized in the era of Genghis Khan. In Europe, estate representation at 
the royal courts slowly developed into a more diversified representation in the 
17th century and then into a party system in modern parliaments. As noted in the 
first half of this chapter, representation could mean having representatives (of a 
group or a region) in service at the center of power in a unitary system or build-
ing a cascading and interlinked ladder of representation at each level of the polity, 
which is often the case in federal systems. China, in contrast, did not have any of 
these structures until local “soviets” and a national congress were established, or 
more accurately, imported, in the early 20th century based on those that had been 
developed earlier in the Soviet Union. There was no institution of representation, 
but rather just a structure of centralized and top-down administration. At most, 
as in other traditional political order systems, this meant conceding aspects of 
decision making to local councils or other kinds of governing or administrating 
bodies without any linkages between one another – a form of self-rule, rather than 
representation.
No matter the different regional traditions, it seems that all current political 
systems feature some type of parliamentary body. Within these modern bodies, 
there are an endless number of committees that help members of parliament work 
on any issue the assembly plans to vote on. In other words, today’s parliaments 
have come to constitute not only an institutionalization of representation, or of 
support for or checks on the executive organs, but also a considerable issue-pro-
cessing subsystem of its own, meant to process an ever-increasing quantity of po-
litical problems and complexities. Parliaments can raise issues that the executive 
does not have on its agenda yet. In this way, the strict division of those “in pow-
er” versus those “in opposition” is blurred. This blurring depends on the specific 
constitutions of each parliament and whether and how issues can be brought up, 
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and there are marked differences between polities that have a two-party struc-
ture and those with a multi-party structure as well as between those with a single 
chamber system and those with a bicameral system. In addition, the executive, 
(i.e., the party/parties in power) can simply push their decisions through by re-
lying on their majority in parliament, even though this may not be an automatic 
process in multi-party structures (compare, for instance, the differences between 
the US system and the German or French systems). In general, however, parlia-
ments can wield considerable systemic political power of their own: they address 
the media and the general political public, they institutionalize performance roles 
and secondary performance roles of their own, and they feature overall structural 
coupling with other function systems of society. This is assisted by the virtual-
ization of political communication and public opinion (see below). For instance, 
representatives no longer only talk to their specific constituencies; via social me-
dia platforms they can easily address anyone in (and beyond) the polity. A recent 
focus on how minority far-right parties in many established democracies in Eu-
rope succeed in shaping political discourse and formal discussion, not only via 
their general campaigns and statements, but also, in particular, by proposing top-
ics for parliamentary debates, is one recognizable variant of this trend that may 
further weaken the “government/opposition” division in parliamentary bodies 
(Franzmann, 2016, 2019).  
Furthermore, while there are many fine studies of parliaments in democracies 
(e.g., Brichzin et al., 2018) as well as their internal properties, ways of selecting 
members, procedural characteristics and work styles, parliamentary bodies in au-
tocracies are not well studied. This is possibly because in an authoritarian context, 
where there is a stark hierarchy between performance roles, with the top lead-
ership positions usually unchallenged by any other branch of government, these 
parliaments are usually not taken seriously as institutions of representation or 
checks and balance. But here, again, the ongoing differentiation of parliaments as 
important bodies of problem communication and processing in modern politics 
may increasingly come into focus. While parliaments are very seldom platforms 
of particularistic representation and usually do not consist of freely elected mem-
bers, research has shown that they can act as institutions of indirect, collective 
representation and as consultative bodies in modern autocracies.34 An ever grow-
ing number of constantly changing problems is worked on in a variety of com-
mittees, commissions and groups; proposals are written to serve as a means of 
supporting agenda setting; and external experts are invited to attend and speak 
at hearings on whatever issues the institution choses to address or is tasked with 
processing. Considering the wider array of functions parliamentary bodies ful-
fill in modern political systems, even their authoritarian variants may turn out to 
34  For studies on the Chinese case, see, e.g., Manion, 2015, 2017; Sagild and Ahlers, 2019b.
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be interesting subjects for empirical and comparative research on differentiation, 
inclusion, and responsiveness.   
Elections and other forms of political voting 
For most scholars of political science and within political system theory, elections 
are treated as equivalent with the final differentiation of the modern political sys-
tem (Luhmann, 2002). Elections are the foundation of democracy and the core 
event of the democratic political process. They are considered the most crucial 
selection mechanism of the personnel for major performance roles such as lead-
ership positions and parliament mandates, and of a candidate’s or a party’s po-
litical program. Elections are usually held at all levels of a polity as well as within 
political organizations, e.g., parties and associations. In autocracies, elections 
are usually merely a ritual, given that free elections with an actual choice hardly 
ever exist. However, this procedure is nevertheless formally copied in autocratic 
systems, even if elections are rigged or of limited functionality (Schedler, 2006). 
This nominal presence shows that elections have emerged as the globally domi-
nant semantics of performance role selection and its legitimation. Even in autoc-
racies, no matter how unfree or unfair the election may be, the political leadership 
usually still ensures that elections are held at the national and/or the local levels, 
in the form of either popular or “inner-party” voting. Also, in all regimes, a whole 
industry emerges around elections. Campaigns have to be held and candidates 
presented with much pomp. This is also due to the fact that it has become widely 
necessary to point towards some kind of political competence, instead of under-
lining the candidate’s extra-political mission or ascriptive powers as was the case 
in earlier epochs and may still be the case in the remaining forms of traditional 
authoritarianism. 
As the above brief descriptions already insinuated, the existence of general 
elections per se does not make a democracy. Again, the function of elections and 
the forms of inclusion involved in the election processes need to be scrutinized 
in great detail in order to reach any conclusion about the regime type prevalent 
in a polity. The late granting of suffrage to women worldwide, or the turbulent 
history of enfranchisement and disenfranchisement of the African American pop-
ulation in the United States of America are just two examples that show how much 
the implementation of elections can be at odds with the idea of equal citizenship 
and universal suffrage even in modern democracies (Levitsky and Ziblatt, 2018; 
Parsons, 1965). Unresolved tensions concerning the form and expected function 
of elections also become obvious, for instance, in the continuing debate about 
the institution of the electoral college in the United States, or the vehemence with 
which the Trump White House enacted a Presidential Advisory Commission on 
Election Integrity to investigate disputed claims of widespread voter fraud, com-
plicate voter registration and promote a redrawing of constituencies, which would 
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all increase the weight of votes for the Republican Party in a given area. In Europe, 
the Brexit drama brought questions about the representativeness and legitimacy 
of the idea of the democratic majority principle to the forefront again: What is the 
necessary minimum turnout for an election in order to count as a valid decision? 
And how to legitimize that the decision reached in a process during which this 
quorum was hardly met should be binding for the rest of the collectivity? Making 
participation in an election mandatory for citizens is therefore sometimes chosen 
as a way of trying to secure a majority decision in polities around the world. More-
over, it may be interesting to look at cases in which contemporary alternatives to 
political elections are considered and tested again, such as selection for public of-
fice by lot, or “sortition” (Delannoi and Dowlen, 2016), and why. 
Formal membership, in general, is usually a precondition for inclusion in elec-
tions and other voting procedures. While participation in general or national elec-
tions is usually contingent upon citizenship, some countries have moved to allow 
for voting in local elections and community affairs based on legal resident status, 
which usually comprises a couple of years of uninterrupted work and residency in 
a foreign locality. As has been mentioned before, this once again bespeaks our ob-
servation of different forms of inclusion at different levels of the political system: 
while smaller-scale polities react and adapt to social trends in the 21st century, 
such as increased individual mobility (including dual citizenship) and global mi-
gration, national-level membership, and the political rights and forms of inclusion 
that follow, remains sacrosanct and relatively exclusive as the example of suffrage 
vividly illustrates. Furthermore, it is interesting to analyze and compare how cit-
izens’ voting rights are further regulated within polities today, and, in particular, 
what individual characteristics and qualifications, such as minimum age, literacy, 
“sanity”, or others, these rules are referring to (see also Chapter 3).    
Finally, while general and local elections come in many forms and can be found 
in both autocracies and democracies, referenda, or other forms of direct voting on 
specific issues, seem to be a procedure that is only really possible and imaginable 
in democracies. Only when an authoritarian government can control the outcome 
of a referendum vote beforehand will it permit such procedure, which is then only 
meant to bolster decisions already taken.35 Otherwise, public votes are seen to 
potentially destabilize and discontinue authoritarian rule, like in the case of the 
referenda organized – though unsuccessfully – by the opposition in Venezuela in 
recent years. Altogether, however, observers note a global increase in the call for 
and use of referenda (Seales, 2016). And, interestingly enough, we now often see 
especially proponents of populism, as in the case of far-right parties in Europe, 
35  A good example is probably the 2017 referendum among the citizens of Turkey about changes in 
the constitution that would grant President Erdogan more powers. The changes were approved 
by a 51.4% majority on the basis of a turnout of 85% (BBC, 2017). 
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referring to referenda as the ideal way of decision-making for the collectivity. At 
least that is what they propose as long as they are in the opposition, so that this 
call appears primarily as a vehicle in their campaigning for political support. Yet, 
there also still seem to be huge regional differences in the declared preference for 
and the feasibility of plebiscites and referenda.
Overall, it will be interesting to track whether this trend can be seen as an 
indicator of further differentiation or transformation of the institution of voting 
in today’s democratic political systems. Other embodiments of ongoing internal 
differentiation that we discuss in this chapter, such as the withering of political 
parties as direct platforms for particular interest and issue representation, the 
virtualization of public opinion, and the competition of forms of protest and 
movements with outcomes of regular elections and majority decisions, seem to be 
somewhat related to the semantical and practical rise of referenda in 21st century 
political systems.
Political parties 
Like parliaments mentioned above, parties as core political organizations have un-
dergone some major shifts in the history of modern political systems. Interesting-
ly, parties developed only in the later 18th century and were originally not regarded 
as a formal part of the state structure, not even of the formal decision-making 
process. Their general function was collective interest representation of former-
ly excluded social groups–especially the working class population–and a sort of 
lobbying for political issues not yet in the purview of the government at all, as 
a counterweight to the nobility, estates and monarchy, and other social elites 
which held decision-making positions. With the emergence of general elections, 
the distinction between parties as the bearer of the binary logic of government/
opposition in modern electoral democracies, and its function as a membership 
organization meant to bridge the whole political process from the voter, to the 
candidates for office, to the party group elected into parliament, and, finally, to 
the candidate for top leadership roles, emerged. At the same time, their neutral 
function as reducers of complexity in the political process, for interest represen-
tation and the preparation of political decisions, as well as “gatekeepers” and the 
selection of suitable candidates for performance roles, was questioned by obser-
vations such as the “iron law of oligarchy” (Michels, 1915). This observation also 
involves that what was once an individual’s motive to join a party and what he 
or she campaigned for when running for office may eventually be altered by the 
logics of the party organization and of government as a whole. These alterations 
potentially involve that the need for consensus replaces strong positioning, hier-
archies distort the equality of voice, access and decision-making power, and spe-
cific interest representation is overridden by general power play. To the contrary, 
independent, i.e. non-party aligned, candidates for leadership positions beyond 
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the local level, have, over roughly the last century, been very rare and their success 
needs extraordinary circumstances, such as financial resources, networks stem-
ming from former party membership, or the support by others in power, among 
other things. Party membership and party organizations have, so far, been the 
necessary precondition to develop and supply incumbents of performance roles 
in democracies. Recent observations may come to shake up this understanding 
though, as we will discuss below.
Parties may therefore be much more complex organizations than just media or 
bridges between the collectivity of citizens in a polity and the rulers, or between 
interests and ultimate decisions. Among the many things that could be said about 
political parties, a few facets of contemporary differentiation will be highlighted 
here that illustrate points of departure for exciting empirical studies in line with 
our overall research interests:
First, the non-binding preparation of decision making that is described as one 
of the main functions of political parties can be expected to happen no matter 
whether a party is on the governmental or the opposition side. When a party is 
in power, these decisions may ultimately materialize, of course. When a party is 
part of the opposition, too, providing alternatives for future decision making are 
the groundwork of a party’s program and the promises with which it seeks to gain 
votes. In order to win an election, a party and its candidates, it is described, need 
to communicate to the public their “capacity to govern” (Reese-Schäfer, 2002). 
Voters would need to be able to trust that the party and the elected representatives 
will be able to follow through with the program and the policies they promised, 
and this confidence is why voters would cast a ballot in favor of this party and can-
didate. Interestingly, it seems that the current rise of populism as well as fringe 
parties around the world may be an indicator of a declining need to evoke and 
prove the capacity to actually govern in order to be able to prepare or even inf lu-
ence decisions. For example: The thrust with which new populist far-right parties 
in the multi-party-systems of Europe gained votes and entered parliaments obvi-
ously worries established parties. In order to react to what appear to be changes 
in the preferences of a considerable part of the voters, they may sometimes begin 
to proactively include some shades of these alternative, more right-wing policy 
propositions into their own party programs, in order not to cede more votes to the 
new competitor. Small and rapidly emerging new parties can thereby alter other 
parties’ “non-binding preparation of decisions”. The same has probably happened 
before, around the rise of the Green parties worldwide. The case of far-right par-
ties, however, may still be a bit different and it may have different implications, 
for reasons we will state below and because their proclaimed goal is usually to 
re-enact a more traditional form of polity and politics. This involves, for instance, 
the re-strengthening of exclusively national polities, anti-globalism, beliefs and 
feelings instead of knowledge and expertise, authoritarian decision-making, uni-
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ty over diversity, and conservation instead of innovation; aspirations that run 
counter to the ideas of a polity and of politics that emerged and were fairly domi-
nant in the later 20th century.
Another trend that is connected to the aforementioned observation, one could 
argue, is that over the course of roughly 200 years of parties as crucial organi-
zations in the political system, political issues have become ever more complex. 
There is no longer just one big question about whether the state should provide 
social security to citizens, how much taxes should be raised, or whether to go to 
war with another country, as was the case in the early era of parties. Alongside 
the general differentiation of party systems, the number of issues that need to be 
processed and decided upon, ad-hoc and long-term, in myriad party sub-groups, 
small parliamentary committees, ministries and general assemblies, grows 
steadily. This makes the bridging and mediating function of parties much more 
difficult. While a voter might be aware of a party’s general position on the scope 
of public welfare services, the principles of taxation, or the preference for eco-
nomic growth versus resource protection, and other specific areas of individual 
importance to him or her, it will not necessarily be clear or known what position 
the same party represents when dealing with highway fees, same-sex marriage, 
or research funding. At the same time, parties constantly screen society for new 
topics on which decisions seem to be imminent, and adapt these for programs and 
policies tailored to their electorates – old and new ones – even before voters may 
have ever heard about these issues or have ref lected on ways to approach it (see 
also Chapter 4 on responsiveness). In both cases, a lot of trust and ex ante support 
is necessary. Facing the enormous catalogue of issues for which political decisions 
are sought today, no one can ever have a complete orientation. And one does not 
need to, as long as one is satisfied with the overall sum and initiatives the party 
promotes, and can tolerate solutions one does not approve of in policy areas that 
are considered not so important to oneself. In case this is no longer satisfactory, 
one can vote differently in the next election (Merkley et al., 2019). On the contrary, 
it is possible that an issue of importance or a desired solution is not promoted 
by any party or candidate, and one can then choose to tolerate this vacuum for 
a while hoping for future attention, alienate oneself from active participation in 
politics and from the party system, or protest (see below). 
Ever more complex knowledge needed to draft non-binding policy decisions 
in today’s society is another important factor impacting on parties and how they 
operate. As there is no knowledge germane to the political system, it is no prob-
lem for democracies to accept incumbents of performance roles who are total 
“lay” persons. It suffices, in fact it is principally required, as a qualification that 
they, besides charisma, can convey their ability to implement the voters’ will and 
– based on these demands – are able to gather the knowledge, expertise and ex-
perience necessary to prepare policy solutions. For this purpose, representatives 
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can usually rely upon professional staff in party committees and the governmen-
tal administration; they do not need to possess all knowledge and understand-
ing themselves. The role of those who do in fact possess factual and specialized 
knowledge, and who are not in the first instance party loyalists, becomes ever 
more important.36 Extrapolated to the systemic level, this tension between the ev-
er-growing complexity of issues and the democratic ideal of a direct transmission 
of the will of the people eventually leads to an occasional conceding of autonomy 
over decision-making to non-majoritarian institutions and other function sys-
tems, as Chapter 5 will discuss more broadly.
These developments appear to also have consequences for the way parties 
function more generally. Representation of a static social class or group as was the 
case when parties emerged, transformed into offering a specific dogma and/or 
manageable set of solutions for the individual voter’s choice. Currently, it seems, 
that together with the expansion of policy issues and the diversification and de-
centralization of levels of decision-making that was discussed in the previous sec-
tion, the basis for supporting a party moves away from a focus on specific issue 
governance and tilts back to more abstract collective alignments. But this time, 
these collective abstractions no longer represent static social cleavages and related 
ideologies, as Luhmann (2002) already described, but instead increasingly come 
in the form of more diffuse values and identities to rally around. These values then 
help to safeguard the necessary trust in the competency of the elected party and 
office incumbents to decide in a way that the voter can agree with. However, as 
most established parties have weakened their ideological profiles (that were his-
torically based on Conservatism, Christianity, Socialism, Anti-Communism, for 
instance) over the course of the last decades, new, more fundamentally-oriented 
or populist parties may benefit from this trend of confronting over-complexity 
with general orientations.
Finally, one core manifestation of the types of populism and personalism that 
emerged around the world at the beginning of the 21st century, is the sharp dis-
tinction between the party collective and individual candidates for or in leader-
ship positions. It will be interesting to trace empirically whether this tendency, in 
the long term, will have an effect on parties’ core function of selection, prepara-
tion and installation of political personnel. As the last chapter will describe, pop-
ulists traditionally come from outside of the established party system; once suc-
cessful, they build a new party around themselves. Or they emerge within a party 
– if they have not changed parties at least once along the way already – and then 
claim to work against its “rotten structures” from the inside. For the latter variant, 
36  See also the study of social networks among legislators in the United States Congress by Chris-
tian Fong (2020), who showed how much the legislatorsʼ voting decision is of ten based on ex-
changes of expertise across party lines, even in times of strong partisan polarization. 
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Donald J. Trump’s campaign, and the theory of the “deep state” in Washington 
D.C. that is popular among his base, is a good example. The so-called deep state 
implies that positions in government and administration, mainly the career posts 
in departments and agencies, are filled with members of a corrupt network who 
harmfully neglect the will of the American people and therefore need to be purged 
by the president and his allies. Interestingly enough, the targets of this campaign 
also include registered Republicans and career officials who have served under al-
ternating presidents of both parties. This seems to imply that while the party pro-
vided a platform for the candidate to run on, his ascent to power has upended the 
principle of mutual loyalty. The Republican Party, naturally clinging to the power 
and fallouts that the presidency entails overall, does so far not move to intervene 
in or stop these smear campaigns or retaliations, although Trump’s actions go 
against not only members but also proclaimed goals and values of the Republi-
can Party. Other recent cases of successful populists in Europe represent more 
classic stories of independent campaigning and newfound parties.37 The question 
in all these episodes of populism and personalism, though, is how sustainable a 
focus on one person will be and to what end, and whether these experiences will 
have lasting effects on established party organizations and their political function 
around the world.
While all the above summaries of the function of political parties and their 
ongoing differentiation into altering means of party organization, personnel re-
cruitment and logic of representation, was naturally geared more towards dem-
ocratic political systems, some ref lections on political parties in authoritarian 
contexts seem warranted. Like parliaments and elections, political parties here 
often just seem to be window dressing, i.e. formalistic copies of democratic insti-
tutions meant to legitimize autocratic rule, without any real power in the political 
process. Yet, in some cases party organizations and membership in parties and 
mass organizations is very important, as is, not least, suggested by the semantics 
37  Interestingly, as has historically been the case with alliances between promoters of extremist 
political currents and ideologies, we see also global structures of direct communication, le-
arning and emulation between populist parties. The teams and allies of Donald Trump in the 
United States, Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil, UKIP and the Brexit Party around Nigel Farage in Great 
Britain, and Marine Le Pen in France, among others, seek exchange and connections, of ten very 
publicly. They frequently praise and refer to each other’s successes and claim to be part of one 
“movement”, although it does not really become clear what strategies and goals this movement 
actually pursues, beyond some shared preferences for nationalism and anti-globalism as well 
as anti-immigrant policies among its proponents. Furthermore, this alliance appears rather vir-
tual and based on individual personal exchanges, instead of being structural. Dif ferent from 
20th century populism, authoritarian ideologies and movements, today’s populists thus, so far, 
appear to rather work towards power and dominance (maybe even autocracy) in their particular 
national settings, but do not necessarily aim at world rule. 
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of “one-party regimes/rule” and “one-party states”. The Chinese Communist Party 
is probably the most compelling contemporary example of such a one-party sys-
tem, in which a party does not function as an interest organization, but instead 
constitutes the whole state structure. It is not restricted to the domains of parties 
in a democracy, which have to cope with the fact that rule is only temporary and 
that their suggestions for political solutions are always competing with others. In 
China, although there is formally a state structure and bureaucracy that is sepa-
rate from the Party since the beginning of the Reform era in the 1980s, the CCP 
copies that same structure again in both the horizontal dimension and across all 
levels and thereby in fact dominates all crucial decision making, including in oth-
er function systems. In addition, incumbents of positions in either domain can 
move back and forth between these two structures without restrictions. The party 
is therefore probably more important as an organization, or actually subsystem, 
here than in other current authoritarian regimes, where parties are more or less 
just an imitation of modern politics and, at most, used to demarcate those be-
longing to the network in power and those who will never get a chance to exercise 
power. Furthermore, even one-party systems change over time, as the Chinese 
example can illustrate again. Party membership, for instance, is not absolutely 
obligatory anymore in order to fill lower-level political (and other) performance 
roles in China today; overall loyalty to the CCP regime is enough. And although 
party membership still offers additional inclusion chances, it is not the only rel-
evant mechanism anymore. Prerequisites for Communist Party membership in 
China were ideologically – actually functionally – modified over the course of 
the last two decades, as the CCP now even welcomes private entrepreneurs and 
claims to represent them, while at the same time it can tap into these new mem-
ber groups as a resource for information gathering and policy reform by allowing 
them some (orderly) voice in the political process.38 That means, in most authori-
tarian regimes, party membership can at the same time foster inclusive and exclu-
sive structures and it is always worth looking beyond the general categorization 
“one-party state” to understand forms and effects of ongoing differentiation in 
each case.
Other political organizations: 
NGOs, interest organizations and political issue networks
While we elaborated above how crucial party organizations and party member-
ship are in democratic and many authoritarian political systems, democracies 
tend to not only rely on parties as organizations of political agenda setting and the 
38  See, for example, Sagild and Ahlers, 2019a. In general, see especially Heberer’s thorough reflec-
tions on the concept of representation and its application to and in China (2019). See also Vol-
ume II of this book for more details.
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preparation of collective decision making as well as personnel recruitment, but to 
a large degree on other organizations and communities, too. Among these other 
organizations, so-called non-governmental organizations (NGOs), interest asso-
ciations, foundations, and lobby groups stand out. While they may all have very 
different origins and operate in many different ways, and it is therefore hard to 
lump them together in a generalizing description, their core goal and modus ope-
randi is to inf luence collectively binding decision making.39 These organizations 
usually have a very specific issue area they are engaged in, such as environmen-
tal protection, health, support for the arts, or labor conditions, and they try to 
promote their preferred understanding and approach to these problems through 
non-profit, public and non-public measures. Apart from interest articulation and 
norm communication, consultation and advocacy vis-à-vis government-inter-
nal and -external addressees, these organizations have come to also function as 
a steppingstone for members to take on (secondary) political performance roles. 
Different from the ones usually sought by party members, these are mainly posi-
tions in the governmental agencies and ministerial bureaucracy, not necessarily 
executive or leadership positions. 
Furthermore, while NGOs and interest associations can work at very differ-
ent scales – think of a local group that promotes car driving restrictions in the 
city center vs. a global one like the International Labor Organization – and are 
usually oriented at very particularistic interest representation, they can be much 
more transnationally or even globally oriented than parties. They, much more nat-
urally, often conceptualize themselves as members of a Weltöffentlichkeit (“world 
public”) who inject political processes with normative interventions and practical 
solutions for specific issues of – in their view – global concern. On the one hand, 
this is where these organizations often draw legitimacy and strength from, but 
it can also constrain them, because it may render identifying and addressing the 
relevant polity that is responsible and able to address the problem in focus much 
more difficult. On the other hand, state actors have in recent decades also under-
stood this ambition and the effects of these local and global organizations and net-
works for the political system, and they have moved to include members of NGOs 
and interest organizations in public hearings, governmental commissions, and 
as bearers of “track 2”-diplomacy initiatives upon state visits. As a consequence, 
we can observe a striking global convergence in the semantics pertaining to these 
organizations. But what is now called a “non-governmental organization” around 
the world, may be embedded and operate in very different local and regional po-
39  There are exceptions to this among NGOs. Some of the organizations in this broad group may 
just see their purpose in providing platforms for – of ten charitable – community engagement 
or services directed at very particular groups, without aiming at the collectivity as a whole and 
at political decision making in general in a polity. 
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litical settings. Authoritarian regimes, in particular, usually seek penetration of 
society not only via political party organizations, but also through what actually 
are mass organizations with obligatory membership, such as youth leagues, wom-
en’s associations, or trade unions. These organizations are often just sub-organi-
zations of the ruling party or clique, and not formally independent associations 
like in democracies. Another prevalent phenomenon in autocratic contexts is that 
authorities encroach upon independently evolving grassroots organizations and 
– if they do not force them to shut down completely – incorporate or convert these 
organizations’ services and activities into the structures of public goods provision 
that the state officially takes credit for. A close examination of these different re-
alities around the world, for instance, an analysis of the actual autonomy of these 
organizations from governmental or party structures, the way that the policy sug-
gestions they produce are processed, as well as their self-conceptualization and 
societal acceptance, can add valuable perspectives to our understanding of differ-
entiation, inclusion and responsiveness in modern political systems.40 
This said, in many ways NGOs therefore increasingly complement the func-
tions of political parties as core organizations of the political system, although 
they are organized and operate differently and although they and their members 
lack a clear and majoritarian mandate. Finally, there may, however, be some cases 
in which trans-regional and trans-national organizations and networks can actu-
ally enfold a distinct relevance for collectively binding decision making, or at least 
for a broad distribution of public goods (Hooghe and Marks, 2016; Witt, 2005). 
This status then runs counter to the dominant multi-level differentiation and seg-
mentation of the political system. Examples of such transregional non-govern-
mental (and initially not even political) organizations are, for instance, “parallel” 
or “grey states” as they may be found in the Muslim brotherhood, or Catholic orga-
nizations such as “Opus Dei” or the Jesuit order as older prominent examples. So 
far, however, these last examples do not seem to indicate a significant and stable 
trend of differentiation, although it can still be interesting to study such cases in 
light of our interest in regime bipolarity and forms of political inclusion. 
Protest and movements 
Protests and movements are social phenomena that are undoubtedly relevant po-
litically, but there is no clear agreement on how to treat these phenomena theo-
retically. Both are events and mechanisms that are not confined to the political 
system, as they can occur as forms of contention, complaints, or resistance in 
other function systems as well (Hirschman, 1970). Due to this ambiguity probably, 
protest and movements are on the one hand usually not included in descriptions 
40  See Volume II of this book for empirical analyses of dif ferent world regions, especially Russia 
and China.
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of established institutions and processes of the political system, while they are on 
the other hand universally regarded as one of the cornerstones of citizens’ political 
rights in a democracy. Against this background, one can probably best charac-
terize them as an informal corrective, a disturbance and irritation, triggered by 
disagreement over a decision – or non-decision – and staged as an attempt to 
bring about a change of course. 
Observable forms of protests can encompass participatory publics, actions 
through formal channels (depending on the context, these could embrace, for ex-
ample, debate, petitioning, or strike) as well as informal, even illegal means, such 
as disobedience, occupation, violent protest, riots, revolt, or coups d’état. They can 
involve both individual and collective acts, although it is commonly the latter that 
has the potential to actually affect collectively binding decision making in a pol-
ity. Political protest can be both very specific and more abstract and appear at all 
levels of the political system: it can take the form of local protests directed at a spe-
cific political project or problem, a nation-wide protest calling for removing the 
current political leadership, or international activism targeting global economic 
inequality. The semantics “social movement”, it seems, is invoked when there is a 
specific issue at stake, but maybe not a clear address in the political system (i.e. a 
particular level or institution of decision making) to turn to, or rather when there 
are several, for instance in environmental or labor movements. The movement is 
then usually either demanding this issue to be raised and recognized as a political 
problem in the first place, or to alter the political solutions offered for this issue 
at that moment.
In a democracy, citizens enjoy legal protection in the sense that political pro-
test is not retaliated against, as long as the related action does not break any laws. 
To the contrary, in autocracies, broadly speaking, laws are often enacted proac-
tively to prohibit any such irregular actions that could include opposing the rul-
ing power, which puts citizens in legal jeopardy. More often than not, protests 
or broad-based movements are simply not tolerated and they are deterred by raw 
force, meaning that those engaged in them may also have to fear for their lives. 
There is, however, also ample research showing that this broad-brush summary 
does not always paint the whole picture, especially when ones takes into account 
multilevel differentiation in an authoritarian setting. While movements or forms 
of oppositional action at the national scale are usually not tolerated in autocra-
cies, local instances of disobedience and specific localized protests are sometimes 
permitted under certain circumstances, as they also serve as an important mech-
anism to gather information and to control subordinate levels of government and 
leaders, or put more abstractly: to generate responsiveness (see O’Brien and Li, 
2006; Frye and Borisova, 2019).
Finally, over the last two to three decades, increased global mobility and dig-
italization, especially the rise of social media, can be seen as developments that 
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directly affect the occurrence, nature and strategies of collective political protest 
in both democratic and authoritarian settings. Together with other phenome-
na outlined above, such as the surge of populism, the ever-growing complexity 
of policy issues (e.g. climate change) including the disagreement over whether 
to meet these challenges with expertocracy or ideology, the changing status of 
parties and the parallel solidification of global political interest-based organiza-
tions, among other things, there is the potential that protest comes to represent 
one case of a more substantial differentiation in today’s political system than 
the theoretical literature was so far able to acknowledge. Research will need to 
confirm whether protests and movements represent a fundamental potential for 
signicicant political inclusion in the form of an extra-parliamentary, extra-party 
and maybe sometimes even extra-legal claim or corrective (e.g. in the case of the 
different “Occupy” movements, or initiatives such as Extinction Rebellion, etc.). 
It might indicate a new type of political inclusion that is neither dependent on 
formal membership in a specific and confined polity or organization – something 
that all other political institutions, organizations and subsystems rely upon –, nor 
does it necessarily require the identification of a formal or even exclusive address 
in the political system or in the world polity. Not least, the self-conceptualization 
of protest actors and movements, including the ways that their legitimacy and 
representativeness is argued for or against, will make this a paradigmatic context 
for studying democratic and authoritarian regime features in both a vertical and 
horizontal dimension in the political system.
Increasingly autonomous relevance of “public opinion” 
and the virtualization of political inclusion 
Closely connected to the developments just mentioned, a few thoughts on the dif-
ferent forms of a political public from which a “public (political) opinion” is de-
rived and channeled into agenda setting in the political system today seem war-
ranted. Galloping digitalization and groundbreaking innovations in the field of 
information technology referred to above, appear to strengthen the role of and the 
increasing autonomous relevance of public opinion and thereby a virtualization 
of political inclusion, from which potential further and probably quite significant 
differentiations can arise.    
Both tendencies can be observed in contemporary political systems largely 
independently of the regime type under scrutiny. Conventionally, the free for-
mation, competition and the institutional processing of public opinion(s), counts 
as one of the cornerstones of modern democracy. Public opinion can find its ex-
pression in traditional and new (social) media debates, protests and petitions, and 
other representations of voice in a diverse population (“published opinion”), but it 
attains its most tangible form when it is purposefully investigated and utilized for 
political purposes. The extreme prominence of public surveys, for instance, in the 
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United States and – albeit to a lesser degree – European politics, in order to an-
ticipate election results and to detect major collective political demands and their 
distribution, is one exemplification of this desire to constantly feel the pulse of the 
public opinion. As this collective singular already implies, for incumbents of polit-
ical performance roles and those in positions of power it is most relevant to know 
what issues are deemed politically important and which related political propos-
als will be appealing to the majority, or at least to majoritarian groups in a polity. 
This can, however, also mean that public opinion can have an impact on political 
decision making on a specific issue that is rather independent of other democratic 
institutions such as parties and elections – especially the more sophisticated and 
pervasive the continuous screening of public opinion becomes. For example, when 
chancellor Angela Merkel, a physicist, announced shortly after the Fukushima di-
saster in Japan in 2011 that Germany would definitively phase out nuclear energy, 
she – so the often-used explanation – reacted to the public opinion palpable at 
that time. This decision was a real U-turn that was neither part of her party’s, the 
CDU’s, program nor an issue that Merkel ran on in her campaign. Quite the con-
trary: her government in 2010 had just proclaimed an extension of state support 
for the operation of nuclear power plants; a decision that completely revised the 
course of the previous government of the Social Democrats and the Green Party 
who, as a major issue on their agenda, had announced the end of nuclear energy 
in Germany in 2000. This episode, among other things, earned her the nickname 
“Stimmungskanzlerin” (“mood chancellor”). Interestingly enough, as such mock-
ery implies, a political decision and probable change of course that appears to be 
an irregular response to a somewhat perceived public opinion usually attracts 
criticism: As much as it for some observers may embody a reaction to popular de-
mands and thereby an adherence to the principle of democracy, it may for others 
appear to be just a response to the ‘loudest’ voices, not necessarily the majority. 
In the latter reading, hasty reactions to a somewhat defined public opinion may 
therefore have the potential to reduce leadership, predictability and trust regard-
ing party programs and candidates in particular and the democratic political pro-
cess in general, and seem to verge on populism. 
Yet, real populism to an extreme degree utilizes a constructed public mood. 
Populist leaders not only claim to be speaking for the people. They also try to ap-
pear to be speaking directly to and with the people. For populists it is necessary to 
show that they want to and can invalidate established (“ineffective”) institutions 
and norms. For this purpose, modern communication technology is very relevant 
as it helps to circumvent traditional media and filters of both the political mes-
sages that are sent out to the people and of the published opinions that reach the 
political authorities. Donald J. Trump is probably the most prominent example of 
this “unfiltered” communication and mood intervention via Twitter, but others, 
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such as India’s current president Narendra Modi, have also tried to copy his style 
quite successfully.41 
From another perspective, evoking public opinion via social media or other 
means can of course also be employed by other members of the polity in order to 
inf luence political decision making, via, for instance, protest, defamation (“shit 
storms”), online petitioning, and other means. Here again, this inf luence is ex-
erted outside of elections or party representation and those engaging in it do not 
even have to officially proof formal citizenship in a polity to be included in these 
processes. Appearing to be a potential future voter who could vote in opposition 
or act as a multiplicator of an opposing opinion, is usually enough. Besides, as has 
been mentioned before, modern communication technology also aides the rapid 
formation and diffusion of opinions in a global public (“Weltöffentlichkeit”) that 
in turn may affect domestic politics again. 
But “public opinion” can also be an element of modern authoritarian politics, 
especially as a means of information gathering, a feedback mechanism, and for 
indirect agenda setting. This is especially true for regimes that live in constant 
fear of stability-eroding opposition and are thus interested in acting, at least par-
tially, in response to public demands and opinions about certain issues (see Wang, 
2008), and which lack other channels through which these can be collected and 
processed. This is of course not an open and free process, as non-contingent value 
patterns and the overall taboo of discussing solutions that would imply an end of 
the current regime usually predetermine what is debatable (see also Chapter 6). 
Modern autocracies, however, find ways to screen the feasibility of implement-
ing certain decisions and to anticipate and control a tipping of the public mood 
that could turn the odds against them. Again, it is not just any published opinion 
but a perceived critical or majority opinion that counts in this context. Minority 
opinions do not count here and are simply suppressed. In other words, autocra-
cies do not rely on public content, but they need to subdue open discontent. New 
communication technologies are also employed in authoritarian contexts for ex-
actly all these purposes. After a period in which new social media and the inter-
net were seen as nails to the coffin of autocracies, i.e. as possessing an almost 
automatic democratizing power and heralding the end of oppression and disin-
formation (Allen-Ebrahimian, 2016), it is observed more recently that this cat and 
mouse game can in fact be dominated by autocrats who skillfully employ modern 
information and communication technology in order to gather and control “public 
opinion” in their realms (Göbel, 2013).  
No matter how far they are able to test, censor and engineer public opinion do-
mestically, today’s autocracies usually also worry about public opinion that trans-
41  See, for example, a comprehensive analysis of Trump’s “Twitter presidency” by McIntire and 
Confessore (2019). 
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gresses the boundaries of their polity. Published opinions about their regime in 
general, critique of their domestic and global actions, and other current trends in 
the “global public” are not controllable, unlike debates within the polity; and they 
have the potential to impact upon the domestic mood. The outbound activities of 
democratic countries, supposed to tilt relevant moods elsewhere in their favor in 
order to achieve national goals, has inspired much debate and coined scholarly 
paradigms over the last decade (e.g., the debate about US-American “soft pow-
er”). Yet, most recently, boundary-spanning propaganda and indirect and direct 
interventions by autocracies in other polities in order to inf luence public opinion 
and even election outcomes and national decision making has become an equally 
hot topic of interest in political practice and theory (Diamond et al., 2016; Mueller 
et al., 2019).
IV. Conclusion
The more complex the societal environment, the more complex the political sys-
tem’s internal environment needs to become in order to hold ready the capacity to 
make collective binding decisions; the more issues become a vital part of political 
decision making, the further the political system differentiates internally. This 
chapter has illustrated these dynamics of differentiation by analyzing the ongo-
ing evolution of multiple levels, institutions and organizations of the political sys-
tem on both the horizontal and vertical dimensions.
One may argue that the break observable between pre-modern polities, which 
displayed a degree of differentiation – for instance, the diffusion of political au-
thority and decision making across different levels, offices and roles – and mod-
ern ones is not so great, or is just a matter of degree. This argument, however, can 
be rebutted with a reference to the relevance of this differentiation. In pre-mod-
ern times, no distinct political system existed. Central authorities and their pe-
ripheral branches in pre-modern states were often struggling to or refused to 
make collectively binding decisions for the whole polity: among other things, they 
usually did not sufficiently and consistently identify the political collectivity to 
which their decisions would apply and could not rely on a generally shared under-
standing of this collectivity, and there was no legal system in place to facilitate ho-
mogeneous decision-making throughout the polity. In a modern political system, 
decisions (through full inclusion and citizenship) potentially apply to all mem-
bers of a polity. Specifically, the observation of ongoing vertical differentiation 
of different levels of collectively binding decision making raises the question of 
whether these levels themselves build new political systems. As noted above, this 
is an empirical question; however, using it as a heuristic point of departure could 
help scholars explore and answer some of the puzzles of political convergence and 
divergence within polities that we have brief ly described above. Vertical and hor-
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izontal internal differentiation of the political system goes hand in hand with the 
emergence of the inclusion formulas of modernity: the more complex a polity and 
its different levels and subsystems, the larger the variety of inclusion roles avail-
able – and this pattern holds even for modern autocracies. Given the plurality of 
levels of decision making internal to any polity, new political inclusion roles can 
arise at all these levels and diversify political systems. In other words, with ris-
ing complexity and the differentiation of decision making at different levels, the 
chance of the coexistence of differential inclusion roles increases – and this seems 
to be true for both democracies and modern autocracies. 
Furthermore, current political systems across the globe seem to agree on a 
certain set of issues for which a society seeks collectively binding decision making 
(e.g., welfare, security, environmental protection). Together with the evolution of 
countries and nation states as the decisive form of political segments in world so-
ciety, this congruence has led to increasing similarity among the population of 
political systems in regard to not only a multi-level system of governance and po-
litical inclusion but also internal horizontal differentiation. Our analysis, howev-
er, cannot stop at proclaiming a formal and maybe empty global institutional iso-
morphism. Yet, regime differences can no longer be illustrated simply by pointing 
to the lack of specific institutions associated with a democratic polity; rather, the 
distinctions are found in other details. The differences usually rest upon non-con-
tingent values that inform, for example, the general orientation of decision mak-
ing, the definition of and access to inclusion roles, and the characteristics of polit-
ical procedures that define the relationship between subsystems and institutions 
as well as the different levels in the political system. There may also be a layer of a 
primary form of organization – possibly a specific elite group, a party state orga-
nization and bureaucracy as in the case of China, clergy as in Iran, a monarchy as 
in Saudi Arabia, or oligarchy organizations as in Russia – that stretches across all 
other levels and subsystems and that, notwithstanding all possible differentiation 
in general, dominates these levels and subsystems (see also Chapter 6).
Finally, this chapter shed light on issues pertaining to the question of poten-
tial future paths for differentiation in modern political systems of both prevalent 
regime types. Interesting dynamics are emerging in the context of the specific 
circumstances of the beginning of the 21st century: the further decentralization 
of decision making at different levels, shifting authority toward both the more 
local and the global level, which competes with the centralization of authority and 
the capacity for collectively binding decisions in and for a country-level polity that 
is usually located at the national level. At a time of both increased global mobility 
of individuals and communicative exchanges between different collectivities as a 
whole, as well as populism and a re-focusing on forms of a traditional territorial 
definition of and identification in politics, these coexisting trends may begin to 
clash more openly and strongly (e.g., the populist narrative of the evil “globalists”). 
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At the same time, the increasing virtualization of a political public and the use 
and misuse of information technologies can create new forms of inclusion at any 
level and can initiate the transformation of conventional political organizations 
and subsystems. The principal diagnosis is therefore maybe not necessarily that 
the overall status of the nation state in the 21st century is declining, but rather 
that the new, additional forms of individual inclusion that arise globally through 
the ongoing vertical and horizontal differentiation of political systems are becom-
ing less bound to the nation state, or country, as the dominant political segment 
in world society. How the current trends develop and how polities conceptualize 
and accommodate this internal diversity and potential divergence are intriguing 
questions that the other chapters in this volume as well as the empirical studies in 
Volume II explore further. 
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3. Knowledge and the Political System
Rudolf Stichweh
I.	 Early	Modern	Politics	and	the	Stratification	of	Society
Early modern European political systems were based on elite social groups whose 
members passed down via birthrights the privilege of inhabiting the most import-
ant political roles. Elites were prepared for these roles by education; indeed, the 
‘education of the monarch’ and the ‘education of the nobility’ were distinct literary 
genres and institutional realities. The transmission of certain types and an ade-
quate amount of knowledge was, of course, part of the educational processes, and 
the knowledge selected for transmission was considered relevant for the perfor-
mance of political roles. Nonetheless, knowledge was not a selection criterion for 
these roles, but rather a complement to the other qualities or qualifications that 
were attributed to the respective persons on the basis of their birth.
The core educational experience of these elites – monarchs, princes and nobles 
– was often military education. The military training of elites was usually support-
ed by forms of behavioral education – riding, fencing, dancing – oriented to a way 
of living centered around bodily practices that combined the military disciplines 
and the courtly aspect of the world of nobility.
In addition to the social circles who were destined for political roles by birth 
(in some respects they were ‘public personae’ who had no private life) there were 
even in medieval Europe officials and advisors whose main qualification was 
knowledge – primarily theological and juridical knowledge. Most of these offi-
cials and advisors belonged to the same status groups identified by ascription. For 
them, the learned education they possessed was an upgrading of their status. But 
scholarship and learning were not a necessary condition for the political inf luence 
they were able to exercise. Occasionally, however, persons who lacked high sta-
tus by birth entered these circles of advisors and high officials, based only on the 
knowledge they had acquired. Thomas Cromwell (1485-1540), the son of a black-
smith from Putney, who as a young man had f led England (probably having killed 
somebody) and had learned about law and economy in Italy and the Netherlands 
and who after returning (around 1515) became for a decade  (1530-1540) the most 
inf luential advisor of Henry VIII and in many respects in these years the regent of 
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England is a fascinating example for such an unsuspected rise (MacCulloch 2018; 
Mantel 2009).
II.	 Democratic	Inclusion	into	Observer	Roles	 	 	 	
	 and	the	Universalization	of	Knowledge
The democratic revolution that occurred from the 18th to the 21st century dra-
matically changed the interrelations between political systems, the conditions of 
access to political inf luence and the relevance of knowledge. First, the universality 
of equal access of everyone to the possibilities of political participation was estab-
lished during this very long period. Today, there are no longer persons who are by 
birth destined for political offices (the few remaining monarchs being the obvious 
exception). Being an active participant in a polity is not an obligation or necessity. 
But it is an option for everyone. But how is this transition related to knowledge?
First of all, it has to be pointed out, we are speaking about inclusion in public 
or observer roles (Stichweh 2016). These roles arise in modernity in nearly all func-
tion systems, and public/observer roles are the roles for which it is most plausible 
that they are universalized. Those who hold public/observer roles do not manage 
the operative core functions of a system (the design and implementation of poli-
cies, legislation, administration). The performance of these functions is limited to 
relatively few participants who specialize in the core roles of a system, which we 
call performance roles. Because there are many function systems in modern soci-
ety, it is quite improbable for individuals to manage performance roles in several 
or all function systems.
In the so-called public roles, an individual is primarily an observer of the sys-
tem, an observer who, in spite of this restricted status, often has access to the 
strategic possibilities of intervening into the system. If one looks to the polity as a 
function system, the interventions that matter for the dynamics of the system are 
participation in elections and, secondly, the communications and documented 
opinions that are part of the ‘public sphere’ and of ‘public opinion’ (Stichweh 2007). 
Additional possibilities include all the forms of petitions that are explicitly institu-
tionalized in political systems and the multiple types of political protest, a form of 
political communication that has expanded enormously in the last decades.
How much and what is an individual expected to know to be able to partici-
pate in elections and the public sphere? For centuries, scholars, philosophers, and 
other actors have asserted that polities need well-informed citizens (Brown 1996; 
Ferguson 1965; Schütz 1972). This type of normative expectation is reasonable but 
can only be understood correctly when interpreted in the context of modern polit-
ical premises. The seemingly unobjectionable wish for well-informed citizens be-
comes discriminatory when formulated as a necessary condition for participation 
in a political system. The structural tension of modernity is easily identified: On 
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the one hand, one may favor expanding secondary schools and higher education, 
hoping to contribute to the education of well-informed citizens (on the impressive 
growth of American schooling, see Goldin and Katz 2008). On the other hand, in 
a modern democracy there is no possibility to deny to those who do not have the 
knowledge and the education desired the access to forms of political participation. 
It is self-evident in modern political systems that even analphabets can vote. The 
expectation to be a well-informed citizen seems to be an ascription. In the act of 
political inclusion the included person is thought of as a political subject endowed 
with the necessary knowledge and capabilities.
This modern turn toward inclusion is more easily understood by examining a 
core argument of ethnomethodology (Garfinkel 1967). Harold Garfinkel has con-
sistently argued that it is not legitimate to distinguish sociologists who are seen as 
competent interpreters of society from normal members of society who are ‘naïve’ 
practitioners of the rule systems of society. Rather, every participant in society is 
always an observer of society and is, on the basis of managing the rule systems of 
society on every single day, a competent lay sociologist. Scientific sociology cannot 
claim any epistemological privileges relative to ‘normal’ members of society. So-
ciology is at best an upgrading of competences available to everyone who lives in 
society. The same argument should be true for the political system: The everyday 
management of living in society, the capacity for which has been acquired in pro-
cesses of socialization, should be a sufficient basis to enable persons to contribute 
knowledge and opinions to political processes. Further, a parallel argument might 
be made for the understanding of the public sphere. The public sphere is a system 
formed by the diversity of opinions, the informations and the knowledge stocks to 
which everyone as a member of society is able to contribute (Stichweh 2007). 
The democratic universalization of access to possibilities of political participa-
tion and the presupposition that everyone by being a member of a polity is knowl-
edgeable is obviously as counterfactual as it is effective. Given the complexity of 
society and the complexity of political problems resulting from it, it is clear that 
the available knowledge of every individual will be insufficient; in some respects 
it is increasingly insufficient. For this reason it is consistent to postulate an in-
terrelation between political knowledge and the ongoing expansion of school and 
university education. On the one hand the possession of knowledge is a presuppo-
sition that includes everyone. But the diagnosis of a structural prevalence of in-
sufficient knowledge also includes everyone. Educational efforts always deal with 
these contradictions, and their goal therefore consists in stimulating a ref lexive 
way of handling the distinction of knowledge and ignorance. Democracy, then, is 
the political system that offers citizens who cultivate such a ref lexive approach to 
the relation of knowledge and ignorance possibilities of participation and inf lu-
ence – even at the level of the public/observer roles of the system.
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III. Performance Roles and Knowledge
As is the case in the other function systems of world society, the political system 
is characterized by the existence of differentiated performance roles besides the 
public/observer roles of the system. The operative core functions of a function 
system are usually entrusted to the performance roles. These roles may be high-
ly professionalized and in these cases a monopolistic control of functions by the 
profession and the knowledge system it owns arises. In other cases, the core roles 
may be held by generalists. Under these conditions the emergence of a profession 
is improbable.
The differentiation between public and performance roles, the ease or difficul-
ty of crossing the boundary between public and performance roles varies across 
political regimes and is one of the best indicators of the type of regime in a specific 
country. Authoritarian political regimes (e.g. China, Iran, Saudi-Arabia, North 
Korea) usually build a boundary between the two role types that cannot be crossed 
easily. For these regimes, the performance roles are essential to safeguarding 
those structures that are considered non-negotiable because they are constitutive 
of the respective regime (e.g. the power of a communist party, the domination of 
a religious elite of lawyer-clerics, or the prevalence of an ethnically defined group 
of families)(Ahlers and Stichweh 2019; and Ch. 6 in this volume). The knowledge 
of the bearers of the respective performance roles is closely connected to the ideo-
logical basis of the regime they work for. This connection implies that the quantity 
and quality of the knowledge they hold depends on whether there is any substan-
tial ideological basis supporting the regime they serve.
Democracies create a more permeable boundary between public/observer 
roles and performance roles. In democracies, there is a tendency – that varies 
significantly across countries – toward universal inclusion even in performance 
roles. The most pronounced case is Switzerland, where the word ‘militia principle’ 
(‘Milizprinzip’) is common. The term refers to the performance roles of a political 
system being open to anyone, as is the case with a militia By this is meant that, as 
is the case with a militia that any individual can enter at any point in time (without 
having had a military education). There is no professionalization that functions 
as a precondition. This implies that there is no specific knowledge system that an 
individual must master before being allowed to take a performance role. In the 
case of Switzerland, most political performance roles – e.g. mandates in the na-
tional parliament – are only second jobs for those who hold them. These persons 
are then in their first, professional roles, specialists for the respective knowledge 
systems. However, the mastery of these knowledge systems is not a condition of 
accessing the performance roles. This structure, which endows professionals (who 
are professionals in other function systems) with political performance roles in 
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which they act as ‘amateurs’, results at best in a pluralization of the knowledge 
backgrounds of political personnel.
Thus, in most political systems there is no professionalization of performance 
roles, at least not in the form of an understanding that there is a specific knowl-
edge base that channels access to political careers (cf. on economists in political 
roles Hallerberg and Wehner 2018). Instead in many (democratic) political sys-
tems another condition of access to political roles has emerged: One must be a 
member of a political party. For most performance roles in political systems there 
is a minimum condition that an individual is either a member of or possesses a 
strong proximity to a political party that is supported by an extensive network 
of social relations. In many respects, membership in a party has taken over the 
structural position formerly claimed by social status. Whereas in earlier times an 
individual was elected because they were well known locally and were inf luential, 
in modern systems success in elections is often achieved by being the local repre-
sentative of a specific political party that has a strong position in the respective 
city or district. Voters now typically vote for candidates they do not know as per-
sons or do not know a great deal about – this facilitates the emergence of nation-
wide parties in bigger political systems. The knowledge that individual candidates 
need under these circumstances is primarily a knowledge of the programmatic 
and ideological premises of the party for which they stand as a candidate. In sum, 
rather than acquire genuine knowledge, individuals must be able to f lexibly and 
competently manage the spaces for political movements that are provided by the 
party, its ideological profile and social embeddedness.
An alternative to this type of structure often emerges where a first-past-the-
post system ties access to political performance roles relatively closely to the 
ability of a person to win an election in a specific constituency. In this case, the 
individual capabilities of a person and the social connections the person has de-
veloped over their lifetime often limit the relevance of the party, which plays only 
a minor role as a precondition of success in an election and which cannot appoint 
the seat by an act of political patronage. The set of competences that a candidate 
needs to be successful is, in this case, highly specific to the respective political 
system: These competences are related to universal inclusion and to the diversity 
of the voters in a given constituency. Candidates who want to be successful must 
be able to handle this diversity among local people and their motives, which may 
be a demanding task. Again, however, these demands do not entail a ‘profession 
of politics’ and thus do not engender a systematized knowledge system on which 
this profession is based.
These two preconditions – (1) membership and proximity to a political party 
(and personal competence that can support a career in the party) and (2) the ability 
to assert oneself in a local election campaign and eventually to win the election – 
impede the professionalization of performance roles and the subsequent genesis 
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of an attendant knowledge system. There is a third circumstance that is equally 
relevant – an idea that comes about, again and again, in attempts to institution-
alize approximations to direct democracy. In a direct democracy there should be 
no exclusive level of performance roles. Those persons whom the voters send to 
parliaments and constitutional convents are seen as endowed with instructions 
and not as autonomous representatives (Wood 1998). This is the most radical form 
of democratic thinking and is clearly incompatible with the professionalization 
of performance roles and the establishment of a knowledge system controlled by 
this profession.
IV.	 Experts	and	the	Evolution	of	Political	Problems
Despite these conditions a political system needs experts. This need is related to 
the type of problems political systems try to work on and try to find a solution 
for. In present-day society, there are no longer problems that are inherently and 
without alternatives political. Rather there is a set of relevant problems of society, 
and the political system claims some of them as belonging to its domain, while 
leaving others, which it previously claimed as its own, to other actors/systems. 
These shifts are easily illustrated by reviewing problems such as air pollution, 
the destruction of the ozone layer, and anthropogenic climate change (Rich 2019; 
Schubert 2018). Neither society nor the polity could have anticipated that these 
types of problems would become key questions first for society and then, conse-
quently, for political action. There is no genuine knowledge in political systems 
that facilitates work on these problems, and universal inclusion in public roles und 
selection for performance roles conditioned by political ‘Eigenstructures’ (parties, 
elections) make it improbable that the relevant knowledge will be acquired spon-
taneously in these processes of the reproduction of political structures. Therefore, 
the political systems need experts. This is true not only with regard to recently 
emerging problems but also with regard to classical political problems such as 
foreign policy. Around 1800 a state such as the newly formed United States had 
only four or five embassies in other states (Wood 2009), and the staffing of these 
embassies was at least until 1914 an affair that involved primarily persons of high 
social status and was not about expertise for the respective country (Clark 2013; 
Lieven 2015). In contrast, in the contemporary world states support embassies in 
as many as 200 countries and cannot manage the complexity of this multi-state 
world without recruiting experts (who are not politicians) on other regions and 
countries.
Given this context, it is helpful to consider political systems in modern society 
– and this is probably true for democracies and autocracies – as systems that orga-
nize access to knowledge via experts who do not participate in the competitive po-
litical processes of selection for performance roles but rather provide knowledge 
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to the political system. Sometimes experts do this proactively, while in other cases 
they provide knowledge only on demand.
For this inclusion of experts into the polity there are two main alternatives. 
One option is to create within the institutions of the political system – e.g. in the 
staff of parliamentarians, in departments and administrations and in the embas-
sies – performance roles for persons who are not recruited as generalists, as is true 
for most political personnel, but instead as experts for specific problem domains. 
These experts are chosen having regard to their proximity to the governing par-
ty; consequently, new experts are often recruited when the government changes. 
These recruits are specialists but have some ties to the programmatic premises 
of the present government. The second option for the inclusion of experts is con-
sulting individuals who belong to organizations that are not primarily located in 
the political system, such as research organizations, enterprises, churches, think 
tanks (McGann 2016), non-governmental organizations and lobbying organiza-
tions.
Whereas those experts who are positioned in the administrative apparatus of 
the state are service providers who move within the intellectual spaces conceded 
to them by those in core political performance roles, the second group of experts 
operate as advisers who have no binding commitments to the programs and ide-
ologies of political parties. The political role of the adviser has been prominent 
in European political systems since the Middle Ages (Stichweh 2006). Whereas 
in premodern political systems those considered potential advisers were mostly 
from the same status groups as the monarchs and princes (and therefore were 
potential competitors), in modern political systems, which do not know compara-
ble status hierarchies, adviser roles are reserved for experts who can claim these 
roles only on the basis of their acquired knowledge systems. Although historical 
contexts differ widely in this respect, the societal functions of advisers have re-
mained relatively similar from premodernity until the modern era. Experts pro-
vide knowledge and information to the political system, in premodernity on the 
basis of a combination of high social status  with knowledge and in present-day 
society on the basis of expertise that distinguishes them and motivates their 
appointment. In stratified society there was a certain pressure built into advice, 
which arose from the status and autonomous power base of the adviser; monarchs 
had to deal with this pressure carefully. In modern society, however, the ‘power’ 
of the adviser is based wholly in the authority of their knowledge system. Advisers 
are not representatives of a region or locality, but rather represent a knowledge 




The diversification and multiplication of problems that belong to the domain of po-
litical decision-making is closely connected to the differentiation and quantitative 
growth of the other function systems of society: science, law, religion, economy, 
education, health and other function systems. In each of these function systems, 
certain problems and needs for action emerge, some of which will be addressed by 
the political system or will be claimed by the political system as belonging to its 
domain. All of these instances entail demands for knowledge for which there are 
no original knowledge resources internal to the political system.
The political system can draw these problems into its domain, thereby generat-
ing an increasing demand for experts who function as advisers for these problems. 
There is one significant alternative to this solution. The polity can begin to stay out 
of specific problem domains and transfer decision-making rights to actors from 
the respective function system and to the experts who act as their representa-
tives or to new institutions that specialize in these problems. The decision spaces 
opened up in this way still remain political decision spaces as the political system 
transfers the right to make collectively binding decisions to specific actors and 
institutions of its choosing – in other words: the political system creates the rights 
to decide and then endows other actors with these rights. In many of these de-
cision-making processes, the political system distributes resources acquired (via 
taxes) to the chosen actors and institutions. However, those charged with mak-
ing the decisions have no classical political legitimacy. They are not selected via 
elections or (regarding institutions) created by referenda, although they are often 
chosen by those who owe their performance roles to success in elections and who 
opt for this kind of political devolution (Tucker 2019; Vibert 2007). In other cases, 
actors/institutions are recruited or created in self-organization processes within 
function systems, which are connected to the political system by these decisions 
and the rights to decide.
There is an increasing number of examples for this autonomization of deci-
sion-making within functionally specialized expert organizations, linking func-
tion systems among one another (see for an extensive discussion Ch. 5 in this 
volume). Two classic examples of this shift are central banks and constitutional 
courts. In both cases, the organization inhabits an intermediary position between 
the polity and a second function system. Further, in both cases political institu-
tions make central decisions about personnel selection within the autonomous 
organization. However, these personnel decisions are often the last decisions for 
which political inf luence is seen as necessary and legitimate. Once persons have 
been selected, their terms of office are long (sometimes a life term as in the US 
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Supreme Court) and from the moment they take office they are free of outside 
instructions. 
The interconnections of decision chains differ from function system to func-
tion system and from autonomous institution to autonomous institution. In the 
case of constitutional courts the distinctive novelty was the judicial review of po-
litical lawmaking, which was seen as revolutionary when it arose in the US brief ly 
after 1800 (Wood 2009, Ch. 12). In the case of central banks, economic expertise 
controls economically relevant parameters (e.g. interest rates) that are perceived 
as instruments of the political control of an economy. Other cases involve even 
more complex hierarchies of decision-making, which characteristically includes 
making decisions about other decisions. In Germany for example, the ‘Federal 
Cartel Office’ (an autonomous expert organization established in 1958) controls 
business mergers; furthermore the ‘Monopolies Commission’ (an advisory coun-
cil created in 1973) adds a general evaluation of the state of competition in Ger-
many and in specific situations writes expert reports regarding individual cases 
without having decision competences. In some cases this functions as a two level 
structure (decision by the cartel office, recommendation by the monopolies com-
missions) to which a ministerial decree is added as a third level decision, which 
can then be examined and potentially revised by a fourth level decision by a law 
court.
In the 20th and 21st century, in the context of the system/environment rela-
tions between the polity and the other function systems, the emergence of au-
tonomous expert organizations is consistent and widespread, leading to a par-
tial shift of the responsibility for making collectively binding decisions from the 
political system to the respective function system: Such expert organizations 
include: autonomous universities that are nonetheless state universities; orga-
nizations focused on the self-steering of science; organizations that approve and 
regulate drugs; patent offices connecting the polity, law, science and the economy; 
organizations for the accreditation of schools and universities; financial auditors; 
even the ‘International Panel on Climate Change’. In some cases final decisions 
are made by intermediary organizations that are staffed by an equal number of 
political actors and experts from the respective function systems.1 Bridges are 
constantly being built between function systems, thus connecting the polity to 
knowledge and making the knowledge resources from other function systems 
available to the polity. The expert organizations that serve as bridges between 
1  This was the case in the German “Excellence Initiative” in 2019 the participating scientific orga-
nizations (National Science Council, DFG/German Research Community) and the international 
experts tried to reach a demonstrative consensus on the selection of universities and by doing so 
decisively narrowed the decision space for the final commission which had an equal number of 
representatives from polity and science.
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function system specialize in the selection and condensation of knowledge that is 
useful for making decisions. The polity creates and tolerates ever-new couplings 
and bridges that further the access to knowledge. At the same time the polity en-
sures that the core of the political system is somehow free from the many types 
of societal knowledge; thus in the core of the system everything centers on poli-
tics, and politicians operating in this space have an opportunistic attitude toward 
knowledge.
VI. Center and Periphery: Structures of the Political System  
	 and	the	Localization	of	Knowledge
On the basis of the arguments of this text one can draw up a model of the relation-
ship of political systems and knowledge. First, the center of the political system 
consists of communications and debates by performance roles that participate to 
a significant amount in the production of the collectively binding decisions that 
define a polity. In this center, the careers of those who compete for performance 
roles are structured mainly by elections and parties, and ‘success’ consists pri-
marily of the ability to prevail in political parties and elections. In the center of a 
polity defined in this way, knowledge is not of first-order importance. The persons 
involved must understand parties and voters/elections, but they are mostly gener-
alists rather than specialists, and highly specific expertise is not very helpful and 
is sometimes perceived as a hindrance.
Beyond this center, there are two peripheries. The first consists of the multi-
plicity and diversity of individuals who are included via the observer roles within 
the political system. These individuals either vote or abstain in elections. They are 
“well-informed citizens” – either by ascription of this status or by really knowing 
something – and they function as contributors to the public sphere. The public 
sphere is the biggest distributed knowledge system of a modern political system 
and its continuous oscillations, which are sometimes barely perceptible, are none-
theless constitutive for the evolutionary dynamics of modern polities.
The second periphery of the political system consists of a large number of ex-
perts who contribute knowledge to decision-making processes. In addition to 
individual experts, this group includes an increasing number of expert organiza-
tions that represent, at the boundaries of the system, the functional differentia-
tion of society and that make visible to the polity the extremely diverse knowledge 
built in the function systems of society. All of these expert organizations are con-
nected to the center of the political system via ‘bridging phenomena’. These result-
ing bridges transport knowledge and ensure a certain amount of participation by 
political actors in the processes of collective decision-making, the results of which 
are often attributed as successes or failures to the political actors, too.
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This model of a political system with a center and two very different peripher-
ies implies a system that has almost no knowledge within its political core. Howev-
er, knowledge is otherwise so well embedded in society – via observer/public roles 
for individuals and via institutions of expertise from multiple function systems 
– that the non-knowledge of the political center functions as a prerequisite for the 
existence of f lexible linkages to extremely diverse knowledge systems in the func-
tion systems of society. The ignorance in the center of the system, which can be 
interpreted as an absorption by ‘the political’, becomes a condition for a f lexible 
learning competence and the ongoing adaptability of the system in a society that 
is extremely differentiated and faces an incessantly shifting set of problems.
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Modern political systems enable society to address perceived problems by formu-
lating and implementing – more or less effectively – collectively binding decisions. 
Performing this general function involves highly complex processes that comprise 
inter alia the formulation of problems in political terms, their interpretation within 
broader meaning contexts, their processing in various policy-making bodies, and 
the formulation of policy decisions that are binding within the purview of a given 
polity. Such processes, which amount to the political identification and handling 
of problems, are highly selective. Only a few of the potential problems experienced 
and/or formulated in society find resonance in political systems. Moreover, the re-
spective “careers” of politicized problems in the processing machinery of political 
systems follow contingent paths, which have far-reaching consequences in terms 
of policy outputs and outcomes.
The present chapter is an attempt to build on and further develop the theo-
retical framework of this book to account for this diagnosing and problem-solv-
ing dimension of political systems. While other chapters emphasize the forma-
tion and internal structuration of modern polities (e.g., formation of citizenries 
through inclusion structures; horizontal and vertical differentiation; autonomous 
political organizations), the present chapter shifts the focus to the policy-making 
processes that occur within these structures. More specifically, notwithstanding 
feedback in the interplay between political structures and policy processes, the 
chapter examines how the structures of political regimes and the broader societal 
contexts in which they are embedded condition the operational identification and 
processing of problems, and thereby the relations between political systems and 
their societal environment. Given the scope of the topic, the goal of this text is 
merely to sketch new theoretical perspectives and research angles that can help 
advance the sociology of political regimes.
Our entry point in the argument is the concept of political responsiveness. Since 
it was introduced in democratic theory in the early 1950s, the concept of political 
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responsiveness has inspired a prolific stream of research on the relationship be-
tween the interests, needs and wants of citizens on the one hand, and the policies 
crafted by representatives and other policy makers on the other hand. This stan-
dard conception of political responsiveness is based on the classical distinction 
between state and society that permeates political science (Luhmann, 2010). It 
conceives of the political system as an autonomous entity that exerts legitimate 
power to order and govern society “from above”. Society is envisaged from the 
point of view of the state, as the national collective of citizens living under its rule. 
In this perspective, responsiveness is understood as the realization of the dem-
ocratic principle of rule of the people, by the people and for the people. Political 
systems are deemed responsive insofar as their policies aim to solve the problems 
of the “people”, that is, problems experienced and expressed by citizens in the po-
litical system’s environment.
As we will show, the fact that this standard approach to responsiveness em-
braces the political system’s own perspective on a division between state and so-
ciety induces several theoretical and methodological shortcomings. By revisiting 
the concept of responsiveness on the basis of a sociological theory of observation 
and functional differentiation, the chapter outlines new perspectives for the study 
of diagnosing and problem-solving processes in modern polities. Responsiveness 
is redefined as the process whereby both democratic and non-democratic political 
systems selectively identify and address problems that they attribute to “society”, 
according to the systems’ own structures, their dynamic of self-reproduction (au-
topoiesis), and their structural couplings with other spheres of modern society. As 
we will argue, while this process of attribution comprises alleged “demands” and 
“preferences” of citizens, it extends beyond this specific aspect of politics.
The redefinition of responsiveness proposed in the present chapter can be 
useful for comparative studies interested in identifying how distinct internal 
structures of political regimes favor different patterns of problem diagnosis and 
solution. In addition, the revised concept of responsiveness sheds light on core 
evolutionary dynamics of political systems, as patterns of responsiveness emerg-
ing from distinct structural settings can, in turn, alter political structures by in-
ducing institutional change. Moreover, the revised concept of responsiveness can 
be useful for the study of relations between political systems and other function-
ally differentiated spheres of modern society, such as the economy, law, science, 
mass media, religion and morality. For instance, political responsiveness involves 
boundary-making processes that define the respective competencies and respon-
sibilities of function systems for given problems (e.g., market prices vs. regulated 
prices; political vs. legal or religious punishment of deviant behaviors). Similar-
ly, “structural couplings” between political systems and other function systems 
contribute to conditioning the circulation and translation of problem descriptions 
from one system to another (e.g., evidence-based policy making; political reac-
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tions to mass media contents or moral scandals). Following this perspective, the 
study of political responsiveness can be connected to a broader sociology of the 
construction and processing of “problems” in a society characterized by the pri-
macy of functional differentiation.
Standard perspectives on political responsiveness
Whom does the polity work for?
In his seminal book, Politics: Who Gets What, When, How, Harold Lasswell (1936) 
envisaged policy science as the study of the conditions that determine who can 
define and pursue desired goals by controlling and exerting power over others. In 
his view, those who can attain such positions of inf luence constitute an elite, as op-
posed to the masses. About two decades later, J. Roland Pennock (1952) introduced 
the concept of responsiveness as a “counterpart of inf luence”, and defined respon-
sive policy making as “ref lecting and giving expression to the will of the people” (p. 
790). Pennock acknowledged how difficult it is to circumscribe this term. What 
counts as the “will of the people”? How should a government respond to f leeting 
demands or to simultaneous but contradictory demands? According to Pennock, 
as a minimum democratic standard, “governments should be responsive to any 
clear and settled popular demand” (p. 791), in particular demands that have a high 
intensity and many supporters.
Several subsequent contributions have anchored this normative conception of 
responsiveness in democratic studies. In one of the most widely cited, Hanna Pit-
kin (1967) defined responsiveness as a key feature of political representation that 
complements electoral mechanisms by ensuring representation between elec-
tions: For democratic representation to occur, representatives must act “in the 
interest of the represented, in a manner responsive to them” (p. 209). Similarly, 
Robert Dahl (1971) described democracy as “the continuing responsiveness of the 
government to the preferences of its citizens, considered as political equals” (p. 1). 
More recently, G. Bingham Powell (2004) argued that democratic responsiveness 
occurs “when the democratic process induces the government to form and imple-
ment policies that the citizens want. When the process induces such policies con-
sistently, we consider democracy to be of higher quality” (p. 91). While theorists of 
democracy generally recognize that too much responsiveness would lead to popu-
lism, the tyranny of majorities, and systemic instability (Sabl, 2015), they still con-
sider responsiveness to be a defining component of democracy, arguing that the 
policy process should be oriented toward the satisfaction of the sovereign people.
This general acceptation of political responsiveness has been developed and 
specified in a number of theoretical and empirical contributions. For instance, in 
a study of the responsiveness of members of the U.S. Congress, Warren Miller and 
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Donald Stokes (1963) operationalized the concept  in terms of the correspondence 
between members’ roll-call voting behavior and the surveyed preferences of citi-
zens in their respective constituencies. This operationalization of the concept of 
responsiveness was later criticized by Heinz Eulau and Paul Karps (1977) as being 
too restrictive. For the two authors, representation-as-responsiveness is about 
the degree to which representatives satisfy the interests and needs of the citizens 
they represent. In this perspective, responsiveness entails four distinct compo-
nents: i) policy responsiveness – representatives’ attempts to shape policies that 
serve the interests or expressed wishes of their constituency; ii) service responsive-
ness – representatives’ engagement in providing particular services to members 
of their constituency (e.g., information, advice, contacts); iii) allocation responsive-
ness – representatives’ efforts to obtain public goods for their constituency (e.g., 
infrastructure, job-creating investments); and iv) symbolic responsiveness – repre-
sentatives’ use of symbols to nurture trust and support among citizens (e.g., par-
ticipation in an inauguration ceremony; shaking hands at a local market). Other 
strands of the literature have expanded the concept of political responsiveness by 
examining not only the responsiveness of elected representatives, but also the re-
sponsiveness of political institutions (e.g., municipal councils, parliaments, govern-
ments) and policy outputs (e.g., levels of social welfare spending) (for reviews, see 
Burstein, 2010; Manza and Cook, 2002; Wlezien and Soroka, 2016).
Overall, the literature has highlighted various conditions underlying contin-
gent patterns of political responsiveness. Unsurprisingly, policymakers are gen-
erally most responsive to popular preferences on salient issues,  that is, policy 
issues that raise concerns among a large number of citizens or among groups of 
citizens who are particularly vocal (e.g. Lax and Phillips, 2009). Conversely, polit-
ical responsiveness is usually lower when policy issues are technical and isolated 
from citizens’ direct concerns, as in the case of reforms of corporate governance 
law (Culpepper, 2011). Social class also plays a role, as illustrated by the limited 
responsiveness of governments to the social spending preferences of lower and 
lower-middle class voters (Bartels, 2017; Elsässer, Hense and Schäfer, 2017), and 
an overall tendency of responsiveness in U.S. politics to be “strongly tilted toward 
the most aff luent citizens” (Druckmann, 2015; Gilens, 2012, p. 1). 
Electoral mechanisms are another key variable. For instance, Christopher 
Wlezien and Stuart Soroka (2012) found proportional systems to be less favorable 
to responsiveness than majoritarian ones. To cite another example, the respon-
siveness of U.S. presidents varies depending on their respective popularity rat-
ings and the time remaining before the next election (Canes-Wrone and Shotts, 
2004). The broader institutional setting of political systems, in which electoral 
mechanisms of responsiveness are embedded, also seems to affect patterns of re-
sponsiveness. For instance, Nada Urbinati and Mark Warren (2008) noted that in 
democracies, presidential regimes tend to be less responsive than parliamentary 
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systems. Based on a comparison between Great Britain, Denmark and the United 
States, Sara Hobolt and Robert Klemmensen (2008) showed that responsiveness 
grows with the intensity of electoral competition, but decreases with the autono-
my of governments vis-à-vis legislative assemblies. 
Other structural characteristics of political regimes matter as well. One such 
characteristic is federalism: According to the literature, opaque interest coalitions 
and the diffusion of decision making among the vertical tiers of federal systems 
hampers responsiveness by making it difficult for voters to hold individual poli-
ticians accountable for policy outcomes (Wlezien and Soroka, 2011; Wood, 1991). 
Another key variable is authoritarianism: In authoritarian regimes, election rig-
ging and assemblies’ limited inf luence allow a type of “bounded responsiveness”, 
which tends to exclude thematic issues and popular demands that could under-
mine the regime’s stability (Chen, Pan and Xu, 2016; Dukalskis and Gerschewski, 
2017; Malesky and Schuler, 2010; Miller, 2015).
Limits of a fuzzy normative approach to political responsiveness 
This brief review of the literature offers a sense of the standard understandings of 
political responsiveness. As Paul Burstein (2010) summarized, responsiveness has 
been constructed as a normative criterion of democracy based on the distinction 
“rule by the many, or rule by the few” (p. 74), and empirical studies have tried to de-
termine whether and under which conditions political systems fulfill this criteri-
on. While this understanding of responsiveness makes sense from the perspective 
of classical democratic theory, it falls short of providing an accurate understand-
ing of the way problems and underlying preferences are identified and addressed 
in the policy-making process.
Firstly, standard theories of political responsiveness are not clear about what 
political systems are or should be responsive to. Some authors write about peo-
ple’s “wishes” or “preferences”, as if these wishes and preferences were a given that 
politicians could translate into policy measures. But citizens’ occasional wishes 
and preferences are generally formed in reaction to alternative policy options, 
whether these options are offered by the political system (e.g., electoral programs 
and promises; policy options under discussion) or hypothesized in public opinion 
surveys (“Would you prefer option A or option B?”). In other words, wishes and 
preferences are not external to political systems, but rather are shaped by them – 
at least to a significant extent. Moreover, given the large volume of daily political 
decision making in modern states and the limited capacity of citizens to closely 
monitor the policy process, genuine wishes and preferences of citizens on alterna-
tive policy options are the exception rather than the rule. As a rule, “public opinion” 
is brought into existence by public commentators and opinion makers, as well as by 
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policy makers acting “in the name of” or “on the basis of” opinions that might not 
exist as such (Disch, 2012). 
This discursive construction of public opinion retroacts on politics itself, as 
politicians try to gauge how their position and the positions of their allies and 
competitors resonate in “public opinion”, in order to adjust their behavior accord-
ingly. In this framework, public opinion is not a point of contact between the po-
litical system (the state) and a given environment (a national society), but rather 
is a kind of self-created mirror in which politics “can only see itself”, including its 
internal description of its environment: a device that “serves the self-referential 
closure of political systems, the relation of politics to politics. The self-referential 
closure occurs with the help of an institution that allows the system to distinguish 
in its operations self-reference and external reference, namely politics and public 
opinion, and thereby to make itself a picture of the limits of its own scope for ac-
tion.” (Luhmann, 1990, pp. 181, 82, our translation).
Other authors define responsiveness in relation not to citizens’ opinions, but 
to their “interests” or “needs”, under the assumption that these needs and inter-
ests can be identified objectively – typically by representatives rather than by the 
citizens concerned. However, as for opinions, needs and interests are contingent 
perceptions and descriptions, and attributing needs or interests to oneself or to 
others is generally fraught with uncertainty (Münnich, 2011; Saward, 2006). Fur-
thermore, the identity of those who have wishes, preferences, interests or needs 
is often considered an external factum, while in fact, the “people” or sub-groups 
of the citizenry are internal constructs of political systems (Disch, 2012; Fossen, 
2019; Stichweh, 2016). In short, the literature on responsiveness tends to overlook 
the role of the political system in the formation of what it is supposed to respond 
to: The political system can only be responsive to itself.
Secondly, the very concept of responsiveness remains fuzzy. What exactly 
does it mean for a political system or any of its internal policy-making compo-
nents (e.g., elected representatives, political institutions) to be responsive? Some 
studies in the literature have defined responsiveness on the basis of the degree 
of static congruence or consistency between the behavior of a political system and 
what a majority of citizens allegedly wants, whereas other studies have defined 
responsiveness in terms of covariation between policy choices and public opinion 
(Wlezien and Soroka, 2016). Both conceptions entail difficulties regarding their 
operationalization in empirical research. The degree of congruence is hard to 
assess accurately, as measurements are fraught with conceptual and method-
ological biases and uncertainties (Burstein, 2010). As for the processual view of 
responsiveness, the assumption of a unidirectional relation of causality between 
movements of public opinion and a policy process that “responds” to these move-
ments is not realistic. In practice, there is an interplay between politics and what 
citizens think or want. This interplay is asymmetrical, as politicians have many 
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resources (e.g., insider knowledge, authority, privileged access to mass media) 
to inf luence people’s opinions and preferences. Further, both policy orientation 
and public opinion can evolve in a similar direction in reaction to external cir-
cumstances, without there being a relation of causality between the two (Burstein, 
2010; Eulau and Karps, 1977; Page, 2002).
A third limitation of the standard conceptions of responsiveness is their nar-
row analytical scope. Because the concept of responsiveness is derived from the 
normative idea that policy makers in democracies should track the preferences 
and interests of citizens, it focuses on the dyadic relationship between “citizens” 
and “policy makers”, while treating other variables involved in policy making as 
either favorable or unfavorable external conditions. This analytical angle is ade-
quate for research endeavors concerned with discussing and testing responsive-
ness as a normative criterion of democracy. However, as the next section attempts 
to show, much can be gained in terms of analytical scope and accuracy by freeing 
the concept of responsiveness from its normative background, and redefining its 
meaning to capture the identification and processing of problems by political sys-
tems in relation to other functional spheres of modern society.
A systems-theoretical approach to political responsiveness 
Problems and responsiveness in modern society
While in standard democratic theory, political systems are – or ought to be – re-
sponsive to the preferences, demands and interests of citizens, we propose that 
the responsiveness of political systems is directed toward socially constructed 
problems, whose conditions of formation and factual content cannot be reduced 
to aggregates of individual preferences, demands and interests.
Problems can be defined quite ordinarily as the observation of discrepancies 
between two or more states of things, where one of these states is considered by 
the observer as being more desirable than the other(s). Individual human beings 
experience problems by observing such discrepancies in their thought processes, 
for instance when noticing a feeling of hunger that departs from the preferred 
state of feeling satiated, or when envisaging the possibility that a political party 
they dislike could win the next election. But for problems to exist in society, they 
must be observed and thereby constructed in the communicative processes of so-
cial systems. Following Luhmann’s theory of society, notwithstanding extensive 
coupling and interaction between the individual and the social construction of 
problems, the two must be clearly distinguished. Problems constructed by social 
systems only need to be described to exist – they do not necessarily match the 
problems experienced by individuals. In fact, many of the problems constructed 
in society are attributed to individuals and groups by social systems “from the 
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outside”, such as when climate science informed humanity there was a significant 
problem of global warming (Weart, 2008), or when, in February 2019, the Trump 
administration informed the American public about a major security threat at the 
border with Mexico (Baker, 2019).
Responsiveness involves not only the identification of problems by social sys-
tems, but also the processing of these problems in ways that are directed toward 
solutions. Once an actual or potential problem has been described, any social sys-
tem that connects to this description and attempts to prevent, remove or minimize 
the occurrence of non-preferred states is responding to this problem – whatever 
the success of the attempted solution. Responsiveness is always selective. Social 
systems identify certain problems but not others, and then only address some of 
the problems described in their communicative processes. Moreover, the relation-
ships between problems and attempted solutions are not necessarily linear. Prob-
lems can be formulated to justify the application of pre-existing solutions, whose 
true purposes might be to address problems other than those referenced in the of-
ficial narrative (Cohen, March and Olsen, 1972; Kingdon, 2013 [1984]). For example, 
Trump’s description of a national emergency was used to justify the construction 
of a wall at the Mexican border, but the described emergency was in fact directed 
mostly toward problems pertaining to the power relations between the Republi-
can president and the Democrat majority in the Congress.
In modern society, the selective identification and processing of problems is 
conditioned in several respects by the primacy of functional differentiation. To 
begin with, the functional specialization of social systems focuses their attention 
on types of problems that correspond to their core function. For instance, because 
modern science specializes in the production of “truth”, it is primarily responsive 
to problems of uncertainty, which it selectively constructs and addresses through 
scientific research and the publication of knowledge. The modern economy is 
foremost responsive to problems of needs, which it constructs and addresses via 
monetary transactions (investing, lending, trading, purchasing, etc.) that sustain 
the production and distribution of commodities. In the case of modern polities, 
their responsiveness focuses mainly on problems related to the self-organization 
of human communities, such as defining the conditions of membership, setting 
formal rules of behavior, policing, gathering common resources (taxation) and 
investing them for collective purposes (education, health, infrastructure, etc.), 
and managing relations with other political communities (foreign affairs). Poli-
ties construct problems by selectively identifying actual or potential problematic 
situations that are relevant insofar as they can be addressed through collective-
ly binding decisions – decisions whose binding character within the community 
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rests ultimately on the power of the state to sanction deviance via the legitimate 
use of physical violence.1
That societal problems seem to be shared across many function systems might 
seem to contradict the idea of functional specialization. For instance, the global 
financial crisis triggered by the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008 was a prob-
lem, inter alia, for the economy, politics, law, science, and morality. Similarly, cli-
mate change concerns all functional spheres of society. However, even in these 
cases, problems exist in society only as descriptions within given observing sys-
tems. For scientific research, a financial crisis or climate change raises problems 
of scientific knowledge (e.g., dimensions, causes, consequences), which are not the 
same as the problems that these phenomena present in other spheres: problems 
of payment/non-payment in the economic sphere, problems of economic or envi-
ronmental policy-making for polities, problems of esteem and contempt in moral 
communication, etc.
The autopoietic dynamic of function systems is a further condition of selective 
responsiveness. Obviously, science does not identify and address every possible 
scientific “puzzle”, but only a subset of possible research questions. Similarly, the 
modern economy identifies and addresses only a selected range of needs, and 
political regimes only devise and enforce public policies related to a selection of 
problems within the community under their rule. A primary driver of these se-
lection processes is the necessity for systems to reproduce the conditions of their 
own existence (autopoiesis). Scientific research tackles questions with an eye on 
the development of disciplines, and publications usually conclude by emphasizing 
that the findings raise new questions and thus call for further investigation. The 
economy selects needs that are likely to generate monetary added value, so as to 
regenerate the circulation of money in the system via the payment of wages, inter-
est rates, dividends, taxes, and other disbursements. For political systems, auto-
poiesis requires first and foremost formulating problems and policies that main-
tain or enhance the power of the state, so as to regenerate the capacity of the latter 
to devise and enforce collectively binding decisions in the future (Luhmann, 1988). 
This systemic necessity overrides both the demands raised by citizens to the state 
and the possibility for a political elite to rule according to its own preferences.
Furthermore, selective responsiveness is conditioned by the internal struc-
tures of social systems. As much as theories and methods direct the attention of 
science toward certain research questions, and price-making markets orient the 
1  While this section focuses on polities and uses science and the economy to illustrate 
commonalities with and dif ferences from other function systems, similar modi of specialization 
could be outlined for the other function systems, including law, education, health, the mass 
media, religion, arts, sports, and morality (insofar as morality can be considered a function 
system, a contentious theoretical point that is beyond the scope of the present argument).
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production and distribution of commodities toward certain needs, the structures 
of political regimes condition their patterns of responsiveness.2 For instance, the 
dynamics of electoral competition in liberal democracies have been found to in-
f luence the political construction of problems by contending parties, depending 
inter alia on their respective interests in ideological polarization or ideological 
consensus-building (Aragonès, Castanheira and Giani, 2015; Dragu and Fan, 2016; 
Odmalm and Bale, 2015). Another example is the tendency of presidential regimes 
to favor “urgent” crisis-like problem descriptions, which allow the president – a 
political role historically rooted in the figure of the monarch – to display her or his 
ability to lead and safeguard the nation while standing above the petty divisions 
of party politics (Keeler, 1993). Additional internal structures arising from the 
vertical and horizontal differentiation of political systems are likely to condition 
political responsiveness as well, such as the (de)centralization of decision-making, 
the distribution of thematic competences among ministries, the role of the army 
in the state, and the degree to which trade unions and non-governmental organi-
zations are integrated into or kept outside policy processes (see chapter 2).  
In addition to functional specialization, autopoiesis, and internal struc-
turation, which are all internal features of function systems, interrelationships 
between the social systems of modern society are key determinants of respon-
siveness. Paradoxically, the more function systems have gained concrete oper-
ational autonomy by gradually differentiating themselves from other meaning 
contexts of societal communication, the more they have become interdependent 
(Luhmann, 2013). For instance, the formation of a world system of national con-
stitutional states and the monetization of exchanges of goods and services have 
disentangled political rule and material possession from the functionally undif-
ferentiated hierarchical structures of feudal Europe. As a result of this differenti-
ation process, modern polities have come to depend on the economy – for instance, 
to generate sufficient monetary value to fund public expenses through taxation 
– while the economy depends on polities – for instance, to set up market-enabling 
institutions such as property rights or central banks, to allow private investments 
by reducing uncertainty through the pacification and stabilization of social rela-
tions, or to decide on public investments that markets need to f lourish but cannot 
realize on their own.
2  While the examples provided here focus on the structures of national political regimes, 
transnational and in particular global governance structures also shape patterns of political 
responsiveness, as illustrated by the way global political institutions (e.g., World Bank, United 
Nations Environmental Program) have attributed responsibility for ecological problem-solving 
to national states and structured national environmental policies through the dif fusion of policy 
blueprints (Goldman, 2005; Hironaka, 2014).
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This twin historical evolution of operational autonomy and inter-systemic in-
terdependencies requires function systems to be at least somewhat responsive to 
problems encountered in other functional spheres. For instance, because political 
systems rely extensively on scientific knowledge to both identify and legitimize 
policy options, they cannot ignore science’s need for resources such as public 
funding to conduct research. Similarly, because political systems depend on eco-
nomic growth to extract sufficient resources for their autopoiesis, they cannot ig-
nore the need to adopt policies that sustain rather than burden economic activity. 
Conversely, scientific research cannot ignore research questions that are relevant 
for policy making, as it would undermine public funding for research. Nor can 
scientific research overlook the moral judgments triggered by morally contentious 
research activities, as moral condemnations could trigger political and legal re-
actions that would deteriorate the conditions for future scientific research. Eco-
nomic decisions, such as closing a factory or investing in a new product, cannot 
fully ignore political problems such as unemployment, public health risks, or pol-
lution, as failing to do so could trigger political dynamics leading to costly political 
decisions. 
The necessity for function systems to be responsive to problems arising in the 
meaning contexts of other systems leads them to develop their capacity of “sec-
ond-order observation” – the observation of observation. While first-order obser-
vation describes operations whereby social systems observe themselves and their 
environment as a given factual reality, second-order observation occurs when a 
social system observes how another system observes reality. For instance, when 
policy makers develop expertise or seek input from experts to evaluate the eco-
nomic impacts of a given public policy, the political system observes how it is ob-
served by the economy. A political system can also observe how scientific research 
impacts the economy, in other words, how the economy “observes” scientific re-
search, so as to devise science policies that promote research projects likely to 
have positive economic outcomes.
Responsiveness arising from inter-systemic interdependencies and the ability 
of social systems to ref lect on these interdependencies via second-order observa-
tion can have several types of consequences. Firstly, it can lead to self-restriction 
when a system foregoes operations that could disrupt its autopoiesis by disrupting 
the functioning of other social systems. As a typical example, a government might 
not address a problem by raising taxes or lowering interest rates to an extent 
deemed too detrimental to the ability of the economy to generate added value and 
address needs, because economic deceleration and/or hyperinf lation would im-
pede the ability of the regime to sustain itself.  Secondly, inter-systemic interde-
pendencies and second-order observation can lead social systems to exert a form 
of solidarity. For instance, political systems can adopt policies meant to help sci-
ence, the economy, or any other social system address problems located in these 
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other spheres of society, with the hope that this solidarity will pay off in political 
terms. Thirdly, interdependencies and second-order observation can support the 
development of institutions meant to make a given social system more responsive 
to societal problems. For instance, political systems, law, morality, science, edu-
cation and religion have participated in the institutional development of Corpo-
rate Social Responsibility (CSR), which is meant to make profit-driven economic 
processes more responsive to societal problems such as poverty, harsh labor con-
ditions, human rights violations, and ecological degradation (Krichewsky, 2019). 
The growing institutionalization of “responsive science”, which aims to harness 
scientific research for societal problem-solving beyond the system’s autonomous 
pursuit of scientific “truth”, is another example of such phenomena (Matthies, Si-
mon and Torka, 2015). 
Gaining a conceptual grasp on such a wide and multifaceted object as the se-
lective identification and processing of problems in modern society requires a lev-
el of abstraction and generalization that might be frustrating for any given read-
er. Nevertheless, the theoretical perspectives on responsiveness outlined above 
help overcome the shortcomings of standard theories of political responsiveness. 
The formal institutions of political regimes are likely to inf luence the extent to 
which policy making responds to popular demands and preferences articulated 
in the public sphere. However, the focus of political systems cannot be to identify 
and satisfy such demands and preferences, which are largely the product of the 
political systems themselves. In fact, the identification and processing of prob-
lems by political systems is conditioned by social structures and processes that 
extend much beyond aggregates of individual preferences. The following section 
attempts to further specify the analytical potential of the revisited concept of re-
sponsiveness, and to sketch possible lines of research to investigate political re-
gimes from this analytical angle. 
Studying political responsiveness: 
research perspectives on inclusion, values and time
The systems-theoretical conceptualization of responsiveness invites a shift in fo-
cus from the “who” to the “what”. Responsiveness is not only about who or whose 
interests and preferences direct the policy process, but also about what problems 
political systems identify and address, and what consequences given patterns of 
responsiveness have for politics and society at large. How do problem formula-
tions emerge in the policy process? Do structural characteristics of political re-
gimes and structural couplings between polities and other functional spheres of 
society favor certain problem descriptions while making other problem descrip-
tions less likely? How do characteristics of problem formulations condition the 
policy options envisaged to address these problems, and how do institutionalized 
4. Political Responsiveness: The Identification and Processing of Problems 133
policy options condition the framing of problems in the policy process? Do prob-
lems and solutions follow typical “careers” or trajectories within the policy-mak-
ing structures of political regimes? How do patterns of responsiveness within 
political regimes retroact on the structural features of these regimes (e.g., the 
institutional delineation of policy fields) and the institutional arrangements orga-
nizing relations between these regimes and other spheres of society?
To investigate these questions, scholars can draw on a rich tradition of re-
search in political sociology regarding how problems are formulated, placed on the 
agenda of political decision making, and addressed by way of public policy mak-
ing and policy implementation. Since the 1960s, departing from the functionalist 
approaches of “social problems” that view problems as ontological dysfunctions 
of society (e.g., poverty, racial discrimination, criminality, pollution), construc-
tivist approaches have examined how actors collectively produce and promote 
various – more or less competing – definitions of problems (Blumer, 1971). In this 
vein, classical studies have identified typical sequences through which individu-
als and organizations (e.g., professional groups, urban dwellers, users of public 
services, organized interest groups, companies, NGOs, media outlets, scientific 
experts, consultants, elected representatives, bureaucrats) i) perceive situations 
as unsatisfactory; ii) define and label these situations as politically relevant prob-
lems having specific causes, consequences (e.g., victims), and solution prospects; 
iii) work to put these problems and/or solutions on the agenda of policy making; 
iv) contribute to the policy making process (the “politics” of policy making); and 
v) possibly follow up on the implementation of policies to evaluate outcomes and 
demand adjustments (e.g. Easton, 1965; Jones, 1970; Kingdon, 2013 [1984]).3 
Three features of this research tradition are particularly relevant for the study 
of political responsiveness. One is its sociological outlook on political phenomena, 
which departs from the focus of political science on political institutions. Unlike 
standard theories of political responsiveness, which focus on institutions such as 
citizens, elections, parliaments, and federalism, the political sociology of prob-
lems accounts for the role of non-political institutions and participants such as 
professions, interest groups (e.g., associations of “victims”), social movements, 
and scientific experts. Looking beyond the political sphere is even more import-
ant given the development of collaborative governance over the past three decades, 
because the formulation and processing of problems within these governance 
3  This Anglo-Saxon literature has been received and further developed in several countries, resul-
ting in overlapping research traditions such as the German study of political planning and steer-
ing (e.g. Janning and Toens, 2008; Scharpf, 1973; Wenzelburger and Zohlnhöfer, 2015; Willke, 2014) 
and French studies on public policies and public action (e.g. Boussaguet et al., 2015; Lascoumes 
and Le Gales, 2007b; Padioleau, 1982; Zittoun, 2013).
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structures rests explicitly on the involvement of a variety of public and private 
actors (Bartley, 2018; Fuchs, 2007; Levi-Faur, 2012; Lievens, 2015). 
Another relevant contribution from this research tradition is the emphasis on 
contingencies in the relations between problems and solutions. Whereas standard 
views on responsiveness locate “problems” on the side of citizens and “responses” 
on the side of policy makers, the political sociology of problems and public policies 
emphasizes the complex and contingent character of relations between problems 
and solutions. Notwithstanding the heuristic idea of a “policy cycle”, which evokes 
a clear sequence from problem identification to policy evaluation, empirical stud-
ies have shown how problems, goals, policy instruments, participating actors and 
opportunities for decision making meet and interact without following a rigid 
sequential order (Jones and Baumgartner, 2005; Kingdon, 2013 [1984]; Lascoumes 
and Le Gales, 2007a; Zahariadis, 2003).
Finally, while standard perspectives on responsiveness tend to assume a 
pre-eminence of formal political structures and processes, studies in political so-
ciology have shed light on the role of informal arrangements. For instance, a num-
ber of empirical studies have examined the role of policy networks and related 
interpersonal ties, which “limit participation in the policy process; shape the be-
haviour of actors through the rules of the game [prevailing in the network]; privi-
lege certain interests; and substitute private government for public accountability” 
(Rhodes, 2006, p. 436; see also Victor, Montgomery and Lubell, 2016). A collection 
of studies on informal politics in the European Union, edited by Thomas Chris-
tiansen and Simona Piattoni (2004), provide additional examples of discrepancies 
between the formalized processes of policy making within political institutions 
on the one hand, and informal exchanges among public office holders as well as 
between them and other actors (e.g., experts, lobbyists, journalists) on the other 
hand.
The systems-theoretical revision of the concept of responsiveness can build 
on and further develop this political sociology of problem construction and poli-
cy making in a way that gives more weight to the conditioning of responsiveness 
by structural features of political regimes. To illustrate the analytical potential 
of this approach, we brief ly focus on three relevant features of political regimes: 
inclusion structures, value patterns, and temporalities.
As outlined in the first chapter of this book, political inclusion structures are 
defining features of political regimes. By defining “public roles” (e.g., national 
citizens, users of public services, beneficiaries of social policies, refugees) and 
“performance roles” (e.g., presidents, ministers, MPs, civil servants), inclusion 
structures condition membership in a political community and its subgroups, at-
tribute rights and other resources, formulate behavioral expectations, define the 
categories through which individuals and groups are addressed by the political 
system, and shape collective identities. Political inclusion structures also insti-
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tutionalize “structural couplings” between political systems and other function 
systems, for instance when citizenship is coupled with inclusion in a religious or 
ethnic community, or when franchise or social rights are coupled with levels of 
economic wealth.
Standard approaches to responsiveness cannot study inclusion structures as 
an independent variable affecting responsiveness because they envisage inclu-
sion as an integral part of responsiveness – indeed, responsiveness is defined as 
the inclusion of citizens in the policy process through the effective representation 
of their interests and preferences. Conversely, our revised concept of responsive-
ness raises the question of how various inclusion structures inf luence the selec-
tive identification and processing of problems in political regimes. For instance, 
ethnic patronage and other forms of “neo-patrimonialism” might favor descrip-
tions of problems and policy options that support the reproduction of these bases 
of power, such as the attribution of causes of problems to the behavior of rival 
ethnic groups, or the selection of policy options that feed clientelistic systems of 
redistribution of goods (Bayart, 1989; Berman, 1998; Koter, 2016). Similarly, the 
attribution of political performance roles to religious clerics in theocracies might 
reinforce the role of religious criteria in the selective identification of problems 
and policy options (e.g. Abdolmohammadi and Cama, 2015; Brumberg and Farhi, 
2016). With regard to public roles, the salience of caste identities in Indian pol-
itics illustrates how subdividing a citizenry along ethnic lines can contribute to 
shaping both the political construction of problems (e.g., as caste injustice) and the 
selection of policy responses (e.g., the extension of affirmative action programs 
to new social groups) (Deshpande, 2013; Jaffrelot, 2003; Jodhka, 2015; Michelutti, 
2007).
Value patterns are another feature of political regimes with structural effects 
on political responsiveness. Following Clyde Kluckhohn (1951), values can be de-
fined as conceptions of the desirable. They are the preferred sides of abstract 
distinctions that are attached to a preference. For instance, the value of freedom 
can be conceived of as desirable based on a preference for freedom as opposed to 
subordination or constraint. The value of prosperity can be conceived of as desir-
able in opposition to poverty. Knowledge is often valued as opposed to ignorance. 
Solidarity becomes a value by being considered preferable over egoism. Beauty is 
generally considered desirable as opposed to ugliness. And power can be a value 
because it is envisaged as better than being dominated and impotent. As empha-
sized by Nathalie Heinich (2017), these general and abstract values are “autotelic” 
principles, in the sense that they are their own end. These “value-principles” can 
be translated into value scales that are used to evaluate objects (things, people, be-
haviors, states of the world), thereby conferring value to these objects. This social 
production of value (from value-principles to value-objects) is embedded in cul-
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tural value patterns, and it contributes to reproducing and changing these value 
patterns over time.
While power is a guiding value in the political sphere, inasmuch as it mo-
tivates and orients the behavior of participants who compete for the control of 
political power, other values can also play a structuring role in political systems. 
Because it is hard to disagree with value-principles (see Luhmann, 1995b), political 
regimes formally commit to values to legitimize their rule and elicit adherence. 
For instance, the preamble of the constitution of the Fifth Republic of France un-
derscores the commitment of the regime to human rights; the self-determination 
of peoples and the sovereignty of nations; the tryptic “liberty, equality, fraternity”; 
and environmental protection as defined in the Environmental Charter of 2004. 
Similarly, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union is imbued 
with commitments to value-principles such as dignity, freedom, equality, solidar-
ity, and justice. Political parties and politicians also make use of value commit-
ments as a semantic device to elicit consensus and adherence among the citizenry. 
As Luhmann noted, values “provide communication processes with premises for 
which one can safely assume consensus. Values are safety posts in every political 
communication, especially in every political speech and controversial political ar-
gumentation. They relieve from the necessity to provide information: one does 
not even need to know the person one is talking with, talking to, or talking about. 
Surely no one will come and oppose humanity and fairness, freedom, solidarity, 
security, well-being, democracy, responsibility, rights, justice, and the like” (1977, 
p. 171, our translation). 
Beyond consensual value commitments, values play a role in the political con-
struction of problems and related policy options. Parliamentary debates, cabi-
net meetings, interviews given by politicians to the mass media, speeches given 
during demonstrations, and other instances of political communication use value 
scales embedded in broader cultural value patterns to evaluate things, persons, 
behaviors and states of the world. For instance, political communication can eval-
uate the rearmament policies of other states in terms of their significance for peace 
and security, immigration f lows in terms of social cohesion, the composition of cor-
porate boards in terms of gender equality, pesticides in terms of their likely im-
pacts on public health, and so on. These myriad instances of evaluation contribute 
directly to the political construction of problems – discrepancies between valued 
states of things and actual or potential alternative states. In doing so, political 
communication also contributes to reproducing and changing the cultural value 
patterns that serve as a basis for these evaluations: Describing the composition of 
corporate boards as unequal reasserts the value of gender equality while under-
mining patriarchal value patterns. 
Such processes of evaluation can be studied at a micro-sociological level, as 
in Sophie Schäfer’s analysis of the discursive construction of “Muslims” in rela-
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tion to values of religious freedom and solidarity in the German parliament (2018). 
However, it might also be fruitful to examine systematically how features of the 
value patterns that prevail in democratic or authoritarian regimes, such as their 
composition, their degree of heterogeneity, or their stability, induce specific pat-
terns of political responsiveness by selectively favoring or hampering value-based 
problem descriptions and policy options. As argued in chapter 6, not only do 
democracy and authoritarianism induce different value patterns, but the role 
of values in the constitution and stabilization of these two types of regimes dif-
fers, with likely consequences for responsiveness.  For instance, in authoritarian 
regimes such as ideocracies and theocracies, problems that allow the regime to 
mobilize the masses in the name of its core ideological or religious values have 
an advantage. Conversely, the formulation in political terms of problems arising 
from values such as free speech or multiculturalism are likely to remain confined 
to small circles of opponents at the fringes of such authoritarian regimes, whose 
legitimacy is grounded in values of conformity and cultural homogeneity (Backes 
and Kailitz, 2016).
Finally, the temporalities of political regimes are a structural variable relevant to 
political responsiveness. In standard scholarship on responsiveness, time is an in-
trinsic parameter akin to reactivity: Responsiveness implies there is a limited time 
between the expression of a collective preference by citizens and the production 
of political decisions directed towards the realization of this preference.4 As men-
tioned above, studies have also examined how political temporalities related to 
electoral cycles impact the responsiveness of politicians and political institutions. 
This latter research angle connects with other political science examinations 
of time in politics. As illustrated by a recent volume on political temporalities ed-
ited by Guillaume Marrel and Renaud Payre (2018), this literature examines time 
in three ways. One is the temporality of electoral mandates in competitive democ-
racies, which structures political careers and confronts policy makers with trade-
offs between the long-term effectiveness of useful political measures and the 
short-term rhythm of electoral competition.  A second research angle examines 
the temporality of political action, such as discrepancies between the routinized 
and synchronized pace of public administrative work on the one hand, and the 
jolty temporalities of political maneuvering on the other hand. Finally, research-
ers have investigated time as both a resource and a constraint that political actors 
manipulate strategically, for instance by forcing issues and policy options onto the 
political agenda in the name of an “emergency”, by playing with the temporality 
of formal procedures within political institutions, or by advancing or delaying the 
transmission of information to gain political advantages.
4  Notably, French political scientists translate “responsiveness” as “réactivité”.
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Notwithstanding their relevance for research on the construction and process-
ing of problems in democratic and authoritarian polities, these three perspectives 
on time focus on political action within the institutional setting of political sys-
tems. Understanding how systemic temporalities condition the responsiveness 
of modern polities requires the use of other theoretical lenses. One theoretical 
option is provided by Hartmut Rosa’s theory of acceleration (2013). In this theory, 
Rosa analyses the acceleration of temporal structures (rhythms, tempos, dura-
tions, sequences) and temporal horizons (conceptions of past, present and future) 
in classical modern and late modern society.5 Acceleration arises from a complex 
“self-propelling circular process” that extends far beyond political action within 
political institutions (Rosa, 2013, chapters 6-8). The concrete manifestations and 
effects of this process can be observed at the level of individual actors, whose daily 
lives and life perspectives are deeply affected by acceleration and the related re-
quirements of synchronization. But acceleration also has far-reaching structural 
and cultural impacts at the level of function systems and their interrelationships.
With regard to political systems, acceleration in late modernity undermines 
the modern assumption that national states can steer the course of history with-
in the frames of domestic and international politics. In liberal democracies in 
particular, the time required for participatory will-formation and deliberative 
decision-making limits possibilities of acceleration. Conversely, the growing au-
tonomy and global scope of other function systems, such as the economy, science, 
law, and mass media, induces a plurality of systems-specific temporalities, whose 
structures depart from political temporalities. As a result of the desynchroniza-
tion of politics and other function systems, “the role of politics as a social pace-
setter that was undisputed in classical modernity has been lost […]. Time within 
politics is becoming thoroughly disorganized and confused (durcheinander), and 
this is also bringing the classical modern conception of the role of politics in time 
[that is in history] to the brink of collapse.” (Rosa, 2013, p. 262)
5  Up to this point, our argument has focused on the responsiveness of modern polities, understood 
as national political regimes that are regional segments of a world political system that also ent-
ails global governance structures (see for instance Stichweh, 2002). With the discussion of Hart-
mut Rosa (2013) and other references below, in particular Ulrich Beck (2016), modern politics and 
society are further divided in two periods, namely the development of classical modern world 
society (from the last decades of the 18th century to the late 1970s) and the subsequent (ongoing) 
period of late modernity. The latter is characterized mainly by an accentuation of core modern 
phenomena, such as functional dif ferentiation, individualization, globalization, and societal ac-
celeration, resulting in structural and cultural changes that disrupt the classical modern order. 
For instance, the growing autonomy and global integration of function systems weaken nation 
states’ modern project of organizing society within national frames, while the rise of global eco-
logical risks such as climate change undermine the modern ideology of progress.
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The rapid pace of other function systems, whose developments and prob-
lem-solving expectations often exceed the temporality of political responsiveness, 
puts democratic regimes under pressure: Decisions can be obsolete by the time 
they are made; the accelerated inf low of decisions to be made shortens the time 
available for each decision-making sequence; and as “the limit of the foreseeable 
moves steadily closer to the present […] temporary and provisional solutions take 
the place of larger political design” (Rosa, 2013, p. 264). To relieve this pressure, 
democracies are tempted to whittle down time-consuming democratic process-
es such as participation, deliberation, accountability, and the judicial control of 
public administration. Political developments such as New Public Management, 
the transfer of regulatory functions from the purview of elected representatives 
to technocratic agencies (see chapter 5), the increasing role of self-regulation as 
an alternative to “command and control” systems, governments’ use of execu-
tive orders as an alternative to parliamentary law-making, and the partial inte-
gration of emergency rules within constitutional normality, can be understood 
as attempts by democratic regimes to keep up with the accelerated pace of late 
modern society. While these examples suggest trade-offs between synchronized 
responsiveness and democracy, democratic institutions such as parliaments have 
also tried to adapt to the new requirements of acceleration, as Ulf Bohmann and 
Henning Laux (2018) showed in their ethnographic study of synchronization in 
the German Bundestag. These temporal and structural developments are likely to 
have far-reaching impacts on both the conditions of political responsiveness and 
the internal properties (the informational substance) of the problems and policies 
constructed by (late) modern political regimes.
The question of the informational substance of political problems and poli-
cies can be further examined in terms of temporal horizons. Following Luhmann 
(1995a; 2012 & 2013), social systems operate only in the actuality of the present, as 
their constitutive communicative events are over as soon as they occur. Howev-
er, social systems also create time by generating in the present information that 
refers to past or future realities. Conceptualized by Luhmann as the temporal di-
mension of meaning, this communicative imagination of pasts (memories) and 
futures (expectations) is a significant aspect of political responsiveness. In par-
ticular, while economic operations (investing, saving, pricing, purchasing) are 
stimulated and partly directed by various imaginations of the future (Beckert, 
2016), the policy process is stimulated and partly directed by various anticipations 
of upcoming problems and likely policy outcomes. As the case of environmental 
politics illustrates, the role that future outlooks play in the ongoing dynamics of 
political responsiveness is conditioned by structural features of political regimes. 
For instance, Germany’s multi-party system with free and fair elections has al-
lowed the green party Bündnis90/Die Grünen to promote future-oriented concerns 
for inter-generational climate justice in German politics (Radkau, 2011), while 
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populist rule under Donald Trump in the United States and Jair Bolsonaro in Bra-
zil make the policy process more sensitive to concerns for short-term economic 
opportunities than to scenarios of a grand climate catastrophe (Bomberg, 2017; 
Escobar, 2018; Ferrante and Fearnside, 2019). As these contrasting examples make 
clear, while climate change and other global risks of late modern society recast 
politics within “cosmopolitical” horizons of references and coordinates of action, 
which are imbued with imaginations of a threatening future for humanity (Beck, 
2016), national regimes remain key to the way these global risks are problematized 
and addressed in world politics.
Conclusion
Since it was introduced in democratic theory by Pennock in 1952, the concept of 
responsiveness has had a successful career as a normative criterion of democracy: 
Unlike regimes where the government controls the political agenda and dictates 
collectively binding decisions, liberal democracies are expected to ensure that 
governments translate popular wishes and interests into public policies. Despite 
its success, this conception of responsiveness has triggered ongoing discussions 
within and around the field of democratic theories, especially regarding the prop-
er meaning and operationalization of this analytical concept.
Building on Luhmann’s theory of social systems, the present chapter reviewed 
and extended relevant critiques of the standard conception of responsiveness, in 
particular critiques voiced by the constructivist branch of political theory (Disch, 
2012; Fossen, 2019; Saward, 2006). While the latter remain attached to normative 
concerns about democratic representation within the schematic distinction be-
tween state and society, Luhmann’s theory of functional differentiation drops that 
schema. The theory conceives of modern polities as national segments of a self-ref-
erential political system that operates within a worldwide system of communica-
tion ordered primarily along functional lines. Notwithstanding significant struc-
tural couplings and interplay with its social and bio-physical environments, the 
political system has no direct access to these environments: The political system 
can only respond to its own representation of its environments, which it constructs 
internally by way of external reference. As Thomas Fossen (2019) remarked in a 
recent article on constructivist approaches to political representation, represen-
tation in politics does not only mean acting for someone in the capacity of a repre-
sentative (representative agency), but also “portraying-something-as-something” (p. 
824), in other words, constructing descriptions of reality (representation-as). This 
emphasis on the two dimensions of representation allows a shift in focus from 
the responsiveness of polities to their citizenry – according to whose preferences 
and interests does the government act – to the responsiveness of democratic and 
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non-democratic polities to society’s problems – what problems do polities identify 
and address beyond the purely self-referential problem of their own autopoiesis.
This reconceptualization of political responsiveness solves at least some of the 
problems posed by the standard interpretation of the term. First, the answer to 
the question of what polities respond to is clear: socially constructed problems. 
The answer to the question of what responsiveness entails is also clear: the pro-
duction of collectively binding decisions intended to address these problems, that 
is, to reduce the observed discrepancies between a preferred state of things and 
actual or potential alternative states of things. Second, the reconceptualization 
of responsiveness extends its analytical scope beyond the normative evaluation 
of political systems. In fact, the approach we propose even moves beyond the 
widespread normative assumption that democratic problem-solving contributes 
to modern progress. While states accumulate and legitimize power by demon-
strating efforts to identify and solve collective problems for the greater good, no 
normative viewpoint in society allows the discourse of progress to be considered 
an objective fact – all the more in late modernity, when negative side effects of 
progress such as climate change increasingly appear as main effects that threaten 
the sustainability of the modern episode (Beck, 2016).
The research perspectives brought about by this theoretical move connect, in 
many respects, with established traditions of political sociology, in particular the 
sociology of public problems and the sociology of public policies. However, while 
these research traditions tend to focus on the detailed conditions of problem 
construction and public policy making, the systemic approach outlined in this 
chapter offers opportunities to embed such studies within the broader analysis of 
classical and late modern society. To illustrate the analytical potential of this more 
systemic approach, we described a few research perspectives on how the inclusion 
structures, value patterns, and temporalities of modern society can condition the 
political production and processing of collective problems. This research agenda 
is well-suited to comparative studies on responsiveness between political regimes, 
either within or across policy fields; between national polities and transnation-
al or global governance structures; or between political responsiveness and the 
responsiveness of other functional systems such as science, law, or the economy.
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The present chapter deals with functional autonomy, a somehow contradicto-
ry feature of modern democracies. Functional autonomy means the deliberate 
self-restriction of majoritarian institutions like parliaments and governments 
with regard to certain fields of political action. Functional autonomy entails the 
transfer of political decision-making authority away from those authorities that 
possess direct or indirect democratic legitimation to organizations that not only 
lack democratic legitimacy, but also largely defy public control by the demos. Im-
portantly, these organizations are granted autonomy, i.e. the ability to handle 
their respective environmental dependencies at their own discretion. As a result, 
collectively binding decisions taken in functional autonomies no longer follow 
political criteria and considerations, but are exclusively guided by external, i.e. 
non-political expertise. 
Functional autonomies appeared in the course of the expansion of political re-
sponsibility to more and more societal spheres. This expansion of responsibility 
has accompanied the differentiation process of the political system as an autono-
mous function system more or less from the beginning on, but gained momentum 
since the mid-20th century, simultaneously to the global spread of democracy. 
Functional autonomy, so the general thesis of this chapter, can be considered a 
core mechanism through which modern democracies process their various envi-
ronmental relations, ensure their capacity to act (i.e., to make collectively binding 
decisions) in a functionally differentiated environment, and try to keep the ability 
of the political system to expand in this environment and deal with the various 
expansionary claims of other function systems.
The relevance of functional autonomy as a feature of modern democracy not 
only results from the obvious persistence and firm institutionalization of respec-
tive decision-making structures. Moreover, the existence of functional autonomy 
ref lects the willingness and capacity of modern democracy to accept a significant 
degree of internal contradiction regarding the democratic core principle of indi-
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vidualized inclusion. To put it bluntly, we can even state that functional autonomy 
represents a kind of autocratic implant in modern democratic regimes which is, 
at the same time, considered a genuinely democratic mode of coping with certain 
decision-making issues. In this respect, understanding the operating, the emer-
gence, and the embeddedness of functional autonomy in democratic regimes is 
key to a profound understanding of modern democracy as such. 
To that end, the present chapter uses a differentiation theory approach which 
allows to examine the political system in its societal environment, and it proceeds 
in three complementary steps each of which illuminating functional autonomy 
from a different angle: The first part of the chapter approaches the rather abstract 
topic in an empirical way. It uses two anecdotical incidents to highlight the di-
verse and often controversial system-environment aspects that are linked to func-
tional autonomy, to underline the practical relevance of this structural feature of 
modern democracy, and to outline its core characteristics. The second and more 
theoretical part deals with the remarkable relationship between functional au-
tonomy and democracy with particular emphasis on three aspects: the contradic-
tion between functional autonomy and key principles of modern democracy, the 
review of the two main lines of argumentation in the relevant literature that try 
to reconcile this contradiction, and the analytical distinction between functional 
autonomy and the internal functional differentiation of modern politics into po-
litical action fields. The third part addresses three case studies – an independent 
regulatory agency, central banks, and judicial review (or constitutional courts, re-
spectively) – to systematically trace their evolution as structural elements of the 
political system with particular emphasis on their analytical key characteristics. 
I.	 Approaching	the	subject	matter	of	study
Setting the stage: Two anecdotal observations on functional autonomy 
and the contested retraction of majoritarian institutions
In the summer of 2016, the plans for a takeover of Kaiser’s Tengelmann, a German 
supermarket chain with, at that time, 451 stores and roughly 16,000 employees, by 
Edeka, Germany’s largest food retailer group (net food sales of 53 billion Euro and 
roughly 347,000 employees in 2015)1, caused considerable political and public tur-
moil in Germany. A year earlier, in March 2015, the German Federal Cartel Office 
(Bundeskartellamt) had prohibited the merger on the grounds that it would have 
negative effects on the competition in purchasing and consumer markets, which, 
as the agency argued, would potentially affect both wholesalers and consumers 
(Bundeskartellamt, 2015, p. 8ff). In March 2016, the Minister of Economic Affairs, 
1  See Edeka (2015) and https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lebensmitteleinzelhandel (23.5.2018). 
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Sigmar Gabriel, to whom both corporations had applied for support, granted a 
special permit that allowed the takeover under strict conditions. Gabriel justified 
his use of this so-called ministerial approval (Ministererlaubnis) by pointing to the 
protection of labor rights and the preservation of 16,000 jobs at Kaiser’s Tengel-
mann that were part of the strict conditions linked to the approval.2 By granting 
this special permit, Gabriel not only overruled the previous decision of the Feder-
al Cartel Office, but also f louted a special report of the monopolies commission 
(Monopolkommission) that vehemently objected the intended merger. The positive 
effects on the common good that the takeover would potentially yield, the report 
argued, were far from sufficient to compensate for the imminent negative impli-
cations resulting from the restraint of market competition (Monopolkommission, 
2015, p. 62). 
Gabriel’s ministerial approval had two immediate consequences: First, the 
head of the monopoly commission, Daniel Zimmer, a law professor at the Univer-
sity of Bonn, resigned his office in protest of Gabriel’s decision. In public state-
ments, Zimmer accused the minister of being driven by the strong and (some 
would say) irrational ref lex to “save and help” as well as the intention to offer 
visible evidence that he was doing the best for the voters who had given him a 
mandate to represent their interests (see e.g. Zacharakis, 2016). Second, two of 
Edeka’s competitors that had also been interested in a takeover of Kaiser’s Tengel-
mann, including the second largest German food retailer Rewe (net food sales of 
40 billion Euro in 2015),3 felt unjustly removed from the process and filed an appeal 
against Gabriel’s decision before the competent Higher Regional Court (Oberlandes- 
gericht). In July 2016, the court suspended the ministerial approval in an urgent 
legal procedure. According to the opinion issued by the court, there was a good 
reason to suspect that Gabriel’s decision was biased and suffered from a lack of 
neutrality since the minister had allegedly made secret agreements with repre-
sentatives of the corporations involved and therefore could not make an objective 
decision on this matter. Moreover, the court argued, the question of labor rights at 
Kaiser’s Tengelmann did not concern the public good, and Gabriel’s assumptions 
about the preservation of jobs were based on incomplete facts.4 In late 2016, the 
conf lict was settled when Edeka and Rewe reached an out-of-court agreement to 
divide Kaiser’s Tengelmann between the two companies.
2  See the press release of Sigmar Gabriel, Federal Ministry for Economic Af fairs and Energy, Ber-
lin, 13.7.2016, https://www.bmwi.de/Redaktion/DE/Reden/2016/20160713-gabriel-zur-entschei 
dung-des-oberlandesgerichts-duesseldorf-im-ministererlaubnisverfahren-edeka-tengelmann.
html (31.10.2019).
3  See https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lebensmitteleinzelhandel (23.5.2018).
4  See https://www.justiz.nrw.de/nrwe/olgs/duesseldorf/j2016/VI_Kart_3_16_V_Beschluss_201 
60712.html (12.11.2019).
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Change of scene: Almost two years later, in October of 2018, the advocate gen-
eral of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) presented a public statement on the 
European Central Bank (ECB) and its Quantitative Easing (QE) program, under 
which the ECB had been purchasing sovereign bonds issued by Eurozone member 
states on secondary bond markets since 2015 (see e.g. Janisch, 2018). The state-
ment referred to an emergency petition (constitutional complaint) that a group of 
German politicians from the conservative camp had filed with the German Fed-
eral Constitutional Court in 2015 to stop the European Central Bank from partic-
ipating in the QE program. The politicians accused the ECB of transgressing its 
mandate. The bank, they argued, was de facto engaging in state financing with-
out a proper mandate, and was managing public finances by money press. The 
advocate general of the ECJ, to which the German Federal Constitutional Court 
had forwarded the appeal, did not share these concerns: He suggested that the QE 
program was legal and justified his claim by noting that the ECB’s permission to 
purchase sovereign bonds is restricted to the secondary market, and direct bond 
transactions with the issuing governments are forbidden. Moreover, he pointed 
to the ECB’s autonomy in monetary policy, its economic expertise and its obvi-
ous success in establishing the Euro zone. The final ECJ decision on the matter is 
pending.
In hindsight, this episode is obviously directly related to the ECB’s behavior 
during the height of the Euro crisis in the summer of 2012, when ECB president 
Mario Draghi publicly declared that “[w]ithin our mandate, the ECB is ready to 
do whatever it takes to preserve the euro. And believe me, it will be enough” (Eu-
ropean Central Bank, 2012). Draghi’s statement was unanimously interpreted as 
an indication that the bank was willing to purchase sovereign bonds from Euro 
member states. In September 2012, the conditions of the respective monetary 
policy instrument, the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) program, were 
fixed by the ECB’s Governing Council. This crisis strategy had both supporters 
and critics: On the one hand, many economic experts trace the eventual stabili-
zation of the Euro directly back to Draghi’s decisive statement and to the exis-
tence of the OMT program, although the latter was never applied in practice to 
any Euro member states (Spain, Ireland, and Portugal expressed interest but did 
not meet the conditions). On the other hand, there was sharp criticism, especially 
in Germany. Jens Weidmann, chairman of the German Federal Bank, argued that 
the purchase of sovereign bonds would redistribute risk between tax payers from 
different countries (see Braunberger and Ruhkamp, 2012). Because it was matter 
of economic (and not monetary) policy, his argument continued, such a decision 
on risk distribution should rest exclusively with democratically legitimated actors 
such as parliaments and governments, and was clearly not covered by the ECB 
mandate. Several German politicians from both the left and the conservative 
camp followed Weidmann and accused Draghi of having used the dynamics of the 
5. Expansion through Self-Restriction: Functional Autonomy in Modern Democracies 153
crisis to act as a minister of economic affairs without democratic legitimation and 
to silently expand the bank’s mandate and scope of action at the expense of na-
tional governments. These concerns culminated in several proceedings before the 
German Federal Constitutional Court, which were eventually transferred without 
judgement to the ECJ. In 2015, the European Court admitted that the ECB had 
indeed expanded its competences during the Euro crisis, however, the court did 
not consider the bank’s behavior illegal. The German Federal Constitutional Court 
followed this decision.
What is at issue?
The two episodes reviewed above – the merger of two major food retailers and the 
related confrontation between the Minister of Economic Affairs and the Federal 
Cartel Office, and the political opposition to the operations of the ECB as chan-
neled through the German Constitutional Court and the ECJ – are telling with 
regard to the topic of the present chapter. Both situations included conf licts with-
in the political system during which certain expectations and relatively well-func-
tioning scripts that usually remain latent were articulated, openly challenged, 
and thus became visible. Reconstructing these conf licts from the perspective of 
the theory of functional differentiation reveals some common patterns and key 
aspects that help narrow down the subject matter. Thus, we explore three con-
clusions related to a theoretical point of view that we can draw from these two 
episodes.
First and most obviously, these situations entailed disputes on matters of com-
petence between multiple institutions involved in political communication (i.e., 
communication directed at making collectively binding decisions). These institu-
tions, however, differ significantly in terms of their internal configuration, their 
democratic legitimation, and their position within the formal institutional struc-
ture of the political system: On the one hand, both episodes were either directly 
or indirectly focused on authorities from the legislative and executive branches 
of power (members of governments and parliaments), which indisputably rest on 
democratic legitimation and are subject to broad mandates to shape certain policy 
fields for the purpose of public welfare. On the other hand, these democratically 
legitimated (or majoritarian) authorities engaged in conf lict with organizations 
that were unelected and explicitly claimed to distance themselves from political 
matters such as ideological disputes, party competition, and the fight for elec-
toral votes, but still participated in collectively binding decision making and ex-
erted significant political authority. In contrast to the majoritarian institutions, 
however, the latter were supposed to operate within limited and clearly defined 
boundaries: The Federal Cartel Office as an independent regulatory agency acts 
on the basis of the Act against Restraints of Competition (Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbs- 
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beschränkungen), from which it derives its mandate to protect economic competi-
tion. Concretely, the agency enforces the ban on cartels, is responsible for merger 
control, controls any abusive practices of dominant or powerful companies, and 
reviews procedures for the award of public contracts by the Federation.5 In case 
of the ECB, several sets of formal rules – the ECB statute, the Treaty on European 
Union, and the Treaty on the Function of the European Union – explicitly limit the 
bank’s authority to monetary policy, with the primary objective of maintaining 
price stability within the Eurozone (i.e. annual inf lation below, but close to, 2 per-
cent). To that end, the ECB may use clearly defined instruments such as minimum 
reserves, standing facilities, and open market operations (European Central Bank, 
2011).
Second, both episodes encompassed the clash of dif ferent function systems and 
their respective expertise within the political system and, as a consequence, interleav-
ing operations of the systems involved, i.e. the political, the legal, and the econom-
ic system: In the Edeka-Tengelmann case, the cartel office based its ban of the in-
tended merger strictly and exclusively on economic considerations concerning the 
anticipated effects on competition and power relations in the markets that would 
potentially be affected – a line of argumentation that follows the cartel office’s 
formal mandate and came as no surprise. Equally unsurprising were Gabriel’s ex-
plicitly broad perspective on the issue and his reasoning on the potential public 
welfare effects of the merger. Generally speaking, Gabriel’s stance was linked to 
his position as a federal minister, which ideally binds him to the promotion of the 
public good. Because the latter is a highly inclusive concept, Gabriel is responsible 
for society as a whole (within national boundaries) and is prohibited from limiting 
his assessment of the effects of his decisions to certain parts of society while ne-
glecting others. In the given case, the need to serve the public interest was legally 
codified in the instrument of ministerial approval. Not only is the use of minis-
terial approval strictly bound to a concrete decision (i.e., ban) of the cartel office 
and implemented only at the request of one of the corporations involved, but it 
also requires justification based on either economic effects beyond competition 
(in this case jobs) or the overwhelming interest of the general public in the merg-
er. To that end, the procedure of ministerial approval must start with a report of 
the monopolies commission, an advisory committee to the federal government 
without its own decision-making power, on the issue at stake. This report not only 
guarantees the incorporation of economic expertise throughout the procedure, 
but also increases public pressure on the minister to carefully evaluate and jus-
tify his decision. The minister’s decision, however, is by no means bound to the 
commission’s advice on the takeover. If complaints against the use of ministerial 
5  See https://www.bundeskartellamt.de/EN/AboutUs/Bundeskartellamt/bundeskartellamt_
node.html (24.5.2018).
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approval are raised – as was the case in the given takeover – the Higher Regional 
Court decides on the issue.
The situation was even more complex in the episode concerning ECB policy 
during and after the Euro crisis, since this scenario involved the expertise of three 
function systems: In terms of its (politically determined) objective to stabilize the 
Euro and the financial system within the Eurozone, the ECB not only made de-
cisions based primarily on economic expertise, but also acted in the operational 
mode of the economic system, i.e. in the form of sovereign bond transactions that 
result in actual payments and are expected to affect future payments. Conversely, 
the bank did not act in the operational mode of the political system, i.e. by issuing 
sanction-based provisions and standards, which it can and does, for instance, in 
the field of banking supervision. The ECB’s policy was challenged by the argument 
that the actual effects of its operations would equal economic policy decisions (e.g. 
regarding the distribution of risk between political collectives and the distribu-
tion of national public funds). In contrast to monetary policy, critics argued, these 
issues should be a subject of political expertise and decided on the basis of politi-
cal standards, which implies that the respective decisions must be made by dem-
ocratically legitimated authorities and must consider aspects such as equality and 
both economic and non-economic effects on the public good. Finally, legal exper-
tise was involved because these concerns were not directly addressed via decrees 
from the respective political institutions to the ECB, but rather were articulated 
via the legal system. With two core institutions of the legal system – the German 
Constitutional Court and the ECJ – becoming involved and being expected to set-
tle the conf lict, political concerns came to have a notable impact and could not 
be ignored. Thus, the clash between economic and political expertise was trans-
formed into a clash between economic and legal expertise. This transformation, 
however, was not uncontested: Both in media coverage and among experts, there 
was a contentious discussion about the extent to which legal interventions in the 
operations of an independent central bank were appropriate.
Third, as this latter aspect indicates, both episodes in some way touched upon 
the general issue of the acceptance of political decision-making as well as upon the 
question of who may and should make decisions in whose name and through 
which channels of inf luence. In this regard, both episodes vividly illustrate the 
dominance and obtrusiveness of non-political expertise within political commu-
nication: In the Edeka-Tengelmann case, the importance of non-political exper-
tise is particularly evident in the fact that the head of the monopolies commission, 
whose advice was not followed by the minister in his eventual decision, immedi-
ately resigned from office in protest of the ministerial approval. Moreover, the 
tone dominating the debates that accompanied the conf lict for months provides 
evidence that public sympathies were unevenly distributed among the parties in-
volved. In a press release on the occasion of the withdrawal, the monopolies com-
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mission bluntly rejected the minister’s line of argumentation and countered with 
an argument using a strictly competition-based concept of the common good.6 In 
the same vein, media coverage and expert statements – notably, not only decided-
ly liberal voices – poured scorn on Gabriel, called the court decision his personal 
disaster and a loss of face, and openly questioned the reasonableness of the min-
isterial approval (see for many Podszun, 2016; Schwenn, 2016; Zacharakis, 2016). 
Few appreciated Gabriel’s approach (e.g. Haucap, 2016), while the independence 
of the cartel office remained completely untouched in the debate. Non-political 
expertise was no less obtrusive in the ECB episode. The perceived threat to dem-
ocratic core institutions caused by a non-majoritarian organization expanding 
its competence at the expense of the majoritarian institution was not defeated by 
political means. Instead, politicians used the law as an instrument for changing 
policies and showing the ECB its limits (or at least trying to do so). The constitu-
tional court acted as a channel of political inf luence that in the given situation 
was obviously considered more reasonable and promising than its purely political 
alternatives.
Functional autonomy as a key feature of modern democracies
These two episodes, as well as the public turmoil accompanying them, suggest that 
what is at stake here is not some minor detail of political institutional structures, 
but rather a basic pattern and key feature of modern democracies. The compe-
tence conf licts, the collision of function systems and their respective expertise, 
and the issue of the public acceptance of collectively binding decisions can be con-
sidered manifestations of a remarkable simultaneous expansion and retraction of the 
political system. This simultaneous expansion and retraction has been in progress 
since at least the mid-20th century and thus seems to go hand in hand with the 
rise of democracy as the sole legitimate model of political rule in modern world 
society: On the one hand, there has been a permanent expansion of the competen-
cies and responsibilities of state politics. The commitment of early modern states 
to the promotion of the common good (“gemeines Wohl”, see Stichweh [2007, p. 
30]) focused on economic regulation (in particular with regard to taxes), the mili-
tary (with regard to warfare and domestic security) and so-called “policey” (Polic-
eyordnung), which covers various aspects of public order such as dressing, gam-
bling, hygiene and others. Ever since, the tasks and responsibilities that nation 
states assume have widened significantly and continuously, over time expanding 
into an increasing number of societal spheres (such as education, health, science, 
6  See the press release of the Monopolies Commission, Bonn, 17.3.2016, http://www.monopol 
kommission.de/index.php/de/pressemitteilungen/37-ruecktritt-des-vorsitzenden-der-mono 
polkommission-wegen-ministererlaubnis-fuer-edeka-kaiser-s-tengelmann (12.11.2019).
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etc.) and penetrating or at least touching on ever more aspects of citizens’ every-
day lives (Micklethwait and Wooldridge, 2014, p. 9). In turn, citizens have react-
ed by making more claims that tend to hold state authorities responsible for an 
increasing number of societal grievances. In the late 20th century, this dynamic 
culminated in democratic governments that presented themselves and acted as 
problem-solvers who take responsibility and are held accountable for society as a 
whole (see e.g. Greven, 1999; Luhmann, 2000; Willke, 2014). Numerous quantita-
tive and qualitative indicators provide evidence of this ongoing trend: Around the 
world, public spending has increased over recent decades (e.g. Di Matteo, 2013; 
Gwartney, Lawson and Hall, 2014; Micklethwait and Wooldridge, 2014); special-
ized policy areas and the corresponding administrative institutions have steadily 
multiplied, which has facilitated to consider and process an increasing number 
and variety of topics in political decision-making (on public sector employment 
in the USA see Light, 1999); the number of and differentiation between catego-
ries by which states address and arrange individuals has constantly increased (for 
migration policy see e.g. Atac and Rosenberger, 2013; for labor market policy see 
e.g. Weinbach, 2014); and welfare states and their institutions have increasingly 
intervened in their societal environment with the explicit goal of inf luencing the 
forms and processes of inclusion into non-political function systems (see e.g. Flora 
and Alber, 1981; Halfmann, 2002; Marshall, 1992 [1949]).
On the other hand, this universalization of the modern political system has 
been accompanied by a remarkable shift in and changing character of collectively 
binding decision-making. In more and more policy fields, political decision-mak-
ing authority has been transferred away from the core institutions of democratic 
regimes, i.e. legislative and executive bodies (parliaments and governments), with 
immediate or at least indirect democratic legitimation shifting to organizations 
that lack democratic legitimacy, largely defy public control, and are situated out-
side the hierarchies and instruction structures of the legislative and the executive 
powers. The most obvious examples of this shift are central banks, constitutional 
courts and courts in charge of judicial review, and independent regulatory insti-
tutions. Although the historical evolution of these three types of institutions fol-
lowed rather different paths, they are united by the fact that their political impor-
tance peaked in the late 20th century: While the first central banks (in the form of 
state banks) emerged in the 17th century, the idea of independent central banks is 
a comparably recent phenomenon. These banks were probably the most important 
consequence of the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange 
rates in 1973, and they have spread rapidly across the globe (for quantitative anal-
yses see e.g. Crowe and Meade, 2007; for a qualitative approach see e.g. Maxfield, 
1997; Polillo and Guillén, 2005; on central banks and the emergence of monetary 
policy see Weinert, 2002). Similarly, the concept of constitutional jurisdiction 
originated in the 17th century. Modern constitutional courts as independent or-
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ganizations, however, appeared significantly later. Their emergence and insti-
tutionalization beginning in the early 20th century was strongly shaped by the 
works of the Austrian legal theorist Hans Kelsen. It began in Western Europe and 
later, i.e. after the political regimes of the Soviet Union and many Eastern Bloc 
countries had collapsed, continued in Eastern Europe and beyond (Stone Sweet, 
2002; see also the contributions in Tate and Vallinder, 1995a). Compared to cen-
tral banks and constitutional courts, independent regulatory agencies are a rel-
atively young institution. They first appeared in the United States in the late 19th 
century, when regulatory agencies in the spheres of transport infrastructure and 
trade were created by the federal government (Interstate Commerce Commission, 
Federal Trade Commission, Shipping Board). While the emergence of further in-
dependent agencies was limited to the United States during the first half of the 
20th century, the concept eventually took root in Western Europe in the 1970s and 
1980s (beyond individual pre-existing agencies in some countries) and has since 
spread across most of the globe. 
We refer to these structures and organizations as functional autonomies, and 
based on initial assessment, we contend that their diverse empirical manifesta-
tions share three core characteristics. First, functional autonomies are political in 
the sense that they are actively and effectively involved in processes of collectively 
binding decision-making. Thereby, functional autonomies are usually endowed 
with a mandate to address a specific regulatory issue within clearly defined 
boundaries. Second, in doing so, i.e. in dealing with their specific regulatory issue, 
functional autonomies are strongly expected – and sometimes explicitly advised 
– to prioritize issue-related, non-political expertise (from economy, law, science, 
etc.). Further, these organizations are expected to both ignore political standards 
such as ideology-related considerations and evade inherently political constraints 
stemming from party competition, the struggle for political power, and the like. 
Third, to that end, functional autonomies are granted autonomy, i.e. the abili-
ty to consider various environmental dependencies, including dependency on 
core democratic institutions, at their own discretion in the course of operating 
(for this understanding of autonomy see Luhmann, 2009 [1980], p. 155; Stichweh, 
2009, p. 44). Autonomy is granted to specialized organizations, which either may 
be preexisting and have a (pre)defined range of activities and competence that is 
extended through the act of delegation and the concession of autonomy, or they 
may be created and configured particularly for the purpose of dealing with certain 
regulatory issues. Perhaps most importantly, autonomy is granted by majoritar-
ian institutions on a permanent basis. This implies that by establishing spheres 
of autonomy, majoritarian institutions, and through them ultimately the people 
– the demos – itself, deliberately restrict themselves by not only agreeing to remain 
on the sidelines of selected political decision-making processes, but formally en-
suring this restriction. They commit themselves to conducting general forms of 
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supervision and control at most, but explicitly forego the right to control (in the 
sense of supervising and intervening in internal decision-making processes), or at 
least to ratify decisions made by those organizations to which the respective pow-
ers were delegated. Moreover, once autonomy has been granted, interventions by 
elected politicians in the respective spheres are usually considered highly illegiti-
mate or even undemocratic.
This autonomy is enforced in both the social and temporal dimensions: In 
the social dimension, autonomy is instituted through the conditions and mech-
anisms used to select, appoint and remove the personnel of the respective organi-
zations. Although elected politicians usually have the ultimate say in the selection 
and appointment of the leading personnel in these organizations, the selection 
procedures are arranged in ways that explicitly exclude, or at least reduce the im-
portance of, political criteria such as ideological proximity, party membership, 
and not least personal loyalty. Instead, it is strongly expected or even formally 
required that the search for, and eventually the appointment of, suitable candi-
dates will be guided by professional standards, i.e. professional qualification and 
expertise as well as – equally relevant – standards of personal integrity (see, as an 
impressive example, the recent conf lict over the nomination of Brett Kavanaugh 
for the U.S. Supreme Court). In practice, this may be reinforced by involving ex-
perts in the appointment process, e.g. by endowing expert commissions with the 
formal right to propose candidates or by making expert consultations mandatory 
for elected politicians prior to the final appointment decision. In line with this, 
a public justification of an appointment decision on the sole grounds of political 
criteria is considered highly illegitimate (see again the example of the Kavanaugh 
appointment). Compared to the appointment process, the removal of the organi-
zational leadership usually fully evades the inf luence of elected politicians. Ap-
pointments are usually for fixed terms of office or, in rare cases, for a lifetime (e.g. 
judges at the U.S. Supreme Court). The options for premature removal are usu-
ally very restricted, imposing strong justification pressure on elected politicians 
who wish to depart from these fixed terms and dismiss individual persons earlier. 
This latter aspect concerns not only the social dimension, but also the temporal 
dimension. Fixed office terms and limited removal power as well as the political 
irreversibility of decisions (Sachentscheidungen) and the strong restriction of politi- 
cal inf luence on agenda setting in functional autonomies facilitates a decoupling 
from the temporal structure of democratic politics, which is strongly marked by 
election periods in both social and factual respects. As a result, decisions made 
about and within functional autonomies usually bind not only current politicians, 
but also future politicians and may significantly limit their scope of action.
Taking these characteristics together, it is evident that although majoritarian 
institutions explicitly step back from active involvement in certain areas of deci-
sion making – or to use Luhmannian terminology, they replace action with expe-
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rience (Luhmann, 1995 [1984], pp. 84-85) – these decision areas are not removed 
from the scope of political responsibility. In other words, functional autonomy 
does not imply the retraction of collectively binding decision making as such, i.e. 
the withdrawal of the political system from its claim to control and be responsible 
for certain societal fields. Rather, this type of collectively binding decision making 
can be considered a specific form of governing “by proxies” that is carried out by 
organizations that are accountable to neither voters nor elected politicians. 
II. Defining functional autonomy within modern democracies
Democratic contradictions: Contextualizing functional autonomy
To understand functional autonomy as an ubiquitous and somehow contradictory 
feature of modern democracy, we must start with the standard mode of demo-
cratic politics, in particular the question of how political power is commonly le-
gitimized in democratic regimes. Following the key rationale of democratic rule, 
the binding force underlying political decisions for a given collective is justified 
by reference to individualized inclusion. Individualized inclusion entails the right 
to political participation being granted to persons solely on the basis of their in-
dividuality, while any non-political affiliations or resources (such as education, 
gender, wealth, religion and many more) are considered neutral. By implication, 
decisions that bind a certain collective are legitimate if, and only if, they are either 
made directly by the collective itself, i.e. through popular vote, or made by author-
ities that are directly or indirectly elected by the members of the collective and can 
therefore claim to represent the will of this collective (for theoretical ref lections 
on representation see Pitkin, 1967; Rehfeld, 2006). 
The key democratic principle of individualized inclusion and, accordingly, the 
radical neutralization of non-political characteristics also apply to the content of 
political decisions, and this means: to interpretations of the common good, which 
acts as the contingency formula (Kontingenzformel) for modern politics7 and as the 
ultimate benchmark and legitimation of political power (Luhmann, 2000, p. 122; 
2012 [1997], p. 282) (incidentally, this holds true for both democratic and autocratic 
regimes). The public good, however, is itself a f luid concept in every respect, i.e. 
it is an empty or “sociologically amorphous” notion (see also Offe, 2002; Weber 
cited in Sigmund, 2008, p. 83) that must be fixed and filled with content to be 
applicable and manageable in political processes. To that end, modern democracy 
and the principle of individualized inclusion require the procedural determination 
7  Following Luhmann (2012 [1997], p. 282), the contingency formulae of function systems “assert 
system-specific indisputability, for instance, scarcity for the economic system, limitationality for 
the science system”.
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of the common good. In practice, this occurs via public debates between political 
parties, associations, and other collective entities that compete for public support 
with their respective ideas of the common good (Münkler and Bluhm, 2001, p. 9f). 
Most importantly, these negotiations, which usually result in majority decisions, 
must be open to the participation of all members of the collective in general, even 
though it is rare for all members to actually claim their right to participate and 
no one can be forced to do so. The predominant reliance on the social dimension, 
i.e. on aspects of inclusion, in fixing the common good implicitly precludes any 
objective (external) criteria by which the outcome could be evaluated (see Mayntz 
(2002) and Offe (2002), who thoroughly problematize this lack of criteria). In other 
words, if the procedure of fixing the common good effectively meets the require-
ment of (direct or indirect) individualized inclusion, no externally imposed stan-
dards can legitimately be applied to assess and potentially modify the resulting 
interpretations of the common good, which then form the basis for concrete polit-
ical measures. Moreover, in the absence of external benchmarks, almost anything 
can become the subject of negotiation and thus potentially be placed at disposal – 
with the exception, usually, but not always, of a few references or basic values such 
as human rights or human dignity being understood as unambiguous premises of 
democratic rule.8
Functional autonomy blatantly departs from these democratic core principles. 
Importantly, this departure is not an unintended side effect but rather constitutes 
the very core of the phenomenon. Spheres of functional autonomy are brought 
into being through majoritarian institutions – i.e., through decisions by execu-
tive and legislative authorities – that delegate certain well-defined decision-mak-
ing powers from their own sphere of inf luence to organizations that lack dem-
ocratic legitimation, thereby withdrawing the immediate control and inf luence 
of the majoritarian institutions (i.e. in the form of the right to ratify decisions). 
These organizations may be preexisting, with a (pre)defined range of activities 
and competence that is extended through the act of delegation and the concession 
of autonomy, or they may be created and configured specifically for that purpose, 
i.e. for making selected collectively binding decisions.
Functional autonomy, we can conclude, is part of the political system and as 
such dedicated to the common good, but suspends the principle of individualized in-
clusion within certain boundaries. This, in turn, implies that the definition and 
promotion of the common good regarding certain fields of political action is no 
longer proceduralized, i.e. left to pluralistic debates and consensual or majori-
ty decisions that are, in general, open to all members of the political collective. 
Instead, procedural determination is replaced by substantive determination. In this 
8  See as a counterexample some public referenda in Switzerland which are in conflict with human 
rights and other principles of international law. 
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way, democratic regimes return, within the limits of a certain field of political 
decision-making and action, to mechanisms that were prevalent in pre-modern 
politics and are currently employed in autocratic regimes. In both of these con-
texts, the political leadership claims the prerogative to interpret the common 
good and implements its concepts largely irrespective of public consent (Münkler 
and Bluhm, 2001, p. 9f) such that any given interpretation may be based on any 
political or non-political standards (e.g. individual wisdom or preferences, reli-
gious constraints, economic efficiency, and many others). In this respect, the par-
ticularity of functional autonomies lies in the fact that they replace the pre-mod-
ern sovereign (“prince”) or the modern autocratic ruler with the dynamics and 
expertise of other, non-political function systems that the political system grants 
authority – or one could even say, submits itself to – within its own boundaries. 
To put it in provocative terms, functional autonomy means that the distinction 
between democratic and autocratic rule – and especially the latter’s technocratic 
aspects – re-appears within the democratic order. 
Before turning to the empirical details of functional autonomy and its con-
crete empirical manifestations in democratic regimes, we address two addition-
al analytical questions about what functional autonomy is (and what it is not) in 
order to shed light on its position in modern democracies and introduce some 
order to the broad literature on the topic. To this end, we first discuss the question 
of whether, and if so how, the obvious contradiction between the core character-
istics of functional autonomy and the main principles of democracy is justified 
and potentially reconciled in theory. Second, we ask how functional autonomy can 
be distinguished from those structures and institutions that ref lect the internal 
functional differentiation of the political system. The latter is in many respects 
the closest relative of functional autonomy and represents another mode in which 
the modern political system attempts to expand into its (functionally differentiat-
ed) societal environment, i.e. seeks to apply its claim of control and regulation to 
ever more spheres of modern society.
Rational decisions and impartial representatives: 
Justifying functional autonomy
Reviewing the existing political science literature, it is striking that the phenom-
ena referred to as functional autonomy here are widely discussed in different em-
pirical contexts and within various analytical perspectives. In particular theoreti-
cal studies deal prominently with the inherent contradiction between democratic 
principles and the functioning of those spheres of political decision making (and 
the corresponding organizations) within democratic regimes that deliberately 
evade democratic legitimation. Attempts to justify and eventually resolve that 
contradiction boil down to two general lines of argument, which can be subsumed 
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under the terms rationality and representation. Both lead to a similar conclusion: 
they reconcile functional autonomy and democratic principles. However, they do 
so by taking different approaches and relying on divergent assumptions. More-
over, since key aspects of both lines of argumentation regularly appear in self-de-
scriptions of democratic regimes, reconstructing them is not simply an intellec-
tual game, but reveals much about how modern democracy conceptualizes itself 
and observes its societal environments.  
The line of reasoning subsumed here under the term rationality focuses on the 
factual dimension (Sachdimension) of political decision-making and assumes ob-
jective standards of good, i.e. efficient and rational, decisions. It is most promi-
nently linked to Jon Elster (1979; 2000), but is also ref lected in the writing of Alan 
Blinder (e.g. 1997) and Giandomenico Majone (e.g. 1996), both of whom strongly in-
f luenced academic and political debates on non-majoritarian institutions during 
the 1990s. The core of the rational choice-inspired approach is simple and starts 
with the general mistrust directed at the members of any political collective in 
general, including politicians and ordinary citizens (voters) alike. For different 
reasons, both groups are considered unable to make sound (or rational) political 
decisions. To illustrate this point, Elster famously drew on the story of Odysseus 
and the sirens from Greek mythology. To resist the bewitching singing of the si-
rens and keep his boat on course, Odysseus advised his fellow sailors to clog their 
ears with wax and to tie him, Odysseus, to the mast until they had safely sailed 
through the critical passage. Under certain circumstances, Elster concluded, 
even the wise and strong hero must restrict himself via external forces in order 
to master a difficult situation and achieve the optimal outcome. Applied to the 
political system, self-restriction of the sovereign is necessary because the unfore-
seeable and distorting effects of individual passions and/or systemic irrationali-
ties on decision processes inevitably prevent optimal outcomes from being real-
ized. Individual passions stem mainly from the nature of human beings, which is 
characterized by limited knowledge, myopia, the tendency to ignore unpleasant 
information, and the like. Systemic irrationalities result from the basic features 
and structures of democratic regimes, such as party competition, lobbyism, and 
election cycles. The latter, as Majone emphasized, account for temporal inconsis-
tency in political decision-making, which lowers the credibility of certain policy 
decisions in the eyes of voters, reduces their willingness to comply with these de-
cisions, and probably even generates discontent with democracy as such. Majone 
concluded that taken as a whole, these developments eventually impede efficient 
governance (at least in certain policy areas) in democracies. Conversely, a welcome 
side-effect of self-restriction would be an increase in citizens’ satisfaction with 
democratic politics.
Regarding the scope of self-restriction, i.e. the question of whose political 
capacity will be limited, Elster’s original version of the argument envisioned the 
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self-restriction of the entire political collective, i.e. of politicians and voters, both 
of whom would be protected from themselves. Further versions put forward by 
Elster himself and others consider more thoroughly the distinction between dif-
ferent groups, i.e. between political performance roles and the audience, and shift 
the focus to the former. To identify those policy fields for which self-restriction 
seems to be appropriate, Majone suggested drawing on Wicksell’s distinction be-
tween efficient and redistributive policies: “Efficient policies attempt to increase 
aggregate welfare, that is, to improve the conditions of all, or almost all, indi-
viduals and groups in society, while the objective of redistributive policies is to 
improve the conditions of one group at the expense of another” (Majone, 1996, p. 
10). Consequently, efficient policies should be shielded from political inf luence in 
order to achieve the best results for all, while redistributive policies require legit-
imation through majority decision. A similar approach was used by Blinder (1997, 
p. 119f), who distinguished between political decisions with a universal effect, for 
which he recommended purely technical criteria, and decisions with particular-
istic effects, which must be resolved on the basis of value judgements. Notwith-
standing the analytical clarity and plausibility of these distinctions, the empirical 
applicability seems limited for at least two reasons: First, the distinctions imply 
that any political issue unequivocally falls under one of these two categories, 
which appears highly unrealistic given the complexity of most political decisions 
and their potentially unforeseeable effects. Second, they implicitly require that 
policy issues in general have quantifiable effects and clearly identifiable beneficia-
ries, what in practice excludes most political problems.
The line of argumentation subsumed here under the term representation takes 
a normative stance on democracy and revolves around representation as a specif-
ic mechanism of political inclusion. This perspective was proposed explicitly and 
prominently by Pierre Rosanvallon (2011), but also ref lects important aspects of 
the theory of political representation (Pitkin, 1967), especially the discussion of the 
“unelected” (Montanaro, 2012; also Rehfeld, 2006; 2009; Saward, 2009). Rosan-
vallon (2011, p. 17ff) started with the observation that participation and the rule 
of majority alone are insufficient sources of legitimacy for democratic regimes. 
Although they are key principles of democracy, he argued, neither effectively 
ensures the representation of the will and interests of the entire political collec-
tive. For Rosanvallon, political representation through majoritarian institutions 
(parliaments and governments) is distorted for at least two reasons: First, demo-
cratic majoritarian institutions fail to adequately represent two significant parts 
of the political collective (the people): the minority whose interests and will are 
factually overruled or – depending on the election system and institutional order 
– represented to a lesser degree than the majoritarian interests, and the members 
of the collective who do not vote or engage in other forms of political participa-
tion but are still subject to political decision making. In effect, the majority on 
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the one hand and the “invisible” or “real” people on the other diverge, with the 
former being represented in majoritarian politics and the latter being excluded 
(Rosanvallon, 2011, p. 69ff). Second, the overwhelming dominance of individual 
(in contrast to common) interests within society means that these interests are 
inevitably channeled into the political system (mainly through party competition 
and individual politicians), affect political decision making, and prevent true rep-
resentation.
Consequently, especially in policy fields that touch upon central aspects of 
social life, majoritarian institutions must be complemented by mechanisms and 
institutions that ensure that any political decision effectively identifies with the 
general public, including both its active and passive parts, and not simply with the 
interests of the majority or of individual parties or politicians (Rosanvallon, 2011, 
p. 75ff). The positive equality of all members of the political collective through 
“one person, one vote” must be complemented by the negative equality of all, which 
according to Rosanvallon is expressed in and ensured by radically impartial polit-
ical decision-making. This logic of impartiality is ref lected in the idea of an auton-
omous state administration and civil service (Berufsbeamtentum) that are based on 
professional (rather than political) standards and effectively escape the inf luence 
of majoritarian institutions and political parties. The same logic, Rosanvallon 
continued, underlies independent regulatory institutions, whose decision-mak-
ing is strictly oriented toward technical (i.e. non-political) criteria. By using these 
criteria, they represent the interests of the political collective as a whole because 
they effectively ban – or at least claim to do so – any type of individual interest. 
Following this line of reasoning, non-majoritarian institutions gain legitimacy 
through their ability to credibly reject particularity (Rosanvallon, 2011, p. 97ff).
In contrast to the rationality approach and its implicit lack of confidence in 
the members of the political collective, whether politicians or voters, and in their 
ability to distance themselves from their own passions and recognize what is ac-
tually in their best interest, the representation approach points to another type 
of mistrust. While the audience’s – the people’s – ability to recognize and articu-
late its interests is uncontested, serious doubts are raised whether the structures 
and dynamics of democracy are suited to represent these interests, i.e. to ade-
quately handle them in the process of decision-making and to translate them into 
concrete policies. Thus, compared to unlimited majority rule, the restriction of 
majoritarian institutions produces better outcomes in terms of more appropriate 
representation.
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Modes of political expansion: Functional autonomy vs. functional 
differentiation of the political system
Although quite different in their basic assumptions and underlying intentions, 
both the rationality and the representation arguments come to the same conclu-
sion: In order to overcome the shortcomings inherent to democratic regimes, ma-
joritarian institutions must be restricted in their competences and scopes of ac-
tion, at least in specific respects. The resulting gap must be filled by non-political 
expertise, which is expected to unfold within the political system and f low easily 
into collectively binding decision-making. This process will guarantee either the 
rationality or the impartiality of collectively binding decision-making. Seen from 
the perspective of differentiation theory, both lines of argumentation recognize 
that the internal operations of the political system are interlinked with its mani-
fold environmental relations, and describe this linkage and its consequences for 
political decision-making. 
It is obvious, however, that functional autonomy as conceptualized so far is 
neither the only way that the political system deals with its environments nor the 
only channel through which non-political expertise finds its way into political 
communication. Indeed, civil servants with special expertise (and without dem-
ocratic legitimation), expert commissions, and think tanks – to name but a few – 
are regularly and in various ways involved in collectively binding decision-making. 
This involvement is related to, and is a manifestation of, another fundamental fea-
ture of modern political systems, namely the internal differentiation of political 
communication according to factual aspects. This differentiation is ref lected in 
the emergence of policy fields such as economic policy, education policy, science 
policy, health policy, and others, which are each directed toward the regulation 
of the respective societal sphere. As with functional autonomy, there are strong 
reasons to assume that the internal functional differentiation of the political sys-
tem is closely linked to the expansionist tendency of the political system vis-à-vis 
its environments – even more so because once policy fields are established, their 
number rarely dwindles, but rather usually grows. In this respect, the emergence 
and stabilization of individual policy fields can be seen as an indicator of which 
societal spheres and problems the political system considers relevant, feels re-
sponsible for at a given moment and thus adopts as “political” – what, as Luhmann 
(2010, p. 37f) pointed out, is per se an open question.  
The internal functional differentiation of the political system is clearly re-
f lected in both the executive and the legislative branches of power: The dominant 
structure of national governments and also of sub- and supranational forms of 
political rule follows the logic of functional differentiation in the sense that gov-
ernments consist of ministers who have competences related to individual policy 
fields and who are the heads of ministries, i.e. specialized agencies with expert 
5. Expansion through Self-Restriction: Functional Autonomy in Modern Democracies 167
(i.e. not primarily political) personnel.9 Similarly, in most countries a significant 
share of parliamentary activities occurs in cross-party committees or working 
groups within party factions that are formed along policy areas. 
Political decision making in all these institutions often refers to complex is-
sues and thus regularly requires the consideration of professional expertise from 
the respective societal sphere (or function system) in order to gather relevant 
information, carefully evaluate different alternatives, and assess potential con-
sequences. Accordingly, expert advice is commonly integrated in political com-
munication within both the executive and legislative branches in many different 
forms and through various channels: It may appear in the form of interaction (e.g. 
expert hearings) or written material (e.g. reports, position papers), on a regular 
basis (e.g. annual expert reports) or only on occasion, and formally (e.g. through 
institutionalized consultation) or informally (e.g. through networks). Further, it 
may either involve external experts (e.g. from research institutes, corporations, 
etc.) or rely mainly on specialized state agencies and similar institutions that are 
explicitly designed to supply political decision-makers with expertise but have no 
decision-making competence of their own (e.g. expert councils, supervisory au-
thorities, advisory boards, etc.).
Despite this diversity of forms and channels through which external expertise 
finds its way into political communication and decisions, it is possible to draw 
a clear analytical distinction between functional autonomy on the one hand and 
the diverse manifestations of the internal functional differentiation of the politi- 
cal system on the other hand. As has already become clear, this distinction does 
not lie in the presence of non-political expertise within political communication 
as such, but rather boils down to the structuring of political and external exper-
tise in collectively binding decision-making, to be precise to the question which 
of these is (institutionally) subordinate and which is superordinate. In this sense, 
we speak of functional autonomy if, and only if, non-political expertise acts as the 
ultimate and irrevocable criterion according to which political decisions are made 
within the boundaries of a clearly defined field of action on a permanent and for-
malized basis (i.e. not occasionally). This implies the (self-)restriction of the po-
litical in the sense that political criteria (like values or ideological principles) are 
either subordinate to certain external standards or do not surface at all during 
the decision-making process, and that the decision makers were selected and 
nominated according to professional criteria and not through majority decision. 
9  Usually, the dominance of professional standards applies to the personnel below the upper ech-
elon of the respective institutions (i.e., ministries and other agencies). The head of the organiza-
tions and of ten also certain parts of the leading personnel can indeed be dismissed – or formally: 
assigned to non-active status – for political reasons (e.g. the respective category in German law 
are so-called political servants or politische Beamte).
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Consequently, they lack democratic accountability (toward the voters or the voters’ 
elected representatives) and they escape direct democratic control (again by the 
voters or elected representatives). 
The internal functional dif ferentiation of the political system into policy fields, in 
contrast, is not about deliberately shifting control from state politics to non-po-
litical expertise, but rather consists of a swelling of the political itself as a result 
of the internalization of external expertise into a given set of political meanings, 
values, and knowledge. This implies that decisions are made by politicians who 
are democratically elected and accountable to the people and who are strongly ex-
pected to act as representatives and not professional experts. Further, it means 
that any non-political expertise can only be part of the preparation stage of the 
political decision-making process and must be subjected to political assessment 
(i.e. according to ideological aspects, party commitments, coalition agreements, 
and the like) before being incorporated into the actual decision-making. Thus, 
even when non-political criteria prove pivotal for a concrete decision, this domi-
nance of external expertise will and must be presented as the result of a political 
decision that was made by thoroughly considering all relevant circumstances and 
alternatives. Any subjugation to factual constraints or any prioritizing of non-po-
litical expertise can only be justified as an individual and temporary solution to 
a specific problem that may be submitted to re-examination and change. There-
by, the inf luence that was given to non-political expertise may be reduced at any 
time. In effect and in contrast to functional autonomy, legislative and executive 
authorities must avoid the impression of thoughtlessly relinquishing command 
and systematically and permanently restricting political considerations in collec-
tively binding decision-making. 
III.	 Exploring	the	subject	matter: 
 Empirical manifestations of functional autonomy
The first part of the present chapter has offered insights on the relevance of func-
tional autonomy as an inherent and irreplaceable feature of modern democracies 
based on two recent episodes: a conf lict surrounding the merger of two retailers 
and a complex dispute over the alleged transgression of competences on the part 
of the European Central Bank. On that basis, the second part provided a concise 
examination of the analytical core of functional autonomy and its relation to dem-
ocratic principles: It elaborated on the contradictions between functional auton-
omy and the core principles of democracy (especially individualized inclusion); 
it reviewed the main lines of justification related to these contradictions as they 
can be found in previous research; and it ref lected on the theoretical distinction 
between functional autonomy and the internal functional differentiation of the 
political system into policy fields. The following third and final part of the analy-
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sis complements this theoretical examination by adding an important missing 
piece: It f leshes out the theoretical frame in empirical terms, i.e. with regard to 
the emergence and unfolding of concrete manifestations of functional autonomy, 
in order to substantiate the assumption that functional autonomy arises and re-
produces itself as an internal structure of the political system and especially of 
modern democracies. This assumption implies that functional autonomy results 
from the political system’s permanent interplay and confrontation with its socie-
tal environments in the course of its differentiation (Ausdif ferenzierung or “outdif-
ferentiation”, Luhmann 2013 [1997], p. 65). It must be considered as an attempt of 
the political system to expand its impact on certain parts of this environment by 
radically subjecting its internal structures to the expertise, and sometimes even 
the operational mode, of the respective environmental segment. 
To that end, the following section shifts to concrete examples and sheds light 
on specific historical processes. In doing so, the key players involved in the in-
troductory episodes, i.e. an independent regulatory agency, a central bank, and a 
constitutional court, once again become the focus of the discussion. Clearly, the 
formal founding of these three institutions, the ways they were shaped through 
various reforms and reconfigurations, and the historical contexts in which they 
emerged have been extensively examined elsewhere and described in much more 
empirical detail than is possible in the present chapter. Thus, the following de-
scription does not claim to provide a comprehensive picture of any of their particu- 
larities, let alone make a singular contribution to the historical research on the 
subject. In line with the general objective of this chapter, however, the following 
discussion identifies and illuminates the major aspects and general patterns of 
the emergence of functional autonomy in the political system. To be more specif-
ic, it traces the evolution – what means: the sequence of variation, selection, and 
eventually the (re-)stabilization of new social structures (Luhmann, 2012 [1997], 
p. 273)10 –  of independent regulatory agencies, central banks, and judicial review 
with an emphasis on the elements that were identified above as constitutive for 
functional autonomy: (1) The identification of an issue as political, i.e. the adoption 
of a problem by the political system; (2) the incorporation of non-political exper-
tise in collectively binding decision-making; and (3) the dynamics of the self-re-
striction of majoritarian institutions.
Importantly, the selection of the three cases is not a coincidence: Independent 
regulatory agencies, central banks, and constitutional courts (or more broadly: 
10  According to the Luhmannian theory of evolution (Luhmann, 2012 [1997], p. 273), variation 
means “unexpected, surprising communication” within a social system; selection is the choice of 
“meanings promising for developing structures, which are suitable for repeated use, which can 
form and condense expectations” while rejecting other innovations; restabilization refers to the 
state of the system and its environmental relation(s) af ter selection.
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judicial review) not only represent three of the most relevant empirical manifes-
tations of functional autonomy, but also –  as an evolutionary theory perspective 
makes clear – they significantly vary in the process of their emergence. Their dis-
tinct trajectories indicate that the political system does not follow a fixed script in 
the way how it handles and shapes its environmental relations. Rather, it seems to 
thoroughly observe its environments and carefully react to their respective spec-
ificities and dynamics. This lack of a fixed script makes it even more striking that 
a common pattern – i.e. the above-described basic elements of functional auton-
omy – clearly emerges from these different trajectories.  
Independent regulatory agencies
In many respects, independent regulatory agencies must be considered as the 
most obvious and purest manifestation of functional autonomy. To get a handle 
on the empirically diverse field and to understand their emergence, we examine 
the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) as an exemplary case. The ICC was 
founded in the United States in 1887 to regulate the emerging railroad system (and 
later also trucking, bus lines, and the telephone system), specifically with regard 
to pricing and safety issues. In its more or less definitive shape, which resulted 
from the Transportation Act of 1920, the ICC fully meets the analytical criteria of 
functional autonomy: It is exclusively in charge of railroad regulation and thus 
directly involved in collectively binding decision-making in and for this specific 
policy sphere. With competences including rate setting, safety issues, counter-
acting discrimination, and the protection of competition in the railroad sector, its 
operations not only affect the major players in the railroad industry, i.e. the rail 
companies, but also concern every individual who is in one way or another con-
nected to the railroads, whether as passenger or client. Thus, the operations of 
the ICC directly or indirectly involve a large part, and likely the majority, of the 
population and of domestic commerce. In its decision making, the ICC is expect-
ed and was created to follow criteria that meet primarily the requirements of the 
objects of regulation. Vice versa, it is supposed to ignore political considerations 
and especially party preferences as much as possible. To that end, the members of 
the commission were selected based on their general professional expertise and 
were required to have no economic or personal links to the railway sector in order 
to preclude conf licts of interest. The political impartiality (which was interpreted 
mainly as bipartisanship) of the commission should be ensured by strict regula-
tions of the commissioners’ party affiliations. Further, majoritarian institutions 
explicitly restrict themselves from the commission by abandoning any claim to 
intervene in the ICC’s operations and to overrule or negate its decisions. 
To understand the emergence of independent regulatory agencies, the case of 
the ICC, as specific as it may appear, is instructive for at least two reasons: First, 
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the ICC was the earliest example of a full-f ledged independent regulatory agency 
and as such represents something like the prototype of this specific form of po-
litical regulation. Second, the commission later became an important role model 
in the realm of regulatory policy which triggered the creation of similar agen-
cies in various policy fields, through the mid-20th century in the United States 
(Cushman, 1941, p. 5) and mainly during the 1970s and 1980s in Western European 
democracies (Rosanvallon, 2011, p. 75ff; Thatcher and Stone Sweet, 2002, p. 9ff). 
Thus, the emergence and formation of the ICC must be considered as represen-
tative also beyond this individual case and they provide more general insights 
into the logic and functioning of independent regulatory agencies and into the 
underlying dynamic of political differentiation. Although it might appear smooth 
and purposeful in retrospect, the ICC’s formation was uneven and continued for 
several decades. Major steps included the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, which 
replaced state-level rules by federation-wide regulation, and the Transportation 
Act of 1920, which determined the definitive form of the ICC. The period before 
and between the institution of these two laws was characterized by intensive and 
controversial political debates, especially on the issues of political self-restriction 
and the concession of autonomy to a non-elected institution, which are worth con-
sidering in detail. 11
Experiments on railroad regulation and the founding of the ICC 
The founding of the ICC in 1887 was preceded by a period in which the railway as 
a new form of technical infrastructure took root and thrived and the railway sec-
tor was discovered by politics and adopted as an issue for regulation. The rise of 
the railway in the United States started in the early 1830s, and the expansion and 
relevance of the railway sector peaked during the so-called Gilded Age, the era of 
rapid economic growth and the fast expansion of industrialization between the 
1870s and the turn of the century. The societal importance of the railroad sector 
arose from the fact that it was not only a key product of the technological progress 
of the period, but also one of the main vehicles of industrialization: the rapidly 
growing track network facilitated the settlement of even the most remote regions 
as well as the transport of passengers and freight across the country, so that it be-
came crucial for almost any other industry (such as commercial farming, mining, 
etc.). At the same time, there were good reasons to consider the railroads a risky 
technology: the trains were driving at previously unknown speeds of more than 
100 kilometers per hour, while a consistent traffic regulation (such as a signaling 
system) and technical assistance (e.g., through radio communication) were still 
lacking. During the first half of the 19th century, the intense competition among 
11  The subsequent reconstruction of the formation of the ICC is based on the detailed and exten- 
sive analysis of Cushman (1941, pp. 19-145).
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the privately owned railroad companies, which was fueled not least by active po-
litical support (e.g. facilitated access to credit and land), not only increased these 
risks, but also had adverse effects for passenger, clients, and dependent industries, 
which were noticeable mainly in the rate system. Strong price discrimination 
against individual regions or companies and large price f luctuations put the grow-
ing number of people who were dependent on the railroads either in their every- 
day lives or economic activity in a difficult and sometimes hopeless situation. 
The outstanding societal importance of the railroads in combination with the 
massive technical risks and access problems for large parts of the society inevi- 
tably forced the railroad sector into the view of the political system. By the middle 
of the century, the contradiction between (economic) profit seeking, which relied 
on the self-regulation of the market, and the (political) objective of promoting the 
common good stimulated the political ref lection on this issue and a search for 
appropriate means and ways to expand into this particular part of society. The 
first regulatory efforts in the railroad sector and the realm of interstate commerce 
were made at the state (i.e. subnational) level in the middle of the 19th century in 
an experimental manner of “trial-and-error” (Cushman, 1941, p. 20ff). However, 
the unequal regional importance of the railroads, which resulted mainly from the 
contrast between their high practical relevance in the Midwest and their relatively 
low importance at the East coast, led to widely varying regulatory engagement of 
the individual subnational political authorities. This in turn resulted in inconsis-
tent and heterogenous regulatory structures across the country. 
Not least due to the federation-wide scope of the railroad system, the practical 
effects of the highly fragmented state level regulations were negligible. Instead 
of moderation and the mitigation of the above-mentioned problems, the 1870s 
and 1880s witnessed a phase of overexpansion in the railroad sector, which even 
intensified the adverse effects of cutthroat competition and an unreliable rate 
system. This, in turn, fueled public demand for federal control, which gradually 
found resonance with the political system. Between 1868 and 1886, approximately 
150 legislative proposals were submitted in Congress, suggesting two alternative 
modes of regulation: either by the judiciary (which eventually became the position 
of the House of Representatives) or by a commission established for that purpose 
(the position of the Senate). To decide on this issue, the political system attempt-
ed to listen to its environment: based on talks with different stakeholders in and 
around the railroad sector, the so-called Cullom committee (officially, the Inter-
state Commerce Committee), which was created specifically for this end, issued a 
report in which it clearly opted for the latter proposal, i.e. the founding of a regu-
latory commission.12
12  See also https://www.archives.gov/legislative/guide/senate/chapter-07-interstate-commerce.
html (1.11.2019).
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The committee’s report eventually tipped the scales toward the creation of the 
Interstate Commerce Commission through the Interstate Commerce Act in 1887 
(Glass, 2015). In its initial form, the ICC was set up to support the implementation 
of railroad regulations primarily through consultancy and information gathering, 
and was explicitly restricted from any decision-making (regulatory) competenc-
es. Importantly, the respective societal environment, i.e. the railroad companies 
themselves, resisted the newly generated commission. They unanimously per-
ceived the ICC as an adversary, feared being placed at a disadvantage, and strictly 
refused to cooperate in the sense of providing information that would have been 
necessary for more effective regulation. The commission was further weakened 
by a series of court decisions during its first years of its existence. Consequently, 
the ICC’s impact was limited and the social problems connected to the railroad in-
dustry persisted, while public pressure for more consistent and resolute political 
interventions increased.
Despite its limited effects, the ICC represented an innovative, formerly un-
known mechanism that was created within the political system to act upon its 
environment. As Cushman (1941, p. 19) explained: “The extension in 1887 of federal 
regulatory power to the nation’s railroads was indeed an important exercise of 
economic control; but it was much more than that: it was a shift in the center of 
control in the federal system. [...] The Interstate Commerce Commission was an 
innovation not because it was endowed with a new type of power, but because it 
represented a new location of power in the federal system”. Although it did not 
yet represent a full-f ledged functional autonomy in its first configuration and its 
regulatory achievements did not impress the political authorities, several key fea-
tures of functional autonomies already appeared in outlines: First, the ICC arose 
out of the political system’s ref lection on the limitations of its own regulatory ca-
pacity. The conventional political steering instruments appeared inappropriate in 
the face of an environment that was perceived as complex, vague and highly dy-
namic, “so that it would be impossible to deal effectively with it by the simple and 
traditional mechanism of passing penal laws and enforcing them by court process” 
(Cushman, 1941, p. 46). Second, the political system found that distant observa-
tion was insufficient to expand into this environment, i.e. to turn this environ-
ment into an object of collectively binding decision-making. Instead, the political 
system clearly recognized a need for immersion in this environment to acquire 
the necessary expertise and integrate this expertise as a pivotal factor in collec-
tively binding decision-making. And third, the efforts of the political system to 
immerse in this environment were accompanied and motivated by a vague notion 
of the fundamental incompatibility of three factors: political operation modes and 
criteria, the integration of external expertise, and decision-making structures 
f lexible enough to meet the respective environmental requirements. In sum, the 
political system acknowledged the need for self-restriction. In this last regard, it 
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is noteworthy that early forms of political self-restriction were less concerned with 
the inf luence of political criteria as such and more concerned with impartiality as 
secured through strict limitations on partisanship. In a similar vein, the high sala- 
ries offered to the commission members, who were appointed by the president, 
were meant to attract the most competent candidates – candidates who should, as 
a necessary condition for appointment, lack any personal or economic links to the 
railway sector in order to avoid conf licts of interests. In other words: non-quali- 
fication rather than qualification was required as a condition for appointment: 
“Who are they [the commissioners, E.M.] to be? They are to be five gentlemen who 
know nothing whatever of their business. That is the first requisite; that is a quali- 
fication not to be varied from under any circumstances” (statement of a member of 
the House of Representatives, cited after Cushman, 1941, p. 63).
Expanding responsibilities: Amendments of the ICC in 1906 and 1910
A second stage in the formation of the ICC included two amendments, one in 1906 
and a second in 1910, which can be considered as gradual affirmations of the inno-
vation of political regulation by means of a commission. Both amendments sub-
stantiated the path that the initial version of the ICC had tentatively suggested by 
connecting to it and by reinforcing and stabilizing individual aspects of it.
The Hepburn Act of 1906 significantly extended the ICC’s regulatory compe-
tence and strengthened its autonomy by granting it decision-making power that 
did not depend on the ratification by other (i.e. legislative or executive) authorities. 
More precisely, the ICC gained the formal authority to set and enforce rates in 
the railway sector. Although it was still not supposed to act on its own initiative, 
but solely in response to complaints from railroad corporations, the commission’s 
provisions, once taken, were obligatory for the companies and other players in-
volved. They could be suspended only by court order. Importantly, this new part 
of the ICC’s competences and, by implication, its stronger autonomy from majori-
tarian institutions was a main issue in the Congressional debates prior to the Hep-
burn act. These debates evolved mainly around the constitutionality of delegating 
a quasi-legislative function to an authority that was explicitly meant to decide on 
related matters and act independently from the democratically legitimized parlia-
ment. While such delegation was eventually declared unconstitutional, Congress 
reconciled the enlarged competences of the ICC with constitutional provisions: 
Since the ICC’s activities only completed goals that had been predefined by Con-
gress (“to fix just and reasonable rates”), it was argued, the commission’s function 
could officially be categorized as purely administrative, while legislative power 
rested with the parliament. As f limsy as this framing may appear at first glance, 
it was remarkable in terms of both its inherent logic, which literally ignored dem-
ocratic inconsistencies rather than addressing them, and its subsequent impact 
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on political language use – this form of framing soon prevailed and revealed a 
decisive preference for the new regulatory mechanism over alternative solutions.
The Mann-Elkins Act of 1910 further stabilized the regulation strategy repre-
sented by the ICC as such. It enabled the commission to regulate rates proactively, 
and expanded its scope of responsibility to telephone, telegraph, and cable com-
panies and thus to further essential parts of the domestic commerce infrastruc-
ture. Additionally, the act stressed the commission’s autonomy vis-à-vis both the 
inf luence of executive authorities and political considerations as such: strong 
claims to autonomy had already dominated the Congressional debates prior to 
the amendment, which had centered mainly on issues of executive control. In the 
course of these debates, the proposal to restrict the commission’s autonomy from 
the executive by involving the Department of Justice as a decision-making body in 
cases of conf lict was rejected. The key argument pointed to the ability of the ICC 
to represent the interests of the people without distortion due to its deliberately 
apolitical setup and its isolation from party competition, which Congress believed 
should not be placed at risk: “The commission is now, and was intended to be from 
its organization, an independent tribunal of the rights of the people and the carri-
ers. The Department of Justice is a political department of this Government, and 
its appointees who direct the policies of the department are the representatives 
and the supporters of the present political administration of the country” (minori-
ty report, House of Representatives, cited by Cushman, 1941, p. 100). Moreover, 
the alternative solution that was eventually adopted did not last: The Commerce 
Court, which was added to the ICC for the purpose of solving conf licts, had been 
abolished by 1913. 
Facing and resisting political headwinds
Having gained far-reaching autonomy by 1910, the ICC proved its persistence as 
an integral part of the political institutional structure even when it came under 
significant pressure in the context of the First World War. Prior to the war, be-
tween 1911 and 1917, several minor reforms were implemented in order to strength-
en the competences of the ICC and its position in the political system. Emergency 
measures that came into effect when the United States entered the war in 1917, 
however, interrupted the effect of these reforms. The Act of 1918 nationalized the 
railroad sector and placed it under central administration by the executive; there-
by, rate setting authority as one of the ICC’s key responsibilities was transferred 
directly to the president. Apart from that, however, the ICC was largely untouched 
by the radical centralization policy. It kept not only its structural form, but also 
the majority of its competences, most notably the authority to monitor the rates in 
the railroad sector in response to complaints lodged by individual companies and 
to ratify these rates with respect to the interests of these companies (among them 
mainly shippers). Remarkably, strong appeals in the legislature were pivotal to the 
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persistently inf luential position of the ICC during the war: strong arguments in 
favor of the persistence of the commission as an autonomous and powerful insti-
tution in the sphere of railroad regulation were raised in both chambers of Con-
gress, which were justified primarily by references to the president, who lacked 
the expertise and skills that the ICC had acquired over decades: “You can not ar-
rive at a just and reasonable rate with a hop, skip, and jump. Even the President of 
the United States or the Director General of Railways can not do that. No man, no 
bureau, commission, or other creation of the law is so qualified to fix railway rates 
as the Interstate Commerce Commission” (statement of a member of the House of 
Representatives, cited by Cushman, 1941, p. 198).
  When domestic politics had returned to normal after the war, the general 
tendencies towards a strong and autonomous commission continued. The Trans-
portation Act of 1920, which can be considered as a preliminary finalization of 
the ICC, did not only initiate the re-privatization of the railroad sector, but also 
further strengthened and broadened the commission’s competences by including, 
inter alia, the monitoring of financial interrelations among railway companies, 
the regulation of mergers and acquisitions, and the preparation of a proposal for 
the consolidation of the sector. Crucially, the ICC’s attitude towards its object of 
regulation, i.e. the railroad sector, shifted to a more constructive approach that 
included an increased consideration of the inner logic of the sector, the shift from 
negative to positive sanctions, and the involvement of a broad(er) set of stake-
holders. The “old policy of restriction and discipline” was replaced by “a positive 
governmental responsibility to see that an efficient and self-sustaining transpor-
tation system should prevail” (Cushman, 1941, p. 115).
In subsequent decades, the ICC was subject to several minor amendments; 
however, these did not significantly change the commission’s path. Rather, the 
ICC in its existing form served as a role model for similar regulatory agencies that 
were founded mainly during the first half of the 20th century in the United States 
(e.g. the Federal Trade Commission [1914], the Federal Communications Com-
mission [1914], the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission [1934], or the Con-
sumer Product Safety Commission [1975])13 and later, during the second half of 
the century in Western Europe (such as the National Commission for Computers 
and Freedom [1978] or the High Authority for Audiovisual Policy [1982] in France 
(Rosanvallon, 2011, p. 100f), and the Federal Cartel Office [1958] or the Regulato-
ry Agency for Telecommunication and Postal Services [1998] in Germany [Döhler, 
2002]). At the end of the 20th century, most of the ICC’s functions were gradually 
transferred to other independent regulatory agencies, among them mainly the 
Federal Railroad Administration and the Surface Transportation Board. The ICC 
itself was abolished with the passage of the ICC Termination Act of 1995.
13  See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Interstate_Commerce_Commission (29.4.2019)
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Overall, this third, stabilizing stage in the emergence of the ICC emphasiz-
es both the extent and the effective irreversibility of political self-restriction and 
the concession of autonomy. It becomes obvious that once the commission had 
been established, its growing and increasingly specialized expertise helped it gain 
momentum and become autonomous up to the point where it proved superior to 
even the most powerful political authorities, among them the president himself. 
Thereby, the shift in the ICC’s (self-)conception in relation to its environment em-
phasizes the aspect of responsivity, i.e. the anticipatory listening to and tuning 
into certain parts of its environment, which had appeared in outline form in the 
founding of the ICC in 1887 and had accompanied its development since that time. 
Its continuous unfolding and institutionalization provide insight into the way in 
which the political system expands: the self-selected responsibility of the political 
system is no longer restricted to the retrospective correction of negative effects 
that concrete economic operations have on the common good. Instead and more 
broadly, the political system feels responsible to prevent such effects by anticipa-
tively changing the operational mode of the economy to increase its alignment 
with the political ideas of the common good.    
Interim conclusions
In sum, the formation process of the ICC is a clear example for the emergence of 
functional autonomy from the clash of two function systems and their competing 
expansionary claims: On the one hand, the political system intentionally expands, 
extending its regulatory claim on the railroads as a newly emerging and thus un-
known societal phenomenon. On the other hand, the economic system expands 
simultaneously with regard to the same object by subjecting it to its distinct oper-
ational mode. Eventually, this culminates in a situation in which further political 
expansion – in the sense of the effective realization of regulatory claims – re-
quires a strategy that enables the political system to cope with the competing ex-
pansion of the economy. In this situation, the decisive step towards the adoption 
of railroad regulation as a political issue was initiated out of the general public, 
which expressed its dissatisfaction with the given state of affairs and addressed 
it to political authorities. Within the political system, it was then specified and 
translated into regulatory policies, initially against the fierce resistance of the 
railroad sector as the object of regulation.  
While the adoption of railroad regulation as a political issue appears relatively 
clear cut, the path that led toward the institutionalized integration of non-politi-
cal expertise in political decision-making and the self-restriction of majoritarian 
institutions was rather erratic and controversial. In this respect, the formation 
process of the ICC bespeaks a two-dimensional search for both the appropriate 
type of expertise and an adequate mode of regulation. Most obviously, the uncer-
tainty regarding the type of expertise needed for regulation directly stems from 
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the fact that the railroad as such was at the time a radically new phenomenon. 
Effective regulation required not only a previously unknown set of expertise re-
garding technical, economic, and legal matters, but also a new type of expert – 
one that no one knew exactly how to find or recruit for the ICC, and in fact, no one 
could accurately describe. This uncertainty, together with the resistance against 
regulation in the railroad sector, pushed the political system towards a gradual 
and tentative path of expansion. In its search of appropriate coping mechanisms 
for the problem of railroad regulation, it started to reduce the initial distance to 
the railway sector it tried to observe. In the course of observation, the political 
system more and more carefully listened to and tuned into this particular part 
of its environment to access its functioning, and the political system sought, in a 
kind of trial-and-error approach, to include its findings into regulatory measures. 
Concerning the mode of regulation, i.e. the inclusion of this expertise into po-
litical decision-making with regard to the implementation of regulatory acts and 
the compliance of the objects of regulation, it is striking that and how the gener-
al idea of political self-restriction was vaguely present from the outset. The idea 
appeared at an early stage of the formation process, when Congress decided to 
establish a regulatory commission instead of charging the judiciary with the task 
of railroad regulation. From then on, however, it unfolded and stabilized rather 
reluctantly. Initially, the newly founded ICC was only used for advice, while the 
majoritarian institutions insisted on their exclusive decision-making competence. 
The delegation of more competences to the ICC and the strengthening of its auton-
omy vis-à-vis parliament and government did not happen until the first regulatory 
efforts had proved ineffective – both due to the resistance on part of the objects 
of regulation (through the non-acceptance of regulatory measures), and due to 
the overload of the majoritarian institutions (parliament) with complexity (i.e. the 
inability to operate in the sense of taking decisions). And even then, self-restric-
tion was far from self-evident, but repeatedly subject of political discussion, in 
which it had to be justified time and again. The parliament, i.e. both chambers of 
congress, seemed to literally force itself to self-restriction.
Against this backdrop, it is somewhat ironic that the specific expertise of the 
ICC was eventually considered so powerful and indispensable that the self-re-
striction and concession of autonomy, once institutionalized, came to appear 
irreversible to the political system itself. In times of political upheaval when the 
commission’s autonomy was explicitly called into question, its unique and irre-
placeable expertise was even raised as a major argument by those defending and 
maintaining the ICC’s strong position in the institutional structure of the political 
system. Rescinding the ICC’s autonomy, it was argued, would inevitably come at 
the cost of political expansion, i.e. it would imply the retraction of the political 
system from the respective sectors of its environment.  
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Central banks
Central banks have a long history, with their institutional core going back more 
than 300 years. It was not until the 20th century, however, that they spread across 
the globe and became an almost mandatory part of the institutional structure of 
nation states and an important symbol of national identity: “When a new nation 
state seeks to establish itself, the foundation of an independent central bank will 
be an early item on the agenda, slightly below the design of the f lag, but above 
the establishment of a national airline” (Capie, Goodhart and Schadt, 1994, p. 91). 
While merely 18 central banks existed in 1900, their number increased to 161 in 
1990 (Capie, Goodhart and Schadt, 1994, p. 6) and further to 192 in 2019.14 This 
means that there are currently almost as many central banks as nation states in 
the world, and that, as a consequence, monetary policy, i.e. collectively binding 
decisions concerning inf lation, money value, and often also banking system sta-
bility, is in the hand of central banks almost everywhere across the globe. Thus, 
although the banks differ in their concrete institutional design and their indepen-
dence vis-à-vis national governments, the overwhelming majority of contempo-
rary nation states neither chose to put monetary policy in the hands of ministries 
or other democratically legitimized authorities, nor did they opt to forego mon-
etary policy and subject the issue of monetary stability and inf lation to market 
mechanisms and the dynamics of the private banking system. Even though free 
banking, which leaves monetary stability to the dynamics of the financial system, 
never completely disappeared as a concept or economic vision, it did not gain 
much ground in practice at any time (apart from a few more or less marginal ex-
ceptions mainly during the 19th century) (Capie, Goodhart and Schadt, 1994, p. 85).
Central banks qualify as a form of functional autonomy in the political sys-
tem in several respects: Depending on their concrete tasks and objectives, central 
banks usually decide upon interest rates and money supply with the direct goals 
of controlling inf lation and ensuring monetary stability, which in turn are consid-
ered important determinants of economic prosperity. Because money acts as the 
reference point of economic communication as such15 and because every citizen is 
usually somehow engaged in economic activity, central bank operations and de-
cisions, by implication, affect all members of the political collective more or less 
directly. The most visible and immediate effects are doubtlessly on the banking 
14  See Bank for International Settlements (BIS), Central bank and monetary authority website, 
https://www.bis.org/cbanks.htm (31.10.2019).
15  In a systems theoretical perspective, money can be considered as the coding of scarcity which 
doubles the scarcity of goods. Money acts as a reference point for economic communication 
since the possibility of receiving payments and the open use of money render property liquid 
and almost universally transformable (Baecker, 2006, p. 48f f; Esposito, 2008, p. 126).
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system and corporate actors, but central bank operations are not less relevant and 
binding to individuals – whether in their role as consumers (regarding inf lation) 
or as depositors and borrowers (regarding interest rates). 
Highly complex economic expertise is ever-present in central bank opera-
tions: It dominates individual monetary policy decision-making of both the more 
and the less independent banks; most central banks comprise research depart-
ments, through which they are firmly and often prominently integrated in rele-
vant economic discourses; and perhaps most importantly, the technical expertise 
of central bank governors and their reputation in the financial community count 
as crucial factors in order to guarantee the credibility of the bank and the feasi-
bility and effectiveness of its decisions (Capie, Goodhart and Schadt, 1994, p. 55). 
Further, the importance of economic expertise is ref lected in the self-conception 
and self-presentation of central banks, which oscillate between two poles: On the 
one hand, many banks explicitly reference their opacity and illegibility for “or-
dinary” people, with the former Fed-chairman Alan Greenspan’s legendary “Fed-
speak” and his “mumbling with great incoherence” (Rowen, 1991) as one of the 
most drastic expressions (Blinder et al., 2001, p. 65ff). On the other hand, banks 
publicly commit themselves to more transparence and clarity in their statements, 
like most recently the (then designated) ECB chairwoman Christine Lagarde, who 
emphasized her intention to reach the “general public” instead of “traditional ex-
pert audiences” in her future communication on behalf of the bank (Committee on 
Economic and Monetary Affairs, 2019, p. 31). 
In their operations, central banks enjoy considerable autonomy vis-à-vis gov-
ernments and parliaments. Although the degree of autonomy varies across na-
tional contexts, its configuration boils down to a handful of key parameters (see 
e.g. Capie, Goodhart and Schadt, 1994, p. 55ff; Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti, 
1992; Lijphart, 2012 [1999], p. 226ff): the formal rules of the appointment and the 
terms of office of the central bank governor; the content and rigidity of central 
bank objectives as well as the authority to issue and change these targets; and re-
strictions on central bank loans to governments. With regard to these parameters, 
central bank autonomy – and, conversely, the self-restriction of majoritarian in-
stitutions – is higher the longer the governor’s terms of office, the stronger the 
barriers to preliminary dismission, and the clearer the focus on inf lation relative 
to other potential objectives (e.g., unemployment or economic growth). Addition-
ally, some authors (e.g. Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti, 1992) suggest to consider 
the turnover of the governor as a criterion for the practical (and not only the for-
mal) autonomy of central banks (the lower, the more autonomy). 
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First steps towards monetary policy
Tracing the formation of central banks from their first appearance to their current 
form as key elements of modern polities and especially of democratic regimes re-
quires beginning with a few remarks on the emergence of money in pre-modern 
society and its development in the transition to modernity. Both – money and 
central banks – have always been closely intertwined and can hardly be under-
stood one without the other. That said, it is even more remarkable that the first 
form of money – coins – is inextricably linked to political power. Coins first ap-
peared as a means of payment in the late 7th century B.C., and since that time, 
political rulers – mainly kings, but later also other dignitaries – have claimed the 
right to mint and issue them (Peacock, 2006). In the transition to modernity, the 
privilege of minting was transferred, largely without dispute, to the governments 
of the newly emerging nation states and continues to be held by governments in 
the present.   
Thus, while coins have been “political” money from the outset, banknotes have 
a different history. Not only did they, once established, become much more rele-
vant for the economic system than coins, but their relationship to the political sys-
tem has been much more strongly inf luenced by economic and political dynamics 
alike. To begin with, banknotes did not appear in Europe until the 17th century 
and thus considerably later than coins. They were a product of the pre-modern 
banking system, which had evolved since the 13th century and provided the op-
portunity to save and borrow money against money, a function that was especially 
relevant to merchants. At some point, financial institutes began to issue receipts 
on private assets (coins and other kinds of assets) that they had taken into safe-
keeping. Little by little, and mainly for practical reasons, these receipts were used 
and circulated as means of payment. As such, they first spread in England and 
Sweden and later more broadly across Europe. Banknotes, we can conclude, arose 
from the differentiation process of the economic system in the transition to mod-
ern society, whereas coins emerged as a premodern phenomenon and were closely 
linked to monarchical power. In contrast to coins, the functioning of banknotes 
requires the existence of a banking system and thus rests on the self-referentiality 
of the economy (i.e. on payments that refer primarily to other payments and/or 
payment expectations) which gradually unfolds in the course of differentiation 
(Esposito, 2010; Goeke and Moser, 2018, p. 89ff). And finally, it is important to 
note that the emergence of banknotes was a decentralized process that occurred 
both outside political power and independently from territorial boundaries. 
It was not until the formation of the early nation states that the territorial as-
pects of money – in the shape of national currencies – became an issue: The emer-
gence of nation states since the 18th century has been accompanied by a signifi-
cant expansion of political responsibility and regulatory demands. This expansion 
culminated in the institutionalization of sovereign rights (Staatliche Hoheitsrechte), 
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such as the right to adopt and implement laws, to levy taxes, and to set up armed 
forces. For different reasons – among which territorially bounded economic in-
terests, fiscal considerations (linked to seigniorage), and the construction and 
strengthening of a national identity were likely pivotal (Helleiner, 2003) – the 
claims for exclusive sovereign responsibility expanded to money and banknotes 
and eventually led to the emergence of national currencies. First and foremost, 
this increase in political responsibility implied that money was territorialized, i.e. 
the validity of individual currencies was limited in spatial terms through political 
regulation, and the right to issue banknotes (Notenprivileg) was monopolized in 
the hands of the state. Early central banks – the first of which was the Bank of 
England which was founded in 1694 – evolved when this exclusive right was sold to 
private financial institutes, usually so states could finance wars or cover sovereign 
debt (Capie, Goodhart and Schadt, 1994, p. 4ff; Hutter, 2014, p. 198ff).
Considered from a differentiation theory perspective, the widening of regula-
tory demands on money equals the expansion of the political system into spheres 
of its societal environment previously untouched by (or, not an explicit object of) 
collectively binding decisions. In the course of this expansion, an early form of 
monetary policy appeared in outline and implied some structural restrictions of 
the economy: the issuing of banknotes was territorialized and centralized via po-
litical power and, in these respects, was withdrawn from the dynamics of eco-
nomic operations. This political intervention in the economy, however, was mod-
erate because it did not (yet) include the limitation of the amount of money, which 
was still left to the decision of the issuing banks.
The birth of modern central banking
The period from the mid-19th century until the outbreak of the First World War 
in 1914 proved crucial for the formation of central banks and for political regu-
lation and (self-)restriction in the sphere of monetary policy. In this respect, it 
is important to consider the heated debate among British economists on the ap-
propriateness and necessary extent of political inf luence on money and currency 
issues with regard to monetary stability. The debate was triggered by the rapid 
proliferation of banknotes as a means of payment during the early and mid-19th 
century, and it centered on the question of whether the supply of money should 
be limited by requiring the gold coverage of banknotes, or whether it should be 
left to the dynamics of the financial system. While the so-called currency school, 
with David Ricardo as its most prominent representative, argued for extensive 
or even complete coverage and thus for strong regulation, the banking school 
called for complete f lexibility and the abolition of any restrictions (Herger, 2016, 
p. 16ff). The currency school eventually prevailed, and its ideas and principles laid 
the foundation for the creation of a two-tier banking system, which divided the 
financial system into two levels: on the upper level a central bank with a superior 
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status which is in charge of regulating money supply, and at the subordinate level 
commercial banks which are concerned with credit allocation to the private sec-
tor, deposits, and any other money-related issues. From the mid-19th century on-
ward, this two-tier structure was adopted by more and more Western European 
countries, with Britain and its 1844 Bank Charter Act acting as a pioneer and role 
model. For several decades, the two-tier system existed in parallel with the free 
banking system, i.e. a much less regulated monetary regime in which banknotes 
are issued in a market and several issuing banks compete with one  another (Her-
ger, 2016, p. 21). Eventually, however, the two-tier system completely replaced free 
banking and has survived more or less unchanged until present day.
Once adopted, the two-tier banking system triggered a remarkable dynamic 
which, backed by economic theory of that time (especially Bagehot, 1873), further 
strengthened the already dominant position of the central banks, culminating in 
the function of so-called lenders of last resort. This function goes back to the ini-
tiative of central banks themselves – in particular, again, the Bank of England –, 
and basically entails the purposeful allocation of short-term loans by central 
banks to troubled financial institutes in order to solve liquidity problems. After 
it had proven effective regarding the stability of the financial system due to both 
its structural and psychological effects, it was gradually adopted by policy makers 
and integrated into political regulation. The function of the lender of last resort 
was made mandatory for more and more central banks and fixed legally, i.e., in 
terms of the conditions for application, the design of individual measures, and the 
scope of action (see e.g. Herger, 2016, p. 19f). 
In sum, although this particular mechanism of short-term liquidity provision 
has always been explicitly restricted to banks with liquidity problems and unavail-
able to those with solvency problems, it constitutes a selected interruption of the 
regular financial market mechanism at a particular, clearly defined point through 
political regulation and thus based on political decisions. Henceforth, central 
banks act separately from market dynamics and the need of short-term prof-
it-maximization. They instead assume the position of an institution whose pri-
mary function is to serve the long-term interests of the financial system, however 
these are then identified and f leshed out in practice (Capie, Goodhart and Schadt, 
1994, p. 10ff). The economic factors behind this shift, however, are blatantly obvi-
ous: The role of the lender of last resort is rooted in a genuinely economic initiative 
that resulted from the (politically induced) strong position of central banks within 
the financial system. And it was designed according to principles that emerged 
from and proved themselves in the course of economic operation. Overall, it can 
be considered a reactive (rather than proactive) expansionary move of the political 
system toward the economy, which resulted from careful observation of its eco-
nomic environment. 
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The monopolization of note issue, the introduction of a two-tier banking sys-
tem, and the function of the lender of last resort, which took root during the 19th 
century, are usually considered key indicators for the emergence of central banks 
in their modern form (Capie, Goodhart and Schadt, 1994, p. 6). They were accom-
panied by another, no less significant change within financial system regulation: 
Since the mid-19th century, again with Britain, which at that time had a dominant 
position in the global economy, taking the lead via the Bank Charter Act of 1844, 
more and more nation states adopted the gold standard. They tied the value of 
their national currencies to a fixed amount of gold (i.e. the British Pound equaled 
to 7.32g of fine gold, the US-Dollar to 1.5046g) and guaranteed the respective con-
vertibility. The gold standard was supposed to prevent the unlimited and uncon-
trolled increase in paper money and, by implication, stabilize the money value. 
Amongst others, it laid the groundwork for the idea that monetary stability should 
be the main objective of central banks, which was picked up and further devel-
oped several decades later, after the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system (see 
below). In contrast to the post-Bretton Woods system, however, the central banks 
under the gold standard were almost completely deprived of any significant de-
cision-making competence. Their key responsibility was limited to guaranteeing 
the gold parity by mutually adjusting the supply of money and the gold reserves 
– a function that is today still present in the so-called “reserve banks” that were 
founded during this period (e.g. India, United States) (Herger, 2016, p. 26). The 
banks’ main instrument was interest rate setting for private financial institutes, 
which borrowed their money reserves from the central banks. Both the position 
and the operational mode of central banks under the gold standard became more 
and more standardized until the early 20th century, including the independence 
vis-à-vis national governments as an increasingly important part of the self-con-
ception of central banks (Capie, Goodhart and Schadt, 1994, p. 15).
Ref lecting on the emergence of central banking from the mid-19th centu-
ry until the early 20th century from the perspective of differentiation theory, at 
least three aspects are noteworthy: First, there was a further significant and, in 
retrospect, lasting expansion of the political system on economic issues, during 
which central banks gained shape and monetary policy was formed. The partic-
ular course of this expansion bespeaks a remarkable dynamic of mutual increase 
between economic operating and political observation and regulation. 
Second, the strictly limited function of central banks under the gold standard, 
which went so far that they became factually replaceable by private financial 
institutions (Herger, 2016, p. 26), can be considered an early version of political 
self-restriction in the field of monetary policy: The gold standard not only restrict-
ed economic operating, but also delimited the leeway of political decision making 
by rendering monetary policy factually obsolete. In other words, by implementing 
the gold standard, both function systems involved in monetary issues deliberate-
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ly abstained from certain possibilities for action. That said, it is no coincidence 
that central bank independence from politics became an issue in that period, 
notwithstanding the banks’ limited scope of action. Moreover, the gold standard 
implied a common reference point of monetary issues that tied the political and 
the economic (financial) system symmetrically to the material ecological environ-
ment (i.e. gold deposits and discoveries) and to the technosphere (i.e. available 
technologies for gold mining). Both spheres follow their distinct logic and cannot 
be directly accessed by political or economic operations. Consequently, neither 
political decisions nor economic dynamics, but rather the total amount of gold, 
determined the price level: def lation occurred when gold mining did not keep 
pace with the increase in the quantity of goods, and inf lation occurred as a result 
of unexpected gold discoveries or technological progress in the mining industry. 
Third, theoretical ref lections and academic debates on economic and financial 
market issues at the time of the gold standard, which can be subsumed under the 
label of classical economics (klassische Nationalökonomie) and was represented by 
Smith, Ricardo, Mill, Say, and others, appear remarkable in two respects: First, 
classical economics obviously played a crucial role in the formation of central 
banks and the structuring of the financial system. And second, its content and 
form offer clear evidence of functional differentiation. While preceding econom-
ic-political doctrines like mercantilism were primarily concerned with economic 
dynamics in view of political objectives (i.e. filling the state treasury, increasing 
the wealth of the sovereign), classical economics rests on the general conviction 
that the economy is not by itself subordinate to politics, and political intervention 
into economic operations, in any form, is not self-evident, but rather requires sub-
stantive economic justifications to count as legitimate. 
From the gold standard to the Bretton Woods regime 
The gold standard had been experiencing a global diffusion since the 1870s. It was 
suspended with the beginning of the First World War, when priority was given to 
financing government deficits and gold was withdrawn from circulation in order 
to pay for the war (Capie, Goodhart and Schadt, 1994, p. 15ff). Not even in the 
tense pre-war situation, however, did central banks surrender their independence 
vis-à-vis politics without resistance, as an anecdote about the Bank of England 
illustrates (see Capie, Goodhart and Schadt, 1994, p. 53): At the outbreak of the war, 
“the Prime Minister […] invited the Governor of the Bank […] to make a written 
promise: ‘that during the war the Bank must in all things act on the directions of 
the Chancellor of the Exchequer […] and must not take any action likely to affect 
credit prior consultation with the Chancellor’”. The governor of the bank first re-
fused to sign, insisting on the function of the bank. After a few weeks, however, 
he gave in and agreed to submit to the government – a decision that was represen-
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tative for the changed position of central banks around the world on the eve of the 
war (Capie, Goodhart and Schadt, 1994, p. 53). 
The emphasis on the primacy of politics and the reduction of political self-re-
striction continued during the period of war and beyond. The gold standard was 
resumed, albeit half-heartedly, during the inter-war period. The problematic 
economic effects of this strong form of economic and political self-restriction, 
however, were already perceptible. Its rigidity, which prevented central banks 
from counteracting the economic downturn by increasing the supply of money, 
was considered one of the main causes of the Great Depression during the 1930s, 
which triggered fundamental ref lections on objectives of monetary policy and on 
the role of central banks and their independence from government. On the one 
hand, the conviction of the basic necessity of central banks prevailed and was 
even reinforced. During the post-Second World War era, not only democracy 
as a form of political order spread in the so-called West, but also central banks, 
which had started to expand since the early 20th century, became an almost indis-
pensable part of the institutional structure of nation states (Capie, Goodhart and 
Schadt, 1994, p. 55). On the other hand, however, the rise of Keynesianism as eco-
nomic doctrine was accompanied by strong arguments in favor of a more active 
state management of monetary issues (Capie, Goodhart and Schadt, 1994, p. 26). 
Against this backdrop, it comes as no surprise that the general approach to mone-
tary policy became more interventionist, including, inter alia, the nationalization 
of many central banks and the conceptualization of monetary policy as part of a 
broader national economic strategy (Capie, Goodhart and Schadt, 1994, p. 54). 
Remarkably, political self-restriction vis-à-vis central banks nonetheless did 
not disappear, but rather changed its form: In 1944, shortly before the end of the 
Second World War, the pure gold standard was replaced by the Bretton Woods re-
gime, a form of monetary management among independent states that combined 
the gold standard with a foreign exchange standard (Capie, Goodhart and Schadt, 
1994, p. 22ff; Herger, 2016, p. 39ff). The agreement provided a gold parity only for 
the US-Dollar, to which the other signatory states tied their national currencies 
in fixed exchange rates with only minor leeway for adaptions. By implication, the 
US-Dollar was, henceforth, the global reserve currency, and the US federal reserve 
bank committed itself to sell the US-Dollar against gold at a fixed price in unlim-
ited amounts. Simultaneously, the function of the national central banks of the 
other Bretton Woods member states was reduced to reacting to the Fed within an 
extremely narrow scope of action. To ensure the smooth functioning of the entire 
regime, the International Monetary Fund was established as a global supervisory 
institution.
The abandonment of the gold standard and the transition to the Bretton Woods 
regime appeared to be a fundamental structural change within the economic sys-
tem, and it was and is ref lected as such in economic theory. The shift appears 
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less radical, however, from a differentiation theory perspective and with regard 
to the emergence of central banks as a form of functional autonomy. The symmet-
ric self-restriction of the political and economic systems that the gold standard 
had initiated continued under Bretton Woods. Moreover, the general mistrust 
towards untamed market dynamics with regard to money and currencies, which 
had already been ref lected in the adoption and rapid expansion of the two-tier 
banking system and had intensified under the gold standard, persisted. Under 
the Bretton Woods regime, it was ref lected in the radical restriction of leeway in 
monetary policy by binding economic operations and political decisions alike to 
a common reference point. The most notable difference from the gold standard 
was a change in the construction of this reference point: By moving to the Bretton 
Woods regime, the political and economic (self-)restriction no longer referred ex-
clusively to the technosphere and the ecological environment of the society. Rath-
er, the reference point was at least partly shifted to political structures by supple-
menting gold by the (fixed) exchange rate relations between national currencies, 
which were the product of political ref lections and negotiations.  
Currency flexibilization and the evolution of the independent central bank
The Bretton Woods regime got under pressure in the wake of the global economic 
turbulences during the 1960s, and it was officially abandoned in 1973. Its abandon-
ment opened the way for the complete f lexibilization of exchange rates among the 
dominant currencies in the world (such as the US-Dollar, the British Pound, the 
German Mark, and several others) – in other words, it facilitated the transition to 
a global market regime in currency issues without permanent state intervention. 
The f lexibilization of the global currency market led to a shift in the monetary pol-
icy focus: While the major reference point of the Bretton Woods regime were the 
exchange rate relations between nation states and their respective currencies, the 
post-Bretton Woods context, in which mandatory fixed currency relations were 
the exception,16 implied the re-nationalization of currency issues and the re-emer-
gence of effective monetary policy at the national level. 
This shift, in turn, led to a fundamental change in the relevance of central 
banks as the key players in monetary policy, and it raised the question of how to 
shape their new role and responsibilities. An answer – or rather, a proposal – was 
provided by economic theory, which now held the conviction that inf lation, rather 
than exchange rates and foreign trade indicators, should be considered the main 
factor inf luencing monetary stability. This, accordingly, shifted concerns about 
domestic economic issues instead of global imbalances in the focus of monetary 
16  Some (mostly small) countries voluntarily renounced autonomous monetary policy. They chose 
fixed exchange rates and tied their national currencies to one of the global lead currencies or to 
so-called currency baskets.
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theory and policy alike (Capie, Goodhart and Schadt, 1994, p. 27ff). Three key pa-
rameters of the post-Bretton Woods conception of central banks clearly ref lect 
this changed theoretical position: They included first price stability as the main 
objective for central banks and as their major performance indicator; second in-
terest rates and money supply as the central instruments of monetary control; and 
third the conviction that these objectives would best be served by a radically au-
tonomous central bank, whose operations are strictly shielded from the inf luence 
of majoritarian institutions (Capie, Goodhart and Schadt, 1994, p. 27ff; for a skep-
tical position with regard to the economic benefits of central bank independence 
see McNamara, 2002). 
These developments show that although central banks had already existed as 
a politically and economically relevant institution for more than three centuries, 
and although economic historians usually identify the modern version of these 
banks emerging since the early 19th century (Goodhart, 1991), it was the experi-
ence of the Bretton Woods effects and the post-Bretton Wood phase that eventu-
ally produced the central bank in its current form: as an institution that is effec-
tively and exclusively responsible for monetary policy and to that end is equipped 
with a large scope of action; that claims radical autonomy from democratically 
elected authorities; that explicitly and comprehensively relies on monetary theory 
and economic principles as decision-making guidelines; and that is unbound by 
formal decision making rules (on the global expansion of central bank indepen-
dence see Crowe and Meade, 2007; Polillo and Guillén, 2005).
A comparison of the post-Bretton Woods regime to the preceding stages in the 
emergence of central banks highlights a fundamental change in the logic of the 
political regulation of monetary issues and the related forms and degrees of the 
self-restriction of majoritarian institutions: The formerly relatively symmetrical 
(self-)restriction of political and economic operations in monetary policy tipped 
toward the political system in the latter period. On the one hand, the guiding 
principle of central bank independence prompted the considerable liberalization 
of the financial system. The strong external limitation through the gold stan-
dard and later the Bretton Woods regime was converted into a form of econom-
ic self-regulation, i.e. the regulation of monetary issues by economic expertise, 
mainly in the form of monetary theory and implemented via central banks. On the 
other hand, the post-Bretton Woods era witnessed the increased self-restriction 
of majoritarian authorities vis-à-vis the central bank, whereby the reference point 
of monetary policy is now located in the economic system and thus completely 
underlies economic dynamics.
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Interim conclusions 
The particularities of the emergence of central banks as a form of functional auton-
omy become apparent if we compare them with the appearance of the ICC. From 
the point of view of differentiation theory and the above discussed understanding 
of functional autonomy, the emergence of the ICC ref lects a more or less linear 
and resolute process of the framing of certain dynamics in the railroad sector as 
a political problem, and the adoption of this problem by the political system. The 
straightforward initial politicization of particular societal circumstances, howev-
er, went hand in hand with a high degree of uncertainty concerning both the kind 
of expertise that would be needed for regulation and the appropriate form and ex-
tent of political self-restriction that would be necessary to ensure the effectiveness 
of regulation and the acceptance by its object, the railroad sector. 
The emergence of central banks follows a different pattern in almost all these 
respects. To a certain degree, this may be due to the fact that central banks, in 
contrast to most other forms of functional autonomy, did not arise in the context 
of democratic order, but considerably earlier. Their roots go back to the late 17th 
century, when they first appeared as organizations. Subsequently, they unfold-
ed their activities and established themselves as political and economic actors in 
the transition to modernity and thus simultaneously to the differentiation of the 
political system and the emergence of modern nation states. The latter gradually 
adopted them as a part of their institutional structure, usually long before these 
states turned into democracies. The particular pace of the adoption of monetary 
issues as a policy field, the perception of the need for regulation and political 
self-restriction, and in the institutional design of central banks and their respon-
sibilities clearly ref lect these contextual dynamics. 
Regarding the process of the adoption of monetary issues as a political prob-
lem and the formation of monetary policy, it is important to note that the first cen-
tral banks were not founded as a political reaction to the observation of public dis-
satisfaction, but rather as an attempt to manage governmental funding problems. 
Inf lation and currency stability were discovered and adopted as political issues 
much later, but then taken as a reason for the expansion of the political system 
into the economic – or, more precisely, the financial – system. Thereby, economic 
(and mainly monetary) theory that claims to speak and act on behalf of the econo-
my turned out as a major driving force in this process by actively articulating the 
need for regulation. And even more: in case of central banks and monetary policy, 
political regulation did not only occur primarily on the initiative of the object of 
regulation, but was also significantly shaped and (pre)defined by it. During more 
than 300 years of central bank history, monetary theory was more or less perma-
nently coming up with concrete proposals for regulative mechanisms. The general 
approach and content of these proposals, however, considerably varied over time.
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The outstanding role of economic theory affected both the consideration of 
non-political expertise in monetary policy making and the pattern of political 
self-restriction towards the economy. Not only the framing of monetary policy was 
in itself a changeful process that accompanied rather than preceded the formation 
and institutionalization of central banks, but also ever new coping mechanisms 
and processing modes for monetary issues appeared and dissolved, not least be-
cause of changes in monetary theory. These variations were ref lected in the search 
for a reference point of monetary regulation, which should be able to purposefully 
restrict economic dynamics in selected respects, but at the same time neither sup-
press nor politicize them, i.e. completely subject market dynamics to political de-
cisions. The reference points that were selected and institutionalized at different 
points in time shifted from the technosphere and ecological environment (gold 
standard) at least partially to the political system (Bretton Woods) and from there 
further to the economic system (post-Bretton Woods).  
This process went hand in hand with different and changing forms of political 
self-restriction. Remarkably, all these forms were radical and far-reaching and, 
most notably, instituted without significant resistance from the affected major-
itarian authorities. Since the implementation of the gold standard, it was never 
seriously contested that the legislative and executive authorities abandon their 
scope of action and delegate monetary policy decisions to central banks. At most 
the setup and framing of central bank activities was from time to time subject 
of political debate. And even more: Albeit political self-restriction in the realm 
of monetary policy had first occurred under non-democratic conditions, it was 
not seriously challenged in the course of democratization. Instead and somehow 
counterintuitively, it was even strengthened after 1945 and spread simultaneously 
to the rise of democracy in the Western world during the 20th century. 
Judicial review & constitutional courts
The picture of the empirical manifestations of functional autonomy would be in-
complete without considering a third prominent case: judicial review, which en-
sures that the decisions made by majoritarian authorities (e.g. laws, acts, govern-
mental actions) are subject to third-party review and can be invalidated against 
the background of existing (constitutional) law. In practice, judicial review is ex-
erted in democratic contexts either in a decentralized manner via delegation to 
the general court system and its hierarchy, usually with a Supreme Court at the 
highest position (e.g. United States), or – in a more recent version – in centralized 
form by a specialized constitutional court (e.g. Germany). 
Notwithstanding these structural variants, it is obvious that judicial review 
as such can be considered a form of functional autonomy in several respects: 
Court decision have a strong political dimension since they effectively bind ex-
5. Expansion through Self-Restriction: Functional Autonomy in Modern Democracies 191
ecutive and legislative authorities, i.e. those authorities which plausibly claim to 
represent the political collective (the people). In doing so, the courts directly in-
f luence policy decisions (Voßkuhle, 2018). This inf luence may be exerted either 
procedurally or substantially (Hirschl, 2008, p. 121ff): It is exerted procedurally 
when the courts oversee the compliance of political decision-making with prin-
ciples of equal opportunity, transparency, accountability, and the like; and when 
they actively intervene in case of violations by (in-)validating the concrete actions 
and decisions of executive and legislative authorities. Court decisions affect the 
substance of public policy-making when the courts themselves decide political 
controversies by effectively making political decisions (like, for instance, on the 
right to same-sex-marriage, on abortion rules, or on minority discrimination). In 
both respects, court decisions often do not only address current political issues 
and conf licts, but draw boundaries that inevitably and significantly shape future 
policy-making as well as the political debates surrounding it. 
Thereby, it goes almost without saying that judicial review gives strict priority 
to legal, i.e. non-political expertise and principles. Courts claim to and must, for 
the sake of their credibility, permanently demonstrate that although they might 
indeed decide on the same issues as majoritarian institutions, they do so deliber-
ately and solely on the basis of legal principles and not in consideration of politi-
cal criteria. In other words, their emphasis is exclusively “upon the role of reason 
and of principle in the judicial, as distinguished from the legislative or executive, 
appraisal of conf licting values” (Wechsler, 1959, p. 16) (see also e.g. Cole, 2019; Val-
linder, 1995). Importantly, operating according to legal principles does not only 
concern decision-making criteria, but also implies the adoption of two procedural 
particularities of the legal system: First, courts in general act only upon applica-
tion. In contrast to legislative and executive bodies, courts do not choose the is-
sues on which they decide by their own initiative, but instead react to and thus 
depend on the selections made by systems in their environment by which they 
are addressed (see e.g. Lepsius, 2011, p. 164; Voßkuhle, 2018). Second, and closely 
linked to the first particularity, the competence of courts concerned with judicial 
review is limited solely and exclusively through the mode of acting on application, 
what means that the scope of judicial review is by no means restricted by the sub-
stantial specification of a certain field of responsibility. Rather, as Hirschl (2004, 
p. 169) vividly illustrated by citing the former Chief Justice of the Supreme Court 
of Israel, Aharon Barak: “Nothing falls beyond the purview of judicial review. The 
world is filled with law; anything and everything is justiciable”. Both specificities – 
acting only on application and the basically unlimited responsibility – are import-
ant differences from the two examples of functional autonomy discussed above, 
i.e. independent regulatory agencies and central banks. 
Finally, the autonomy of judicial review vis-à-vis majoritarian institutions 
and, inversely, the self-restriction of the latter are apparent on all dimensions: 
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With respect to the fact dimension, autonomy consists both of the power of the 
courts to invalidate majority decisions and, vice versa, the inability of democrati- 
cally elected bodies to overrule or otherwise bypass court decisions. Besides, it is 
here where the strong standing of (political) liberalism vis-à-vis democracy finds 
one of its most vivid expressions. Autonomy on the social and time dimensions is 
mainly based on the formal conditions of judgeship. The appointment procedure 
at least officially claims to exclude any political tactics and to focus exclusively 
on the professional expertise and personal qualifications of the candidates. This 
is not least due to the awareness that the acceptance of court decisions hinges on 
public confidence in “the independence, integrity and professional competence 
of justices serving at the constitutional court” (Voßkuhle, 2018, p. 481). If public 
confidence in the integrity of judges is shaken or even betrayed, the institution 
as such may be seriously damaged and its capacity to act might be negatively af-
fected (as was evident in the fierce conf lict over the appointment of Brett Kavan- 
augh as a justice of the U.S. Supreme Court). In a much more formalized manner 
than the ostentatious political impartiality of the appointment procedure (which 
is, in fact, not always fulfilled), autonomy is granted to the judges through fixed 
terms of office or even appointment for life, which are protected with high barri-
ers to preliminary dismissal. Finally, autonomy is rooted in the fact that judges 
make their decisions free of not only intervention by elected politicians, but also 
of time pressure derived from urgency (Voßkuhle, 2018, p. 480). In this regard, 
they strongly contrast with majoritarian institutions, whose decision-making is 
framed by electoral terms, voter expectations, coalition agreements, and the like. 
With regard to the political context of judicial review, its autonomy is usually 
considered crucial to modern democracy as such, not least because it sits at the 
very core of the self-conception of democratic regimes. This is most evident with 
regard to the fact that a strong and autonomous judicial review which restricts 
the scope of action of majoritarian institutions on the grounds of existing (con-
stitutional) law undisputedly counts as a key feature and important stabilizer of 
democracy in both political theory and practice. Conversely, when legislative or 
executive authorities restrict the scope of action of judicial review and intervene 
into its competences, these actions are considered an assault on the democratic 
order itself.
Autonomy of judicial review, however, is also a sensitive issue beyond emer-
gency situations and in the normal operation of the democratic polity. Not-
withstanding the high public expectations, strong regulation, and ostentatious 
confessions of political actors concerning political impartiality, the actual or sup-
posed effects of party affiliation or ideological preferences give rise to almost con-
stant debates about the selection of candidates, their confirmation, which usually 
requires legislative majorities in some way or another, or their exercise of duty. 
In this last regard, the question of political-ideological interpretations of the law, 
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i.e. of whether judges are subliminally guided by their political preferences and 
values as they make decisions on constitutional issues, is among the most debated 
issues related to judicial review.17
Similar to the analyses of independent regulatory agencies and central banks, 
the particularity of judicial review as a specific appearance of functional autono-
my becomes evident in a review of the historical conditions of its emergence and 
formation. Again, the focus of the following examination is not exclusively on the 
internal structures and operations of the political system, but also on the bound-
aries that separate the system from its functionally differentiated environment 
and the way it copes with this environment. In this respect, it is important to note 
that the relationship between the political and the legal systems stands out in gen-
eral (i.e., with regard to other issues than functional autonomy) among the diverse 
environmental contexts. Under the condition of the rule of law, both the politi-
cal and the legal systems find their ultimate legitimacy in each other – a matter 
of fact that Teubner (2015) describes as the mutual externalization of legitimacy 
paradoxes between both systems. Both deliberately use the respective other sys-
tem and its differentiation and autonomy for their own stabilization: any form of 
legal regulation originates from the political system, while the polity subjects to 
the legal principles which it created. Consequently, the concession of autonomy 
towards the legal system leads inevitably to some form of self-reference. With re-
gard to functional autonomy, this particular interrelation differentiates the law 
system from other function systems that also act as reference points of functional 
autonomy but have origins that are clearly distinct from politics.
The first occurrence of judicial review: 
Ensuring the constitutionality of legislation
Judicial review has its roots in the formation of the early American state. Although 
historical research shows that the practice of judicial review was, in some way 
or other, already been known to the colonial governments (see Ginsburg, 2008, 
p. 82), its first instance occurred in 1803 with a decision of the Supreme Court of 
the United States under Chief Justice John Marshall in the famous (and complex) 
Marbury vs. Madison case (Vallinder, 1995, p. 17ff). Marbury vs. Madison, which 
was triggered by the attempted nomination of state judges during the change of 
presidency from Adams to Jefferson in 1800/1801, came as a sudden and unex-
17  See most recently Devins and Baum (2019), whose empirical analysis suggests that the impact of 
partisan af filiation and majorities among the judges on the decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court 
is much weaker than usually assumed in public discourse; also see the regular ef forts on the 
part of the German Constitutional Court and the humble self-descriptions of the constitutional 
judges as “servants of law” (“Knechte des Rechts”), who try to dispel the suspicion of partiali-
ty with references to the democratic “esprit de corps” of the institution itself, which allegedly 
transgresses individual ideological standpoints (see Beckmann, 2016; also Vanberg, 2005).
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pected impulse to the young political system. It led to the decision that the Con-
gress cannot pass laws that contradict the Constitution, and that it is up to the 
judiciary’s responsibility to interpret what the Constitution permits. 
The court decision initiated a readjustment of the relationship between the po-
litical and legal systems, which was underpinned by the general mistrust of unre-
stricted majority rule that had accompanied modern democracy more or less from 
the very outset: It had been indicated in the Federalist Papers and was shared a 
few decades later by political thinkers such as Mill or Tocqueville, among others, 
who warned against a “tyranny of the majority” as a kind of a built-in, and thus in-
evitable, threat in democratic regimes. The readjustment not only confirmed the 
autonomy of the judiciary vis-à-vis the executive and legislative power, but also 
established the judiciary’s supremacy over parliament and government in cases of 
doubt, which became and remained a key characteristic of the political system of 
the United States (Ginsburg, 2008; Vallinder, 1995). 
Examining the emergence of judicial review in the early 19th century United 
States and at its subsequent institutionalization in the American polity, three as-
pects are especially noteworthy for understanding its relevance and specificity in 
this historical context: First, it is important to note that not only democracy as 
such was an exceptional form of political rule at that time, but also the restric-
tion on majority rule as implied by independent (autonomous) judicial review 
was highly unusual for the few early democratic regimes. Another important 
early democracy, Great Britain, firmly refused this kind of restriction and even 
today has neither a written constitution nor an institutionalized form of auton-
omous judicial review; a similar pattern is found in Sweden (Lijphart, 2012 [1999], 
p. 212ff). Thus, notwithstanding the popularity that autonomous judicial review 
gained later on in the 20th century, initially it was not uncontested and existed 
parallel to alternative structures, i.e. simultaneous with democratic regimes with 
largely unrestricted majority rule. Seen from this perspective, the situation in a 
way resembled the parallel existence of central banks and free banking systems in 
the second half of the 19th century (see above). Free banking, however, eventually 
proved much less persistent than polities without judicial review: it had factually 
vanished and been replaced by two-tier systems by the early 20th century. 
Second, it is remarkable that judicial review emerged relatively suddenly and 
much less gradually and hesitantly than other forms of functional autonomy. Not-
withstanding later changes in structural details, among them most notably the 
invention of the constitutional court as a designated body, the key features – the 
supremacy of legal expertise in a particular sphere of collectively binding deci-
sion-making, and the explicit self-restriction of majoritarian institutions – were 
in place immediately and have remained more or less unchanged until today. 
Third, with regard to functional differentiation and especially the differen-
tiation of the political system, the emergence of judicial review appears as an in-
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herently political initiative – its first instance, Marbury vs. Madison, occurred on 
an impulse that emerged from the political system and the interplay of different 
state authorities. It thus can be considered an expression of the self-reference of 
the political system; initially, other function systems were irrelevant. Thereby, the 
liberal attitude underlying the limitation of majority rule emphasizes the individ-
ual citizen and the protection of his or her freedom vis-à-vis the state. However, 
while citizens are a crucial reference point, they are included less as active polit-
ical participants and more as individuals who are inevitably affected by political 
decisions but whose activities that require and use individual freedoms are main-
ly directed towards other societal spheres.  
The invention of the constitutional court
The 20th century witnessed an impressive quantitative expansion of judicial 
review across the globe (Vallinder, 1995), which is commonly traced back to the 
spread of liberal democracy in the aftermath of the Second World War. Addition-
ally, it might have been underpinned by the increasing international inf luence of 
the United States in two respects: The strong position of the Supreme Court in 
the American polity became an important political role model for many democ-
ratization processes, and the strong international standing of American political 
science and its “obsession with courts and legal procedures” (Tate and Vallinder, 
1995b, p. 2f) doubtlessly fostered the rise of autonomous judicial review as a key 
ingredient of modern democracy. 
An important part of this surge was the early 20th century invention of a 
structural variant that soon became quite inf luential: Kelsen’s model of a consti-
tutional court, which entails the delegation of judicial review to a designated body 
standing outside the general legal system and the court hierarchy. The first consti-
tutional court was implemented in Austria in 1920. In the aftermath of the Second 
World War, constitutional courts were established mainly in post-fascist countries 
(Germany, Italy, Portugal, and Spain), whereof the German Verfassungsgericht 
became a particularly inf luential model (Ginsburg, 2008, p. 85f; Müller, 2013, p. 
247ff). The initial appearance of constitutional courts primarily in post-fascist 
contexts was probably not a coincidence, but must be considered as a reaction to 
those countries’ experience of democratic regimes being literally beaten at their 
own game by systematically undermining democratic key principles – an expe-
rience which Kelsen (2018 [1929]) himself had vaguely anticipated, who as early as 
in the 1920s recognized democracy as the only form of government that nourishes 
its enemies at its own breast. Given this structural weakness, Kelsen concluded, 
a strong constitutional court should help prevent these enemies from becoming 
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superior, i.e. reaching a position which allows them to effectively undermine key 
democratic principles.18
Compared to the initial stage of the emergence of judicial review, this later 
stage includes not only the diversification of the structural forms, but also the plu-
ralization of the motives and principles: First, the initial reference to liberal prin-
ciples is still present, and the general idea of protecting the citizens against exces-
sive state intervention persists, in part due to a change of the understanding of 
democracy in the 20th century that puts particular emphasis on liberal principles 
and their integration into democratic structures (e.g. Plattner, 1998) and eventu-
ally effects a tight coupling of democracy and judicial review. Second, against the 
backdrop of the fascist experience, the idea that citizens need protection against 
the state is complemented by the opposite attitude, i.e. a strong distrust in the 
people’s sovereignty. This distrust leads to the understanding of judicial review 
as a protection of democratic rule against the people and the general will. It en-
tails an emphasis on “checks and balances” as well as the relative weakening of 
parliaments within the institutional structures of Western European democra-
cies, inter alia by subjecting them to constitutional courts (Müller, 2013, p. 247ff). 
Notwithstanding these motives, the (unelected) judiciary has gained enormous 
trust on the part of the general public, which – especially during this second stage 
– exceeded even the public trust in democratically elected bodies and/or individu-
al politicians (see e.g. for the case of the German Constitutional Court: Vorländer 
and Brodocz, 2006). Third, these two aspects, which aimed at the stabilization of 
democratic rule by means of judicial review, were supplemented by a function of 
judicial review that pointed to the quality of political decision-making: improving 
legislation in procedural terms by introducing a strict hierarchy of legal norms 
that should make law making more effective. This function, which was categori- 
cally new, went hand in hand with the pragmatic and technical approach to the 
constitutional underpinning of the state, which was also represented by Kelsen’s 
constitutional theory (Müller, 2013, p. 247ff; Rosanvallon, 2011, p. 138ff). It implied 
a new emphasis in the understanding of the constitutional court, which shifted 
away from the role of a watchdog over the constitutionality of laws in the context 
of the liberalism-democracy dichotomy and toward the role of a “negative legisla-
tor” in the context of the hierarchy of legal norms (Rosanvallon, 2011, p. 138ff). As 
such, the mid-20th century version of judicial review, in particular the constitu-
tional court, claims to complement and improve parliamentary legislation. It can 
be considered as the attempt to extend the repertoire of mechanisms for collec-
tively binding decision-making that occurs in the course of an overall expansion 
18  In a similar vein, Böckenförde stated a few decades later that the liberal secular state lives on 
premises which it cannot itself guarantee, and on this basis argued for the necessity of autono-
mous legal systems in democratic regimes (Böckenförde, 2013 [1967], p. 112f).
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of political responsibilities. By implication, this claim shifts the focus of judicial 
review away from political authorities and to the objects of political regulation 
– and thus to those societal spheres and issues for which the political system con-
siders itself responsible. In other words, judicial review ref lects no longer merely 
the self-referentiality of the political system, but involves a dose of external ref-
erence. The processing of external reference, however, strongly differs from the 
examples of functional autonomy discussed above: In the case of judicial review 
and constitutional courts, non-political expertise is not used to govern or regulate 
the system from which it comes, i.e. judicial review must not be considered a form 
of indirect self-regulation of the legal system. Instead, legal expertise is employed 
by the political system for the regulation of other (third) function systems. 
Politicization & competing expressions of the general will
Towards the end of the 20th century, a third stage of the emergence of judicial re-
view began. Although there was no clear turning point or major historical rupture 
such as the Second World War that separated the third stage from the preceding 
one, some significant changes in judicial review are evident. Probably the most 
obvious change was a wave of quantitative expansion: As a consequence of the 
breakdown of socialist regimes throughout Eastern Europe and parts of Asia and 
the beginning of profound political transformation in the post-socialist countries, 
the mere number of nation states with judicial review increased significantly 
since the late 1980s. Most notably, this new wave did not just capture the newly 
democratizing states – or those that pretended to democratize. Instead, judicial 
review changed from being considered a structural option that could or could not 
be adopted to being considered an imperative that was addressed even to authori-
tarian regimes, notwithstanding its fundamental incompatibility with autocratic 
regime structures. As a result, by around the turn of the millennium the over-
whelming majority of the nation states in the world had established some form of 
judicial review, at least on paper.19
In addition to this increase in number, judicial review experienced qualitative 
changes, primarily in the form of a stronger involvement in policy making. By the 
end of the 20th century, an increasing number of courts endowed with judicial re-
view were no longer merely engaged with principle decisions (Grundsatzentschei-
dungen) and procedural issues of policy making. Instead, many courts had become 
much more directly involved in genuinely political questions, i.e. in controversies 
that cannot be decided by politically unbiased reference to legal norms alone, but 
in which any decision necessarily entails political partiality and a commitment to 
certain ideological principles and values (Hirschl, 2008, p. 123). In practice, this 
19  Own research based primarily on https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_supreme_courts_by_
country (11.11.2019), Maddex (2007), and various websites of national constitutional courts.
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includes the whole range from seemingly small, state-level policy issues (e.g. the 
funding of public schools) to so-called nation-building questions “concerning the 
very definition, or raison d’être, of the polity as such” (like ethnic, linguistic, or 
religious issues) (Hirschl, 2004, p. 172; see also Tate and Vallinder, 1995b). Conse-
quently, supreme and constitutional courts worldwide transformed into “a cru-
cial part of their respective countries’ national policy-making apparatus” (Hirschl, 
2008, p. 123). An effect of the politicization of judicial review is the increasingly 
conf lictual character of the appointment processes of judges, which Devins and 
Baum (2019) observed especially for the U.S. Supreme Court: Until the 1990s, the 
mandatory approval of candidates by the Congress was largely unanimous, and 
even the rare cases of rejection were supported by both parties and caused little 
controversy. Since the early 2000s, in contrast, the hearings and confirmation of 
judicial candidates have become a highly contested issue that has provoked fierce 
conf lict between Republicans and Democrats. 
The relevant literature discusses several drivers of this trend toward the judi-
cialization of politics, most notably institutional political factors such as federal-
ism, constitutional characteristics, and the number of parliamentary chambers 
(for an overview and critical discussion see Hirschl, 2004, p. 31ff). Most interest-
ing from a differentiation theory perspective are those factors that can be sub-
sumed under the label “judicialization from below” (Hirschl, 2008, p. 130) and that 
directly point to political inclusion: First, the broad public awareness for and the 
firm societal standing of human rights at least since the 1970s have encouraged 
and mobilized movements to use constitutional rights litigation as a mechanism 
to advance political change (Eckel, 2009, p. 458ff; Moyn, 2010, p. 176ff). Second, 
courts have been increasingly considered an alternative mechanism to conven-
tional decision-making procedures in everyday politics and in the struggle be-
tween government and opposition. Especially oppositional actors both within and 
outside the parliament have (often successfully) tried to achieve their policy goals 
outside the majoritarian decision-making institutions via judicial review (Hirschl, 
2008, p. 130; Michelsen and Walter, 2013, p. 40ff). Overall, the effects of these 
changes on political inclusion – or more specifically, on participation – perfectly 
fit to Rosanvallon’s (2011, p. 138ff; also Rosanvallon, 2012) interpretation, who con-
siders (constitutional) courts and their activities an important mechanism of ex-
pressing the general will. As such, they complement and compete with legislative 
and executive authorities and in doing so eventually increase citizens’ inf luence 
on political decision-making. 
Interim conclusions
The examination of the emergence of judicial review from a differentiation theo-
ry perspective adds some important aspects to our understanding of functional 
autonomy: First, the formation of judicial review and of constitutional courts as 
5. Expansion through Self-Restriction: Functional Autonomy in Modern Democracies 199
its special organizational manifestation inverted the general pattern that was ev-
ident in case of independent regulatory agencies and central banks. In contrast to 
the latter, the emergence of judicial review did not begin with the politicization 
of a problem outside the political system, i.e. an issue which the political system 
detected in its environment, for which it assumed, for whatever reason, responsi-
bility, and to which it reacted with internal structural changes (such as the estab-
lishment of an organization). Instead, the emergence of judicial review was trig-
gered by an inherently political conf lict, namely irritations regarding the balance 
of power and the separation of political authorities. This internal struggle resulted 
in the strengthening of the supreme court and thus factually in the establishment 
of a powerful institution, which was primarily meant to use legal expertise and 
procedures to stabilize democracy itself.
Second, the reference to other function system, i.e. to the environment of the 
political system, occurred much later when judicial review (and constitution-
al courts) factually turned into authorities for the regulation of other societal 
spheres by the end of the 20th century. Importantly, this shift was not so much 
the result of formal planning. Rather, one key driving force behind the changing 
role of judicial review was its use and effects in political practice and the manner 
in which actors applied to the courts both from within the political system (e.g. in 
the case of legislative and executive authorities, oppositional parties, and the like) 
and from outside. Much in line with this evolutionary and audience-driven de-
velopment, this process did not occur as a consecutive replacement of individual 
structures and functions, but rather as a form of overlaying and interplay. 
Third, the emergence of judicial review entailed, from the beginning on, as 
a constitutive feature the clear-cut and radical self-restriction of majoritarian 
authorities. Moreover, the basic form of judicial review had appeared in more or 
less a single step and has remained largely unchanged since that time, i.e. it was 
not subject to significant variation. Instead, in case of judicial review and consti-
tutional courts, the variation or search process obviously set in after the initial 
emergence of judicial review and did not primarily concern its institutional core. 
In sum, the emergence of judicial review can be described as a search for how 
a given structure and firmly institutionalized legal expertise could be used in the 
political system with regard to collectively binding decision-making. In the course 
of this shift that legal review experienced, there was a transition from the self-ref-
erence of the political system to external reference and thus a transition from 
an institution that was expected to ref lect on and supervise collectively binding 
decision-making to an authority that is directly involved in collectively binding 
decision-making with regard to the regulation of other function systems and/or 
societal spheres. In other words, in the case of judicial review, it was not the in-
stitutionalized form as such and the self-restriction of majoritarian authorities 
that emerged gradually and hesitantly, but rather its orientation to the external 
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environment of the political system. This relates to and aligns with the expansion 
of the political system, but it does so differently than other functional autono-
mies: Judicial review is not a mechanism for the self-regulation of the system of 
law, but rather a new mechanism to regulate other, or third, function systems. 
Internally, it provides the political system with new structures to cope with com-
plexity, which is constantly increasing due to expanding political responsibilities. 
Externally, judicial review helps to pluralize the opportunities to participate – the 
opportunities to raise one’s voice – and to enhance the acceptance of political de-
cisions by those who are subject to political regulation. In this last respect, the 
process of the emergence of judicial review also illustrates how the gradual tran-
sition from self-reference to external reference goes hand in hand with the shift 
from passive consideration to active inclusion of citizens.
Concluding remarks
The present chapter shed light on the phenomenon of functional autonomy, which 
is an essential structural feature of democratic political rule in modern society 
through which the political system expands into its environment by deliberately 
restricting majoritarian institutions and the applicability of political standards 
and expertise. To enhance our understanding of functional autonomy, the chap-
ter offered a concise theoretical definition, which boils the phenomenon down 
to three key elements: First, functional autonomies are political in the sense that 
they are actively and effectively involved in processes of collectively binding deci-
sion-making. Second, in doing so, i.e. in making decisions on their specific issues, 
functional autonomies are strongly expected – and sometimes explicitly advised 
– to prioritize issue-related, non-political expertise. Third, functional autonomies 
are granted autonomy vis-à-vis majoritarian institutions and principles, i.e. they 
are able to consider various environmental dependencies, including the depen-
dency on core democratic institutions, at their own discretion in the course of 
operating.
Importantly, this theoretical and somehow abstract definition is not an end 
in itself. It rather allows us to identify a broad spectrum of – at first sight – di-
verse structural elements of modern democracies as different manifestations of 
functional autonomy and to relate them to each other. In this regard, the theo-
retical definition was applied to three of the most prominent and representative 
empirical manifestations and their formation processes: the ICC as an example of 
independent regulatory agencies, central banks, and judicial review. The exam-
ination of the emergence and structural configurations of these empirical cases 
from this specific theoretical perspective illustrated and substantiated the as-
sumption that functional autonomy is an important mode through which modern 
democratic regimes deal with the complexity of their functionally differentiated 
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environment. Thereby, all three cases show important similarities: the close in-
terrelation between the formation of functional autonomies and the emergence 
of new policy fields; the recognition in the political system that specific external 
expertise is needed to effectively handle the respective regulatory issues; and, fi-
nally, the radical incorporation of this external expertise into collectively bind-
ing decision-making that goes hand in hand with the (more or less controversial) 
self-restriction of majoritarian authorities.   
At the same time, however, the empirical examples reveal that and how the 
similar patterns are the result of rather different paths of emergence. Tracing 
these paths from the perspective of differentiation theory does not only high-
light the different schemes of emergence, but also underlines that each scheme 
entails a considerable degree of contingency, i.e. left much leeway for variations 
and junctions that might have become starting points for the development of al-
ternative structures. These variations were obvious in several respects: regarding 
the politicization of societal issues, the modes of processing external expertise 
within political communication, and the role that majoritarian institutions as de-
cision-making authorities themselves assumed. 
Against this background, the fact that a common and clearly identifiable struc-
tural pattern nonetheless appeared and stabilized can be taken as evidence that 
functional autonomies are the outcome of the deliberate self-restriction of major-
itarian institutions with regard to maintaining the ability of the political system 
to operate, i.e. to make collectively binding decisions with reference to its societal 
environment. In other words, self-restriction appears as a form of self-assertion. 
Its institution followed the distinct rationality of the political system, which must 
not be understood as the purposeful pursuit of optimal decision-making or most 
efficient regulation in the narrow sense of these concepts. Instead, it can be con-
sidered as the striving for self-reproduction in a complex, uncertain, and dynamic 
environment through the permanent and careful listening to this environment 
and the ongoing adaptation to environmental changes without abandoning the 
own (i.e. political) function under the condition of democracy. Vice versa, there 
is not much evidence for the interpretation of the modern democratic polity as a 
defenseless entity that is overpowered by its environment (or by certain environ-
mental segments) and unable to oppose this external attack. 
That said, it is important to emphasize that the present chapter did not aim to 
provide a definitive and all-embracing analysis of functional autonomy, but rather 
an attempt to narrow down a wide and complex topic in theoretical and empirical 
respect. After having done this, various follow-up questions arise, whereof two 
shall be mentioned in conclusion because they appear especially relevant with re-
gard to the overall focus of the book: First, notwithstanding the fact that function-
al autonomy is an important structural feature of democratic regimes enabling 
them to cope with their environments, it would further deepen our understand-
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ing of modern democracies to systematically explore the question which envi-
ronmental segments and which kind of external expertise most likely trigger the 
formation of functional autonomy as a mode of political regulation (e.g., instead 
of inducing further internal functional differentiation of the political system). 
Second, with regard to the dichotomy of democratic and authoritarian forms of 
political rule, further research could investigate which equivalent structures ap-
pear and stabilize in autocratic regimes that fulfil the function of dealing with 
complex and uncertain societal environments and facilitate political regulation 
under the condition of functional differentiation. This issue is all the more im-
portant because totalitarian regimes that are based on the more or less complete 
suppression of functional differentiation (like the Soviet regime, see Moser [2015; 
2016]) factually disappeared. Since the late 1990s and early 2000s, they have been 
replaced by a new form of autocracy which not only accepts, but even tries to use 
functional differentiation for its own purposes, what, in turn, makes the tension 
between autocratic rule and (functional) autonomy and the need for appropriate 
control mechanisms obvious.  
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6. The Bipolarity of Democracy and Authoritarianism 
 and Its Societal Origins
Rudolf Stichweh and Anna L. Ahlers
I. Individuality and Collectivity in Democratic    
 and Authoritarian Systems
In a functionally differentiated society the political system is responsible for the 
societal production of collectively binding decisions. There is no other function 
system in society that can do something similar. If someone tries to solve societal 
problems and wants to claim bindingness for the solutions finally found, the re-
spective actor will have to transfer the problem to the political system and work 
toward the making of binding decisions there.
In this functional description of the political system there is no preconception 
of either the form of government or the form of political regime implied. The idea 
of the polity as a system specialized on collectively binding decisions is compatible 
with autocracies, democracies, monarchies, aristocracies and other government 
and regime types as long as they reliably fulfill this function of the polity. But one 
must know the constitution of the collectivity that is supposed to be bound by the 
collective decisions. How does the collectivity come about? What does its internal 
social structure look like? Why and how does it accept the decisions that are pro-
duced? And what does ‘acceptance’ mean?
Societal modernity has one of its origins in a fundamental transformation 
of the collectivities on which political systems are based. A person is no longer 
a member of the respective political collectivity via inclusion in the estates and 
strata of pre-modern (European) society. It is no longer membership in social cat-
egories (nobility, peasantry, bourgeoisie, clergy) that guarantees inclusion in the 
political system. Instead membership is based on individuality, which means it is 
based on a paradoxical property: Individuality is something everyone shares with 
everyone else because all humans are individuals and no exceptions are imagin-
able;  however, individuality distinguishes each individual from every other indi-
vidual who realizes its individuality in a different way and who must be different 
as an individual in order to be an individual at all (Ghosh 2013; Simmel 1890; Sim-
mel 1917). This paradoxical structure of individuality seems to guarantee both the 
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unity and the internal diversity of a political system and it generates these two 
effects via the same institution: the individual as a core institution of modernity 
(Bourricaud 1977; Dumont 1991; Durkheim 1893; Durkheim 1898; Parsons 2007b). 
Interpretations of individuality arise in all the other function systems of mod-
ern society (education, science, economy, religion). These function systems are all 
based on the inclusion of individuals. At the same time, each of the function sys-
tems has a completely different perspective on individuals.
Political systems invent new terms or redefine old ones to describe themselves 
as an inclusive collectivity of individuals: The ‘people’ and the ‘nation’ are the most 
prominent of these terms. Both concepts refer to collectivities that may include a 
significant number of individuals, millions of individuals or even a billion of them 
(in the case of the Chinese or the Indian people or nation). What distinguishes 
the two semantics is that ‘people’ is more clearly dominated by its popular origin, 
meaning only the simple, unrefined people who have no claim to a relevant social 
status. In contrast, ‘nation’ for centuries was an elite term, referring to the culti-
vated social strata. While both terms are used to describe a unified political and 
social community, ‘people’ signifies a unification from below whereas ‘nation’ im-
plies a unification from above. The convergence of these movements from above 
and below reveals the strongly egalitarian character of the modern political com-
munity, although it can also be understood as indication of the tensions inherent 
in these processes of forming a unified political community.
Both terms – nation and people – are egalitarian in contemporary society and 
as egalitarian terms they formulate a semantics of inclusion. Everyone is part of 
the people and everyone is part of the nation. But both terms are not necessarily 
tied to democracy as a political regime. They can also be prominent and decisive 
terms in a monarchy or in an authoritarian system. It is possible that someone (an 
authoritarian populist) governs who says: This is my people, this is my nation. The 
prominence of these two terms is one of the many indicators that reveal the shared 
semantic basis of modern democracy and modern authoritarianism. Democratic 
and authoritarian regimes typically claim to be based on such an inclusively inter-
preted collectivity. In the case of democracies this takes the form of self-government by 
the people, in monarchical/authoritarian systems it takes the form of government for the 
people, for the welfare of the people, and in the best interest of the people, and in all these 
authoritarian variants we observe more indirect forms of the representation of the people 
and the nation. The study of these forms is the study of authoritarianism in modernity.
There is a bipolar structure inherent in all contemporary political systems: 
On the one hand the individualization of inclusion in the political system, on the 
other hand the different collectivities to which all included individuals belong. 
Democracies typically focus on the individual pole of this bipolar structure and 
must emphasize the individual exercise of participation in political processes, 
whereas autocracies typically accentuate the collectivities, which are the contexts 
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of the belongingness of the individuals, and they claim the exercise of authority 
in the name of the collectivity. In autocracies, there will be someone outside the 
collectivity who will be the bearer of authority over the collectivity (a hereditary 
monarch, an irreplaceable party, a charismatic personality with innate qualities, a 
cleric from a religious role structure, a military officer). In democracies, all lead-
ership roles are completely derived from the self-organization of the collectivity as 
a collection of individuals. In a democracy there is no individual in the collectivity 
who could not be thought of as being potentially able to take the most powerful 
political roles in a political system. In sum: Both types of regimes realize a uni-
versal inclusion of all members of society in some types of participation and in 
participation roles in the political system (‘public roles’); however, only in democ-
racies there is a complete inclusion of everyone in the possibilities of taking even 
the highest political roles in government (‘performance roles’). (Stichweh 2016)
It is instructive to look more closely at differences between ‘people’ and ‘na-
tion’ as the two major terms for the modern political collectivity based on inclu-
sion. From the point of view of a theory of inclusion, ‘people’ signifies an inclusion 
from below. People were originally the ordinary, simple people who had no claim 
at all for a privileged place in society. If in the current times ‘people’ becomes a 
universal term that includes everyone in ‘the people’, this means the inclusion of 
the higher strata in a collectivity to which for centuries they never would have 
wanted to belong. With ‘nation’ it is exactly the other way around. Its original us-
age primarily meant the higher strata of society, as in ‘Holy Roman Empire of the 
German Nation’, where clearly the ‘nation’ only referred to those who were part of 
the politically independent estates of the empire. In this case inclusion was from 
above. The concept of the nation expanded and ever more people from ever more 
social strata and stations became part of the nation, and finally the idea of the na-
tion became a kind of political program that sought to include ever more persons.
Another dimension of the distinction is related to scope. In many cases ‘nation’ 
is a universalizing and globalizing term. Inclusion in the nation is then the inclu-
sion of regions, provinces, and other smaller groups and units in an encompassing 
concept of the nation (Weber 1976). There are other cases, in which the usage of 
‘nation’ is particularizing. In these cases, it is claimed that a smaller part of a social 
whole is a nation of its own. Sometimes such a claim prepares a political secession. 
To speak of ‘the people’ or simply ‘people’ does not point to transregional or global 
circumstances but is much more closely tied to locality and local circumstances.
We mention a last aspect: exclusion. The two core concepts for the modern 
political collectivity (or ‘community’), ‘people’ and ‘nation’, are both clearly linked 
not only to ideas of inclusion (mainly the complete inclusion of all individuals) but 
also to ideas of exclusion. There is again an asymmetry. In the case of the seman-
tics of ‘people’ exclusion is comparatively rare. A person can become an ‘enemy’ of 
the people or may be a ‘stranger’ to the people. In the latter case he or she probably 
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belongs to another people. From the perspective of ‘nation’ exclusions are much 
more likely. In a political system (democratic or autocratic) it may be declared that 
someone lacks properties that are deemed to be constitutive of the nation (eth-
nic, religious, linguistic). And then these persons or groups may become excluded 
from the respective political system.
II. Functional Differentiation
One of the major commonalities of democracies and autocracies is that both types 
of regimes arise in and are an adaptation to a functionally differentiated world 
society. Political systems cannot escape functional differentiation. It is a world 
structure that requires a response and an adaptation. Different political regime 
types differ in their responses and adaptations and these differences generate the 
distinction of democracy and authoritarianism.
We claim, therefore, that the most important societal circumstance that de-
termines the careers, of both democratic and authoritarian regimes, is the func-
tional differentiation of society, which after 1750 finally takes over as the primary 
differentiation of world society. In contrast, in premodern stratified societies the 
‘polity’ or ‘the state’ was the instrument by which the most important stratum of 
society (the nobility or other elites in a structurally equivalent position) exercised 
its dominance over all the other societal groups. The preponderance of the state as 
a functional institution goes easily hand in hand with the stratification of society, 
as a hierarchy of groups into one of which everyone is born and that predetermine 
the entire life course of individuals.
In a functionally differentiated society, the state is no longer the apex of so-
ciety. The state is only the ‘political system’, i.e. the state becomes one function 
system among numerous other function systems. The conditions for inclusion in 
a political system are clearly different from the conditions of inclusion in a pre-
modern state. Starting with the inclusion of elites that was characteristic of pre-
modern states there has been a slow shift towards universal inclusion. The two 
premodern collectivities of ‘nation’ (elites) and ‘people’ (everyone, the ‘plebs’) have 
converged, creating a situation in which everyone is both a member of the nation 
and a part of the people. These two collectivities, nation and people, are now un-
derstood as political collectivities, i.e. collectivities that define one function sys-
tem in society, but do not constitute ‘society’ and are not a ‘societal community’ in 
the understanding proposed by Talcott Parsons (Parsons 2007a). It is difficult to 
identify a societal community in the Parsonian understanding of this term, and 
society and polity have become separate from one another in global modernity, 
and as a consequence the political system is only one function system among a 
significant number of other function systems (law, economy, religion, etc.) and 
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has its own collectivities that differ from the communities underlying the other 
function systems.
It is this enormous societal transformation that finally produces the bipolar-
ity of democracy and authoritarianism. Democracies are based on the complete 
breakdown of stratification as a form of political domination. They constitute an 
egalitarian, self-organizing democratic collectivity that includes everyone in so-
ciety on the same terms and concedes to everyone the same rights of participation, 
first via numerous forms of participation and second by the principal possibility 
of acceding to the highest political offices. This principal possibility is not limited 
by professionalism or educational demands. There is no ‘political profession’ in 
the same way as there is ‘the profession of medicine’ (Freidson 1988) and there is 
no characteristic and indispensable education for the political system aside from 
being active and taking roles and thereby building a career in the respective po-
litical system.
From the perspective of the self-organizing democratic collectivity, it is easily 
to be seen that there are similar egalitarian communities based on universal in-
clusion in all the other function systems. These communities have internal social 
structures that differ from the internal structures of the political collectivities. 
Often there is a split between professionals/performers and amateurs/clients. 
Nonetheless, however, all the function systems are based on universal inclusion. 
Of course, the professional/performer statuses are not ascribed statuses, but are, 
in principle, accessible to everyone. There are no constraints built into the struc-
ture of society which make it impossible that a student of sociology becomes a 
successful opera singer.1 In all of the function systems there are some passage-
ways that may allow the amateurs to perform together with professionals or even 
to compete with them (the cup tournaments in soccer are one of many examples 
and there are many other practices and institutions of permeability in all of the 
sports). If, from the perspective of the democratic collectivity of the political system, one 
observes the inclusion communities of the other function systems in society and their in-
ternal structures there is no reason the democratic collectivity should legitimately claim 
somehow to ‘govern’ the inclusion communities of the other function systems. From a 
democratic point of view it would be much more plausible to postulate that if the self-or-
ganization of the democratic collectivity is the core structure of the ‘radicalism’ of the 
democratic revolution (Wood 1998), then for the other function systems in society the idea 
of the self-organization of their constitutive communities should be a self-evident insight. 
1  One of the authors of this chapter was surprised by one of his students to whom af ter finishing his 
diploma thesis fif teen years ago he of fered a position in a DFG research project but who declined 
the of fer and said he was going to switch to professional singing and had already been accepted 
by a teacher in a ‘Musikhochschule’. This former student is today a well-known performer of 
operas and of the German tradition of ‘Lieder’.
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From this argument it follows that a built-in feature of modern democracy is an inherent 
acceptance of both functional dif ferentiation as the fundamental structure of society and 
a tendency towards the self-restriction of the decision space that a political collectivity 
claims as its own. Democracies do not tend toward an expansion of the political 
decision space. Rather, they should and do prefer self-limitations of the political 
domain induced by respect for the self-organization of the other function systems.
This argument highlights how authoritarian systems differ from democracies. 
Whereas democracies rest on the complete breakdown of the domination by as-
criptive elites, most autocracies have their basis in either the continuity or the new 
emergence of elites who claim a stable political authority and power on the basis 
of their elite status. As elites, they typically perceive themselves to be irreplace-
able. This irreplaceability may be postulated with respect to elite parties (fascist, 
communist, socialist, and other ideologies), a religious clerisy (any religion), the 
military, a traditional or newly emerging kinship group (Saudi-Arabia), a tribal or 
ethnic elite that distinguishes itself from other ethnic groups in the same country, 
or even an elite of socio-economic modernizers (although elite consistency and 
stability will be difficult in this case). The elites of authoritarian countries mostly 
accept, indeed must accept, an inclusive collectivity of all others (all those who are 
dominated by the elite). Thus, these countries often have elections, parties, par-
liaments and other institutional aspects characteristic of democracies. However, 
there are always sharply drawn boundaries that demarcate the space where the 
domination by the elite begins and limits the participation and potential inf lu-
ence of all others.
The political system of an autocracy is in some (often in many) respects a spe-
cialized function system of society, as is the case for democracies. The autocratic 
political system must accept its partiality resulting from functional specializa-
tion. But there are limits to this acceptance. The elites who control an autocracy 
have an ingrained distrust of the self-organizing autonomy of the communities 
of the other function systems. Therefore, one of the major differences between 
democracies and autocracies consists in the completely different relationships 
to functional differentiation. Democracies must accept the plurality of function 
systems because they perceive the autonomy of the other function systems as 
something similar to the way a democratic polity itself establishes and defends 
its autonomy. This could be described as a kind of solidarity among the function 
systems and their respective demands for autonomy. The elites of autocracies, in 
contrast, will observe elites in other function systems as competitors in the strug-
gle for power and domination. Therefore, autocratic elites often try to establish an 
extensive political control of other function systems.
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III. Values
A further way to distinguish between democracies and autocracies is by looking at 
values and value patterns. Values are socially institutionalized preferences. They 
are only preferences. They do not dictate social choices. But they point to certain 
directions. In an understanding proposed by Clyde Kluckhohn and Talcott Par-
sons, values are “conceptions of the desirable type of society” (Kluckhohn 1951; 
Parsons and White 2016). What are the constitutive values of contemporary world 
society and how do they allow observers to distinguish between democracies and 
authoritarian systems?
First, there is individuality, which may be called the constitutive value of 
modern society. It is important for functional differentiation because it allows 
to understand how the functional autonomy of global communication systems is 
based on the potential universal inclusion of every individual in the possibilities 
of participation in the respective system. Participations are nearly always indi-
vidualized: there are individual votes in elections, individual consumer choice 
and individual entrepreneurs that are responsible for innovation in the economy, 
individual conversion as the major goal of many religions, individual evaluation 
in educational institutions, individual responsibility in legal systems, individual 
publication in science (with the strange effect that there are sometimes hundreds 
of individual names on scientific papers), the individual attribution of works in 
the art system (even films have ‘auteurs’2), individual partner choice, and individ-
ualized dying in war and even genocide (with a tendency towards a reconstruction 
of the circumstances of death of every single individual, and individual burying 
and individual honoring of the dead). This is an impressive balance sheet of the 
relevance of individuality as the core value of world society, although individual-
ity is hedged by numerous countervalues in different world regions, for example 
the relevance of social conformity and responsibility, which seems to be an espe-
cially strong value in East Asia.
In addition to individuality, which obviously must be honored by democra-
cies and autocracies alike – although they differ in the way they institutionalize 
individuality – there are human rights that are often both values and norms (be-
cause they are enforceable, which is not true of values) and are constructed as a 
kind of protective core around individuality. Some might argue that the system of 
human rights defines democracy, that democracy is somehow the exercise of hu-
man rights. But that would not be a correct interpretation. Human rights define 
limitations that democracies must accept. They are adopted and codified in the 
constitutions that most democracies and autocracies create at some point in their 
histories, often as a foundational act. As such constitutional rights, human rights 
2  https://indiefilmhustle.com/auteur-theroy/.
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are constraints. They circumscribe the powers of political systems. At their core, 
they describe the interrelations of the political system with the other function sys-
tems in society by making clear what a polity should not do in infringing on the 
territory of other function systems (Luhmann 1965). This can easily be studied in 
the ‘Bill of Rights’, which was ratified as the first ten amendments to the U.S. Con-
stitution (in December 1791, four years after the Constitution). In the Constitution 
you first find a preamble to the ‘Bill of Rights’ (agreed in March 1789) that declares 
the document’s intention: “A number of the states … expressed a desire, in order 
to prevent … abuse of its powers, that further declaratory and restrictive claus-
es should be added.”(Constitution 2017, p.27) Two years after the preamble was 
written, the ten amendments were adopted; the first of them begins: “Congress 
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free 
exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press …” (op.cit. 29). 
Of course, the framers of the U.S. constitution had no concept of functional dif-
ferentiation. But the ‘Bill of Rights’ focuses on (among other things) the freedoms 
and autonomies in which a democratic polity should not intervene – and these 
are the freedoms at the basis of the other function systems emerging at that time 
(mass media, religion, art, science, higher education, and so on).
The institution of individuality and the supporting core of human rights de-
termine a certain number of values that a democratic polity should not interfere 
with. These could be called the values of functionally differentiated world society, 
and the corpus of these values has evolved in sync with the emergence of world 
society. These values constitute a very general value system that is a highly gen-
eralized complement to the increasing internal differentiation of world society 
into global communication systems, many of which are organized around one of 
the freedoms postulated in the various catalogues of human rights that have been 
written since 1789.
A democratic polity is bound by these values. But otherwise it is free in defin-
ing, debating and even creating societal values. Political processes and the deci-
sions that are their final outcomes are not only about societal problems the polity 
considers as part of its domain. Of course, this is what political systems do: Iden-
tifying, defining and trying to solve societal problems. But in discussing problems 
and developing problem solutions, the political debate is always about societal val-
ues, as well. Values change and evolve, together with societal practices, institu-
tions and norms. Many of these value changes in society never touch the decision 
space of the political system. If, in society, an informalization of behavior emerges 
as a very general societal trend, then the polity probably will be part of this trend 
and will be changed by it. However, the polity will never decree about it. It is dif-
ferent for other values. If values regarding family, marriage, sexuality, drug use, 
privacy of information, the use of artificial intelligence, and the manipulation of 
the genome of plants, animals, and humans – and many other values – change, 
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political decisions will at some point ratify or condemn these value changes. How-
ever, the polity will never do it directly in decreeing about values. It will always do 
it indirectly, by creating institutions and norms based on these respective values.
Autocracies seem to have a wholly different relationship to values. Whereas 
democracies are value-receiving and value-processing political systems and are thereby 
very active (although somewhat secondary) participants in societal value change, autoc-
racies are either value-free or value-controlled.
Value-free autocracies are those that consist of a governing group or stratum 
that is focused primarily on the private use and acquisition of resources that be-
come accessible on the basis of control over governmental institutions. This type 
of regime has often been called a “kleptocracy”. It consists of corrupt practices 
that are found in all political systems, even and sometimes extensively in democ-
racies. Identifying these practices is not easy because there is not always a sharp 
boundary between the privileges for elites in stratified systems – which are often 
seen as part of the symbols and rituals that legitimize power – and the illegal ac-
quisition of public resources for private uses. One possible interpretation is that in 
democracies kleptocratic practices are a kind of deviance, tied to individual actors 
who over the years of officeholding grow a feeling of being entitled to take and to 
claim gifts.3 Kleptocratic regimes do not consist of individual deviants or crimi-
nals but rather of gangs that establish systematic control over a territory (a city, a 
state) and that always compete with other gangs. The endemic succession prob-
lems characteristic of autocracies are in the case of kleptocracies usually managed 
by a transition of power from one ‘gang’ to a different ‘gang’. This interpretation 
allows us to specify the ‘value-free’ character of kleptocracies. Kleptocrats possess 
some values, but these values are mostly ‘gang’ or ‘mob’ values.4 
Most autocracies are probably not value-free but rather are value-controlled. 
This means that there is not only an elite group or stratum that establishes polit-
ical domination over the modern inclusive community of all members of a poli-
ty. These elite groups are mostly built around value systems that guarantee the 
status of the elites and at the same time are incessantly renewed and stabilized 
by the activities of the elites. Among such value systems are political ideologies 
(communism, fascism), religious belief systems, ethno-historic or ethno-religious 
narratives, technocratic ideologies of learning and effectiveness, and ideologies 
of order and control. There may be other candidates for autocratic value systems. 
3  One could produce a very long list of names on which Ryan Zinke and Benjamin Netanjahu might 
be some of the recent additions.
4  One of the fascinating aspects of the Trump government is that it shows many of the properties of 
a gang. And the language that comes to Trump naturally is the language of a Mob boss, interest-
ing McCabe 2019. This interpretive perspective helps to explain why Trump as a politician is only 
superficially connected to political values.
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Very often these value systems are based in cultural traditions which belong to 
one of the function systems of modern society. In this case, the autocratic polity 
establishes autocratic political domination for a function system other than the 
polity (e.g. religion, religious law, economy, science). Further, all these value sys-
tems are interpreted as consisting of non-contingent values. There is always a kind 
of fundamentalism implied (Stichweh 2010), there are always ideas about the pu-
rity of value systems that must not be endangered by dissenting opinions and the 
passing of time. This heterogenesis of values and the accompanying non-contin-
gency of values are two major reasons that most autocratic regimes do not accept 
functional differentiation.
Because functional differentiation is a world structure and because autocra-
cies cannot escape from world society, they must live with and to a certain ex-
tent affirm functional differentiation. However, there is always a tendency and 
a temptation to make use of the foundational value systems to control the opera-
tions of function systems other than the polity. One can study this phenomenon 
in looking at present-day People’s Republic of China. The country seems to affirm 
the principles of liberal world-trade and to accept other aspects of a non-politi-
cized world economy. But at the same time China tries to establish ever more strict 
mechanisms of ideological control of science (censorship of foreign publications; 
establishing journals in formal cooperation with Western publishers but manag-
ing these journals from China on the basis of the political acceptability of content; 
restricting theory building in the humanities and social sciences from an idiosyn-
cratic, regime based interpretive perspective, called ‘theory with Chinese char-
acteristics’). Interestingly, this is not a retreat from world science. Indeed, Chi-
na wants to establish its science system as a central part of world science, which 
means that its ideological projects, in the end, might aim for an ideological trans-
formation of world science in the service of autocratic ideologies. Again, a refusal 
to accept functional differentiation underlies this strategy. For a value-controlled 
authoritarian political regime such as China’s (the highest value of the regime is 
the supremacy of the Communist Party) there are two options for dealing with 
science. The country can opt out of science and close universities (which China 
did for a number of years during the Cultural Revolution) and opt out of other 
academic institutions. However, this option is more hypothetical than real as no 
country can opt out of doing and using science, in the current era. The other al-
ternative is to accept the major institutions of science and to buy into them, but 
to hope to change them over the years towards conformity with the value imper-
atives of the Communist Party regime. The idea of seeking to change the value 
imperatives of science will only arise in a country like China where a presuppo-
sition that it might become the center of world science in the near future is not 
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completely unrealistic, but it will probably not become the center of world science 
as long as it is an autocracy5.
IV. Decisions and Time
The most important elementary communications of which political systems con-
sist are (collectively binding) political decisions. When individual citizens vote 
for candidates or parties select the candidates they nominate for elections, when 
members of parliament or cabinet members vote after deliberating alternative 
courses of action, these communications and many other communications are 
decisions that – once they have been made and have been aggregated to a majority 
decision and minority vote – become binding for a certain collectivity that is part 
of the respective political system.
Decisions are never the final communications in a political system, and, of 
course, there are actually no final communications in an autopoietic system. 
From decisions, there always arise further questions and problems: First, are de-
cisions consistent and compatible with earlier decisions and with other interests 
one pursues? Second, is the decision one has made a well-informed decision or did 
the deciders overlook an important piece of information or knowledge? Third, how 
good are the reasons to believe that the collectivity that is meant to be bound by 
the decision is willing to accept the bindingness and what are the motives behind 
this acceptance and how stable are they? Of course, these questions of acceptance 
are especially urgent for those who did not agree to the decision and who nonethe-
less as members of the respective collectivity are thought to be bound by the col-
lective character of decision-making. Fourth, and perhaps most important, how 
long does bindingness last and how soon is it possible to change decisions? The 
consistency problem, the information problem, and the social acceptance problem 
related to binding decisions can probably best be addressed when political sys-
tems have the liberty to change decisions as soon as reasons for doing so become 
visible and have been communicated by participants. This question of the prin-
cipal reversibility of all decisions seems to be of strategic relevance especially in 
democratic systems. Participants can accept defeat in a political deliberation and 
subsequent vote if they know they will get a second chance at some point. These at-
titudes of acceptance are further supported by time limits and term limits. Partic-
ipants know there will be new elections at regular intervals and know that some of 
the powerful persons will have to leave office anyway after a certain time, which 
in a modern political system normally is specified in advance.
5  Cf. on this the recently established research group “China in the global system of science” at the 
MPIWG and “The Merton Project” as a part of this research group: https://www.mpiwg-berlin.
mpg.de/research/departments/lise-meitner-research-group.
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The relevance of the reversibility of decisions has been impressively made clear 
by the Brexit drama that has been playing out in the UK for years and has been in-
tensifying since the beginning of 2019. Even before the referendum of 2016, there 
was a fear that a decision by a narrow majority might suffer from insufficient le-
gitimacy, and there existed at that time a motion by Brexiters demanding a sec-
ond vote if the first vote was not supported by a majority of at least 60:40. Further, 
there were problems with (intentionally) false information being used as propa-
ganda in the referendum campaign.6 In 2019, three years later, the legitimacy of a 
second vote, either confirming or reversing the first vote, became ever more hotly 
debated. Some pleaded for irreversibility, interpreting it as the respect for a deci-
sion once made by the people, while others pointed to the Brexit process and the 
information that had been generated in it since 2016 and to the incessant change 
in the composition of the voter base (more than two million new young voters 
since 2016). In March/April 2019 the Brexit process went on by ever new votes in 
Parliament and in debates in the parties and in the form of petitions to the UK 
Government that tested decision alternatives: Recall the prime minister; revoke 
article 50 and remain in the EU; leave the EU without a deal; organize a second ref-
erendum – and so on. In July 2019 the UK got a new prime minister (Boris Johnson) 
whose instauration was not based on procedures one would call ‘inclusive’ and 
whose agenda was mostly focused on the postulated ‘irreversibility’ of the Brexit 
referendum of 2016. With the very simple position “Get Brexit done” Johnson fi-
nally won the parliamentary election in December 2019, and on this basis the UK 
has left the EU on January 31, 2020. Of course, the result could have been different, 
if the supporters of a second referendum had been better organized and had been 
able to communicate their pro-reversibility arguments in a more plausible way. A 
split in the Labour Party and a temporary hybris of the Liberals, who proposed to 
voters to annul the referendum result without a second vote, made this impossible. 
What is never in doubt, in principle, in all these processes is that a democracy 
is a political regime that makes decisions that are reversible. Members can change 
laws, replace the government, and reverse a popular vote, at least after some time 
and on the basis of new information. Therefore, the combination of decisions (1) 
being binding even for opponents and (2) being reversible after some time is one 
of the core institutions of democracy.
Authoritarian political systems do not differ with respect to the fundamental 
relevance of collectively binding political decisions. In this regard, it is difficult 
to observe differences. However, autocracies differ regarding the reversibility of 
decisions. Whereas in democracies there is nearly always a mechanism to replace 
6  This is considered a fundamental problem in other contexts: On April 10, 2019, the Swiss 
Federal Court cancelled a referendum result from 2016 because voters had received wrong and 
insuf ficient information at the time of the vote.
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the personnel in all performance roles (resignations, dismissals, motions of no 
confidence, impeachment), to renew parliaments (dissolving the parliament), and 
to change or cancel laws (constitutional law review, amendments), few of these 
mechanisms exist in autocracies. In an authoritarian system, reversing important 
decisions is usually seen as a significant crisis. Therefore, autocrats try to prevent 
such reversals, or they make every effort to frame them as a sort of sophisticated 
adjustment to altered, exogenous circumstances – without conceding that they 
came to see their earlier decision as inadequate or ineffective. One of the most 
critical questions in autocracies is succession. Most autocracies never succeed 
in establishing a relatively well-ordered mode of succession for the core perfor-
mance roles. Even China, a country which seemed to have managed this, because 
the party is so much more important than any person representing it, now seems 
to be retreating from ordered succession rules.
Regarding policy programs and legislation there is an interesting alternative 
to reversibility that can currently be observed in China (cf. Ahlers 2014). This alter-
native consists in adopting laws and political programs that are formulated in a 
highly generalized language. When these generalized programs and laws are im-
plemented in the many regions and provinces of China there emerge numerous lo-
cal and regional specifications, which can legitimately be interpreted as concreti-
zations or specifications. This legislative strategy can meaningfully be interpreted 
as experimental or evolutionary policy-making, and therefore as a policy process 
that demonstrates f lexibilities and possibilities of learning from multiple expe-
riences, which are not available in the policy processes of democratic countries.
V.	 Social	Control	by	Law
In political systems it is possible to reverse political decisions by deciding the same 
question a second time. Another possibility is to control political decisions by law. 
Control by law is a way of examining the consistency of decisions by comparing 
them to the corpus of other decisions that have been made at earlier times in the 
same or other relevant political systems. Currently, systems can often control de-
cisions not only by comparing them to national law, but also by comparing them to 
rules and statutes in international law and then appealing to international courts 
to right wrongs.
In democracies, this practice of controlling decisions and normative struc-
tures by law has expanded in the last few decades. The practice is no longer used 
only by political institutions and legal specialists and constitutional and other 
courts as a mechanism of control. Instead, the practice is increasingly used by in-
dividual citizens and NGOs who, as activists, fight for political changes, and who 
make use of law as one instrument among others to effect sociopolitical change. 
In many countries – the United States perhaps more than others – litigation has 
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become a strategy for trying to effect political change in fields (e.g. arms control) 
where legislative reform strategies have often failed.
The possibility of making use of the law as an instrument to control the le-
gal exercise of political power demands the establishment of a judiciary that is 
an autonomous institution in itself and is no longer a political institution. The in-
creasing autonomy of the judiciary was an important part of the democratic revo-
lution which began late in the eighteenth century (Wood 2009 Ch. 11). The genesis 
of an autonomous judiciary is compatible with the political selection of judges, but 
after having been selected these judges should be able to serve for life and there 
should be no possibility of recalling them (besides impeachment). This is a very 
sensitive point and it is easily observed that in most recent cases of authoritarian 
populists trying to restrict the legal control of the exercise of political power, the 
respective regimes have tampered with the selection and the terms of office of 
judges (cf. numerous examples in Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018).
Authoritarian regimes mostly differ in regard to the point made above. In 
the relevant respects (selection procedures, terms of office, appellate procedures), 
they do not have an autonomous judiciary. Instead the judiciary becomes a part 
of the power of the executive. The law and the judiciary are still an instrument 
of social control (cf. Hurst 2018). But they do not primarily control the legality of 
the use of power, they are an instrument for controlling citizens, distinguishing 
between law-abiding and non-law-abiding citizen members. This kind of con-
trol is clearly used everywhere and the question of citizens following the law is 
an important aspect of democratic orders, too. However, in autocratic regimes 
the control of citizens often becomes the primary function of law and establishes 
asymmetries between those actions routinely controlled by law and actions that 
are nearly uncontrollable, asymmetries that shape the autocratic character of au-
thoritarian orders.
VI. Variants of Democracy
1. What is Democracy and what are its Eigenvalues?
A democracy is an autonomous political sphere founded on its Eigenvalues and 
based on individual political inclusion more than on collective political inclusion. 
In addition to having Eigenvalues, a democracy tolerates and even adapts to ex-
tra-political or non-political values (e.g. economic values, religious values) locat-
ed in the other function systems of society. We discussed this topic earlier (part 
III of this chapter): A democracy is a cognitively open, value-receiving and val-
ue-processing system. It is a system observing society, with a tendency towards 
non-intervention in the diversity and conf licts in other function systems (e.g. re-
ligion, education), but otherwise formulating problems perceived as political and 
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political tasks and creating legal norms on the basis of changes in other function 
systems (e.g. intimate relations, families). 
But what are the democratic Eigenvalues? We know from the history of other 
function systems, such as art and science, self-referential and tautological value 
formulas such as ‘l’art pour l’art” (first use by Benjamin Constant in 1804, cf. Wil-
cox 1953) or “science for science’s sake” or “pure science” (Stichweh 2007). These 
tautological Eigenvalues have always been controversial because many observers 
interpreted them as celebrating self-sufficiency without societal relevance. How-
ever, these value statements often established and affirmed the functional auton-
omy of a societal sphere at the historical beginning of functional differentiation 
in the late 18th and early 19th century society. As far as we are aware, no similar 
tautological Eigenvalue (but cf. Sen 1999 on democracy as value principle) has been 
in use in the history of democratic political systems. Since the beginning of mo-
dernity, being actively involved in politics has not typically been understood as 
an inherent value in itself (the situation was different in the aristocratic systems 
of premodern Europe, Pocock 1975). This understanding likely exists because the 
tautological self-affirmations of emerging function systems mostly formulate 
elite values. But a democratic polity is not an elite system. The democratic poli-
ty is completely derived from the self-organization and self-determination of the 
democratic political collectivity, which is based on the universal inclusion of all 
the members of the people/nation. These terms are probably the central political 
Eigenvalues and it is this claim of social universality that dominates politics in-
stead of the self-absorbed immersion into political life as a total way of life. Total 
immersion into political life is a pre-modern social value and is not compatible 
with the diversity of engagements in a functionally differentiated society.
There is a certain tension between this diversity of engagements under con-
ditions of functional differentiation and universal inclusion in a democratic pol-
ity. For the polity, universal inclusion must be ‘real’. It is not sufficient for this 
inclusion to be a hypothetical or distant possibility that is rarely realized. Nor can 
inclusion be an obligation. People, on the other hand, must be free to trust a de-
mocracy and to do so without casting their vote in an election. Democratic order 
is a liberal order that is not supposed to discriminate against those who have other 
priorities at this moment.
2. Practicing Democracy
Members are not obliged to participate in the institutions and processes of a de-
mocracy but can opt in and decide to participate at any time. This is what is meant 
by ‘practicing democracy’ – that besides the Eigenvalues and permanent insti-
tutions and processes, there is always the possibility of switching from passive 
citizenship to active involvement (cf. Anderson 2000). In some respects, there is 
Rudolf Stichweh and Anna L. Ahlers224
no ‘cumulative advantage’ for those who have been participants for a long time 
(on ‘cumulative advantage’ see DiPrete and Eirich 2006). In practical respects, 
advantages based on experience and the number of ‘social ties’ an individual has 
collected undoubtedly exist. However, these advantages are not supported by 
norms, and the history of populist newcomers demonstrates how fast individuals 
can enter a democratic system and gain inf luence under certain circumstances. 
In addition to these social and temporal aspects that demand that anyone can 
enter and intervene in a political system at any time, there is the substantial or 
material aspect implying that any subject or matter or social problem can become 
the object of democratic practice. This condition concurs with the argument that 
there are no societal problems that are inherently political, but rather there is a 
situational-historical logic which incessantly transfers social problems to the po-
litical system and parallel to these expansions depoliticizes other themata that are 
left to other organizations and function systems in contemporary society. There 
is, finally, a learning aspect to the practice of democracy. Individuals learn what 
democracy is by doing democracy. They must be creative, not only with regard 
to policies and suggested solutions, but also with regard to working and arguing 
for points of view for which they want to mobilize inf luence. Democracy is an 
experimental undertaking, and it is experimental with respect to initiating new 
political processes as much as with respect to substantial matters that are dealt 
with in processes.
3. Contingency and Democracy
One of the most unequivocal identifiers of democracy is contingency. In a de-
mocracy (nearly) everything can be changed. All decisions on structures are con-
tingent, including even the very basic structures of a democracy (e.g. the change 
from a parliamentary to a presidential regime). In addition, one can change norms 
and values and it is possible to replace persons in elite positions. Only the Eigen-
values (self-organization, self-determination, universal inclusion) must remain 
the same. This radical contingency of democracy is the reason democracies are 
always at risk. In both historical as well as contemporary situations, it is normal 
for democracies to coexist with perhaps 20-30% of the electorate being aligned 
with movements and parties which are radically anti-democratic (very interesting 
Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018). Further, in a democracy one must always be coopera-
tive, has to accept compromises, and work with parties one does not like, and at 
the same time one has to know intuitively where to draw the demarcation line by 
saying: “We will never compromise and cooperate with the political party XYZ be-
cause XYZ is a party that endangers democracy itself.” There is no absolute certi-
tude about these decisions, only the knowledge acquired by having been a practi-
tioner of democracy for a long time and having learned by this participation where 
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to draw the demarcation line, where to be unwavering even though one must so 
often be willing to compromise.7
4. The Space of Social Systems — the Space of the Polity
To explore the varieties of democratic and authoritarian political regimes in the 
early 21st century world, we will use an analytical tool from the AGIL paradigm of 
Talcott Parsons (Parsons 1967; Parsons 1977; Parsons 1978; Parsons and Platt 1974). 
We do not intend or need to make strong claims for the universality of AGIL as the 
underlying logic of all social systems. Rather, we introduce this analytical tool as 
a heuristic instrument to help us structure and understand the varieties of and 
alternatives in contemporary democratic and authoritarian regimes.
For any political system and the institutions and processes that constitute it, there 
are at least four functional demands that invariably must be met. First, the sys-
tem must adapt to environmental demands (A-function). This is, as has always 
been pointed out by Talcott Parsons, about an active mastery of the environment 
that presupposes a problem-defining capacity in the respective political system. 
‘Environment’ is a generalized concept that includes societal environments of the 
polity, such as the economy, as well as non-social natural environments. When a 
political system is defined by ‘responsiveness’, this concept primarily refers to a 
focus on the A-function.
7  A good illustration of such a decision occurred on April 25, 2019, when, in announcing his candi-
dacy for the U.S. presidency, Joe Biden, explained his motivation by pointing to the day in 2017 
(August 27) when Donald Trump defended a demonstration of white supremacists in Charlot-
tesville, Virginia. 
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The second function, for which Parsons coined the term ‘goal-attainment’ (G), 
is somewhat in the center of what is understood as ‘politics’. There are plural in-
terests and plural interest articulations, and as a G-system a polity selects among 
these plural possibilities articulated by participants and moves from deliberating 
about alternative possibilities to making collective decisions. The classical po-
litical concept of ‘representation’ is closely related to this understanding of the 
G-function.
In a third respect, in every country there is a plurality of linguistic, ethnic, re-
ligious, regional or status (e.g. castes in the Indian case) communities. The co-
ordination and integration of these diverse and often conf licting communities 
cohabitating in the same country can, in one respect, be seen as a core task of the 
political system. Parsons called this function ‘integration’ (I), and this is a third 
potential focus of the institution building and processes in a political system.
Fourth, there is the question of values and culture functioning as highly gen-
eralized patterns that instruct and shape the genesis of more concrete norms and 
institutions. These values and cultural semantics likely have a different life cycle 
than the more f luid elements of social structure. They may even continue and sur-
vive when one might have the general impression that they are no longer visible 
in the daily occurrences of a political system. This persistence is the reason why 
Parsons spoke of latency and latent patterns (L). For the polity (as for other function 
systems), values and culture normally function as a background that may not be 
easily identifiable in everyday events.8 However, there are obviously other cases 
of political systems in which the maintenance of these latent patterns is somehow 
the focus of political actions and institution building. As long as this is the case 
we can speak of the primacy of the L-function in the respective political system.
Our interpretation of this four-function paradigm follows Parsons in postu-
lating that all of these functions are relevant at any time in any political system. 
The substantial respects formulated by the four functions are so fundamental that 
they will never completely lose relevance in any political system. However, there 
are changing primacies among these four functions and these shifting primacies 
are a good instrument for studying the differentiation of types of democratic re-
gimes and the differentiation of types of autocratic regimes.
8  The concept of ‘truth’ in science, rarely mentioned in everyday communications today, is a good 
example of a latent pattern and value.
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5. Variants of Democratic Regimes
When one applies the Parsonian paradigm presented above to democratic regimes 
in the contemporary world, a pattern of four variants emerges that, at a first ap-
proximation, seems sufficiently heterogeneous with some clear-cut boundaries 
becoming visible.
Policies are a very prominent feature of the contemporary political world, and the 
preference for policies over ideologies often extends across the boundary that 
separates democratic from authoritarian regimes. Policies are adaptive. They at-
tempt to solve a problem that politicians perceive as being related to environmen-
tal demands and necessities. One can work on policies one after another without 
needing an encompassing vision. Policies and the diagnoses on which they are 
based can be particulate. Policies need experts and policy-intense regimes are 
typically steeped in expert cultures. On the democratic side, the Scandinavian 
polities can be understood as being near to this adaptive quadrant of the space of 
political variants (Sejersted 2011).
An alternative understanding of the primary task of a political system is that it 
is a kind of decision machine. There is an immense diversity of interests in a mod-
ern political system in which every individual and group is free to articulate its in-
terests. Then the major task of the political institutions is to function as a selector 
by identifying the options and then making decisions and finally sequences of de-
cisions that command the broadest support and satisfy a majority of inclusion ad-
dresses in the respective political system. In a political system that operates in this 
way, a key question will always be: How are the interests of the minorities taken 
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care of? In a sufficiently diverse society, the answer should normally be that one 
is part of a minority only for certain questions and that in respect to other policy 
questions one will belong to a majority whose demands are satisfied. Another pos-
sibility is that the interests of minorities are somehow protected. However, there 
are limits to doing this. A decision will always privilege some participants and 
groups, even if aspects of compromise are built into it. There is no solution that is 
equally satisfying to all sides. The fatal Brexit decision has been made in looking at 
the form of participation of the UK in the EU as a majority/minority-decision (and 
not as the choice of ever new policies). Under such premises there will always be 
winners and losers – these are the inherent costs of a democratic political system 
that opts for the primacy of the G-function.
The third democratic option is multicultural democracy (primacy of the I-func-
tion). If one prefers the I-function, one will understand the political collectivity 
(nation, people) as consisting of a plurality of sub-communities (religious, ethnic, 
etc.) and one will create institutions that integrate the separate communities with 
one another. This integration does not dissolve differences and boundaries – and 
does not want to do so – but rather seeks integrative ideas and structures. Inte-
gration normally means that one accepts a certain reduction in the space of the 
behavioral alternatives one claims in order to make one’s own alternatives com-
patible with the behavioral spaces of the other communities/participants (Luh-
mann 1987). An I-democracy does not necessarily produce ‘losers’ in the way the 
primacy of the G-function does. However, one of its disadvantages is, that – to a 
certain extent – it confines or even locks up participants in communities that they 
would probably prefer not to be exclusively connected to. Therefore, this option is 
not entirely in step with the individualistic culture of modern democracy. Instead, 
there is a certain collectivism inherent to this option, and with collectivism comes 
an affinity to authoritarianism. Therefore, as is true in different ways for each of 
the four alternatives, there is a probability of transitioning from a multicultural 
democracy to an autocracy located in the same quadrant (in this case, the I-quad-
rant).
The last type we propose is an L-democracy. The constitutive values or Eigen-
values of a democracy are of paramount importance for this type. There are sev-
eral variants of an L-democracy. One is ‘direct democracy’ which prioritizes the 
individual right of participation in every decision and the ‘self-organization of the 
democratic collectivity’ and thus binds nearly every decision of some significance 
to the possibility of a popular vote. The political system of Switzerland is the para-
digmatic example in our days. A certain anti-legalism may arise in a direct democ-
racy that seeks to base every decision on the will of the people (often document-
ed via a popular vote). The popular vote is allowed and considered valid even if it 
overrides human rights or the law of nations. There are Swiss examples for this 
(e.g. the popular vote on minarets which conf licts with the freedom of religion). 
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In addition, direct democracy may further right-wing or left-wing populism and 
the authoritarian tendencies inherent in populism. The rise of the SVP (a right-
wing populist party that approaches a 30% share of votes in national elections) in 
Switzerland is a good example of this effect.
The other variant of an L-democracy is based in the legal or constitutional 
interpretation of the constitutive principles/Eigenvalues of a democracy. In this 
case the foundational principle that is taken to the extreme is not the direct will of 
the people but rather the legal thinking behind the constitutive principles. Coun-
tries that have very strong constitutional courts, such as the United States and 
Germany, can potentially tend toward this direction. In the United States there 
have been remarkably intense fights for the chance to nominate Supreme Court 
judges for the past 200 years. This began in 1801 when, after the election of Thom-
as Jefferson as the first ‘Republican’ president of the United States, the Federalist 
majority in Congress reduced the number of Supreme Court judges from six to 
five to deny the incoming President the chance to nominate a judge of his choice 
(Wood 2009).9 A similar episode occurred in 2016 when the Republican majority 
in Congress refused to begin the process of examining Merrick Garland, who was 
nominated for a free Supreme Court position by Barack Obama at a time when 
Obama had only ten more months in office (Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018). In some re-
spects, a Supreme Court judge who is called for life has a stronger power position 
than the president, who serves a maximum of eight years, although this argument 
can only be true when there is a strong claim for the foundational relevance of the 
interpretation of the US constitution. However, exactly this claim is shared by a 
number of observers who sometimes define the presidency as the right to select 
Supreme Court judges. Behind this argument is a kind of value fundamentalism. 
Such a fundamentalism, however, is real in terms of a definition of a situation.
VII. Populism, Personalism, and the Transition to Authoritarianism
In all democratic regimes – we have made this abundantly clear – there is the 
implied risk of a transition to an authoritarian variant. There is an authoritari-
anism of effectiveness that has no respect for those who are not knowledge elites; 
there is an authoritarianism of political majorities who no longer want to compro-
mise with the divergent preferences of minorities; there is an authoritarianism of 
dominant groups who no longer seek balances in a multicultural situation; and 
there is an authoritarianism of democratic value principles that are interpreted in 
9  The other Federalist strategy was to claim the Common Law as the valid federal law of the United 
States although US Congress had never legislated on it. If this Federalist claim had been ruled 
valid, the status of law would have been independent from political institutions, and it is not by 
accident that the Jef ferson Republicans called the Federalists ‘Monocrats’ and ‘Autocrats’.
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a fundamentalist manner. One democratic principle that is often interpreted in a 
fundamentalist manner is the concept of the ‘people’.
One political ideology that introduces a fundamentalist interpretation of the 
concept of the people is ‘populism’. If the distinction between ‘the individual’ and 
‘the people’ is a core distinction of modern political systems, populism is clearly 
based on a preference for the people and for a specific concept of the ‘people’. The 
‘people’ of the populist is not a population of individuals with different and di-
vergent interests and opinions. It is not the richness of the diversity of opinions 
that inspires the populist to find a convincing synthesis that balances this multi-
plicity. Instead, populists understand the people as having spoken with one voice 
and perceive it as a homogeneous people with no significant internal diversity. In 
addition to the people, there are elites who, at some point, will be left behind. They 
are, in a polemical formulation to be heard in German politics, “die Altparteien” 
(“the old parties”). The elites are not part of the people. Indeed, populists often see 
the elites as traitors who operate against the interests of the people.
The strong belief in a kind of primary unity and truthfulness of the people that 
does not need education or information but has a spontaneous and adequate con-
sciousness of what it wants and needs is well articulated in a passage from Simon 
Bolivar that Hugo Chavez cited frequently, among other occasions in his inaugu-
ral address from 2007:
“All individuals are subject to error and seduction, but not the people, which pos-
sesses to an eminent degree the consciousness of its own good and the measure of 
its independence. Because of this its judgment is pure, its will is strong, and none 
can corrupt or ever threaten it.” (Hawkins 2010, 60)
In addition to the people, which populism understands in an essentialist manner, 
there is a necessary complement: the populist party or populist leader who articu-
lates the will of the people. There is a certain logic to the populist leader not being 
a party with diverse interests and tendencies but rather being a single person who 
represents the presumed unity of the people in the unity of his/her consciousness. 
The leader may nonetheless be a leader of a party. However, in most cases, the 
leader is not chosen in a pluralist competition within the respective party but is 
the only person considered as a possible leader of the party. The leader is often 
a newcomer with no anterior political career or a convert from a different party 
whose claims for the status of the leader are based in a conversion experience. The 
absence of political experience and a political career does not count against the 
leader. In fact, it is often considered an asset. The newness of the leader guaran-
tees that he/she is not weighed down by the failures of the old parties. The leader is 
often a member of the societal elites but likely the elites of other function systems 
(e.g. economy, education, religion) rather than politics.
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For the reasons just mentioned, populism is often coupled with personalism. 
The best populist leader is a charismatic personality whose extraordinary quali-
ties consist of experiencing and representing the unitary will of the people. The 
role-interpretations for the leader vacillate between sacrificing him-/herself for 
the people and at the same time being a political actor of extraordinary effective-
ness and capability. Both qualities can be combined in the same person.
What is the structure of the social space between the populist leader and the 
people? Perhaps the best term to describe this structure is ‘disintermediation’ 
(on the concept of disintermediation, see Berghel 2000). This means that there 
are almost no ‘media’ or ‘mediators’ between the people and the populist lead-
er: Populists are not in favor of parliaments, they are against experts, they fight 
against traditional media and the news communicated by the media, they prefer 
unitary interests to ‘interest groups’, they favor referenda over other forms of de-
cision-making, and usually do not like administrations and autonomous expert 
organizations. However, they often have a strong affinity for digital media be-
cause the format allows direct, unmediated contact between the populist leader(s) 
and the people. Donald J. Trump is the best illustration of this modern type of 
populism – he has a direct, disintermediated relationship to his 76.3 million fol-
lowers on Twitter (on April 10, 2020). His style of government and campaigning is 
to a significant degree government and campaigning by Twitter (Shear et al. 2019).
The hypothesis of disintermediation makes a clear path from populism to au-
thoritarianism visible. Populist regimes and their followers have strong motives 
to weaken and sometimes abolish intermediary institutions. These motives are 
easily observed in the Trump administration. In this case, there has been a hol-
lowing out of administrations, a weakening of expert organizations such as the 
EPA or the FBI, a denigration of science, a disrespect for diplomatic competen-
cies, a contestation of the legitimacy of democratic elections, and a massive fight 
against critical news media.
These events and transformations that occur within individual democracies 
are small steps. The transition from democracy to populism to authoritarianism 
is, in most cases, a slow process in which the first events and impressions of ob-
servers may point in directions that are not pursued in the end. In a long-term 
perspective, the reversal of these developments may be the most probable out-
come. The United States are – one may hope – a good candidate for this optimis-
tic hypothesis. The personalism of most populist regimes makes it probable that 
the succession problem for the populist leader will result in the disestablishment 
of the populist regime. There is a very big difference between the transformative 
steps that lead to a populist regime and the demands that have to be met for the 
long-time stability of an authoritarian regime. We explore this gap in the next 
step of our argument.
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VIII. Variants of Authoritarianism
1. What is Authoritarianism?
Authoritarianism mostly means the prevalence of institutions and values that 
are non-negotiable. Such institutions and values exist in democracies, too. But 
in democracies they are primarily procedural – which means they are open in 
the results they produce – whereas in autocracies, system-defining institutions 
and values close spaces of possibility. Democracy could be defined as the daily 
exploratory practice of its institutions and values; in contrast, authoritarianism is 
about the affirmation and stabilization of its underlying principles tied to insti-
tutions and values. This does not exclude the possibility that an autocracy can be 
much more f lexible in continuing current policies and introducing new policies 
than many democracies are able to do. The reason for this is that autocracies may 
succeed in decoupling their institutions and values from their policies whereas 
democracies must find and establish policies under the premises defined by their 
institutions and values.
We have discussed five major points important for the comparison of author-
itarian systems and democracies: In autocracies, inclusion is (1) realized much 
more than in democracies via collectivities and the position of individuals par-
tially given to them by their collectivities. The political community of an autocratic 
system (including all the collectivities and individuals) has a tendency (2) either 
to claim the subordination of the constitutive communities of other function 
systems or alternatively to act in service of another function system that is con-
sidered even more important than the polity. Authoritarianism has an inherent 
tendency to postulate asymmetrical, hierarchical relationships between function 
systems. There are (3) often values in authoritarian systems that are non-contin-
gent and non-negotiable and they very much define the respective system. In a 
democracy, this position of central values is mostly claimed by the procedural val-
ues of democracy and by human rights that are the rights of inclusion in function 
systems and the rights of compatibility between and non-intervention in the dif-
ferent function systems. In an authoritarian system, (4) the decisions made have 
a tendency to be irreversible (otherwise the reputation of the decider might be 
weakened), whereas in a democracy the possibility of reversibility is always im-
plied and is a proof of an incessant search process. The possibility of reversibility 
extends to decisions about the selection of persons for performance roles. Anyone 
can be revoked in a democracy. In authoritarian systems, (5) the law is seen as a 
tool polities use to control individuals and collectivities. In contrast, democracies 
accept the autonomy of law (as well as the autonomy of other function systems) 
and thus law is perceived as a welcome mechanism for controlling the exercise 
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of power. Law is not primarily an instrument of power, but rather a limitation of 
power.
2. Variants of Authoritarian Regimes
The general picture of an authoritarian system that we have painted thus far be-
comes much more differentiated and probably more interesting when we intro-
duce the Parsonian AGIL-paradigm into the analysis of authoritarianism, too. The 
analysis of authoritarian regimes is based on the same four functional alterna-
tives we have used to analyze democracy. This decision seems plausible. In both 
cases, we must consider the same global function system, which we call ‘World 
Polity’ (cf. Meyer 2010). The world polity is differentiated into national states that 
are characterized by either democratic or authoritarian regimes. Functional dif-
ferentiation is the macrostructure for both democratic and authoritarian polities. 
The functional characterization of the two types of regimes – the polity as a sys-
tem that specializes on making collectively binding decisions and uses power as 
its symbolically generalized medium of communication – does not differ between 
the two regime types. Therefore, it is not at all surprising that the two types move 
in similar spaces with regard to the organization of differences.
Many of the authoritarian regimes we observe are based on the prevalence of val-
ues. This is a general difference between authoritarian and democratic regimes 
that authoritarian systems, which – besides some of them being value-free sys-
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tems – mostly are value-controlled systems, can more consistently be character-
ized by the differences in the values that are of foundational relevance for them.
There are first A-autocracies, i.e. adaptive authoritarian systems that build 
their foundation on knowledge systems that they believe are decisive for their 
adaptive capacity. The belief that they possess a superior learning capacity or 
adaptive capacity is, to a significant degree, defining for these authoritarian sys-
tems and instills in them a feeling of superiority relative to democratic systems 
– China and Singapore are good examples of these aggressively self-confident au-
thoritarianisms – whereas democratic polities are forced to give the same relative 
weight to all democratic systems, independent of the kind of knowledge available 
in them. The knowledge systems favored by adaptive autocracies are diverse but 
there is a certain preference for forms of scholarship/learning and science, es-
pecially for the knowledge systems of engineers and economists. This adaptive 
quadrant of the political space is almost never claimed by sociopolitical ideologies. 
On the other hand, the preference for knowledge systems and knowledge elites 
has a more ideological bent in authoritarian systems than it will likely ever have 
in democracies. Democracies focus – as we argued above – on policies and on the 
multiplicity of policies and have a more pragmatic attitude toward the knowledge 
needed to invent and realize the respective policies.
Whereas a G-democracy is a system that does not primarily seek well-found-
ed policies but always attempts to find majorities and minorities and then makes 
decisions that are supported by a majority, G-authoritarianism is a system built 
around strong positions and roles, and the competence to make collectively bind-
ing decisions is entrusted to those in these positions and roles. There are no shift-
ing majorities that change from policy question to policy question and from one 
election to the next, but there are strongly established positions for deciders who 
possess the right to make collectively binding decisions as their exclusive privi-
lege. The ultimate decider may be an absolute monarch or quasi-monarch (Sau-
di-Arabia, North Korea), a populist leader basing his/her decisions on the pre-
sumptive will of the people (Venezuela, Philippines, Turkey), the head of a party in 
a monopolistic situation (China, Cuba, Vietnam), a military leader who grabs or 
receives the power from civil institutions (Egypt, in earlier decades Latin America 
and Turkey), a person in a core performance role of another function system, a 
function system that is seen as so important that the final decision competence in 
the polity is given to a representative from this other function system (Iran).
A G-authoritarianism can clearly be coupled to an A-authoritarianism (China). 
An important implication of the Parsonian paradigm is that the orientations of 
the regimes/systems in the four-function space are only primacies. That is, the 
characterizations of political systems in this paper are about primacies. Any po-
litical system necessarily involves all four functions. However, there are historical 
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tendencies in political systems that in most cases allow them to gravitate toward 
one (or sometimes two) of the functional orientations.
The I-function creates the structural possibility of a third type of authoritari-
anism. We noted earlier that an I-democracy is a system that integrates a plurality 
of communities in a single multicultural democratic polity. Even in democracies 
this implies a certain tendency to move toward collectivism (and the weakening of 
individualism) and therefore a slight affinity to authoritarianism. This tendency 
is strengthened significantly as soon as the interrelationships between the (eth-
nic, religious, regional, linguistic) communities shift toward a hierarchical and 
discriminating interpretation in which one or several of these communities are 
perceived as nearer to core values of the polity than the other communities. This 
type of hierarchical interpretation leads to significant political inequalities among 
communities that are not compatible with universal and equal inclusion in public 
roles and performance roles and, in turn, foster a strong movement toward an 
authoritarian regime. In our days, this scenario raises a very important question: 
What consequences will result from the tendency of well-established democracies 
such as India and Israel to reinterpret their respective political communities in an 
ethno-religious understanding?
The last type of regime to consider is an L-authoritarianism. Whereas a L-de-
mocracy seems not to be very probable because the ultimate dominance of a value 
complex or ideology has limited compatibility with the pragmatic and experimen-
tal spirit that can be considered characteristic of the democratic tradition, the sit-
uation is different on the authoritarian side. There are religions and ideologies 
that serve as teleological interpretations of the world. If these thought systems are 
understood as ultimate value statements and become inf luential and even dom-
inant in societal and political communication, and institutions are built around 
these thought systems, an autocracy controlled by ultimate value statements may 
emerge.
Of course, the development of such ideologically controlled autocracies (id-
eocracies, see Backes and Kailitz 2015) may follow very different trajectories. In 
some cases the dynamics has ideological origins, while in other cases authoritari-
an systems are built on other foundations (for example, a communist party and a 
family dynasty as is the case in North Korea), and the ideology (Juche in the North 
Korean case, Fifield 2019) is then appended as a strategic instrument of the stabi-
lization of the regime.
IX. The Future of Democracy and Authoritarianism in World Society
In the current world situation, the distribution of autocracies and democracies is 
nearly balanced. The number of states that can be seen as democracies is approx-
imately the same as the number of states that can be called autocratic, and the 
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share of the world population governed by each regime type is around 50%. Look-
ing at the two most populous countries in the world, one is a stable autocracy (Chi-
na), and the other has been seen for a long time as a successful democracy (India). 
However, the Indian democracy seems to be endangered by Hindu nationalism, 
which could push this I-democracy toward becoming an I-autocracy.
The present-day distribution of democracies and autocracies does not reveal 
any trends or tendencies. There is no longer a democratic wave to be identified, 
there are no more Springs or Color Revolutions. However, there is an ascendancy 
that is not obvious in the distribution of democracies and autocracies: the ascen-
dancy of right-wing nationalist populisms. Not all of these are anti-democratic, not 
all will succeed and become stable autocracies. Nonetheless, as long as this is the 
significant trend in the present-day world polity, one prognosis seems plausible. 
Some of these right-wing populisms will succeed and some of those that succeed 
will undergo a transition to authoritarianism. Therefore, at this moment it is 
somehow plausible to predict a shift toward more autocracies.
What is driving this trend? A review of the current collection of urgent and 
unsolved world problems offers an idea as to why authoritarianism seems ascen-
dant. There are three world problems that might be considered the most urgent 
world problems of the current era: Climate change, inequality, and migration. All 
three potentially increase the tendency of countries to move toward right-wing 
nationalism. Climate change policies are costly and demand sacrifices, including 
calls for a regulation of individual consumption and mobility preferences. They 
are world policies and only have a chance of succeeding if all countries consistently 
handle them as such. However, they clearly provoke nationalistic backlashes that 
propose to discontinue national participation in global climate policies and seek 
national advantages. The governments of Trump (in the United States) and Bol-
sonaro (in Brazil) are obvious examples.
The growth of inequality in many nations across the world since the 1970s and 
1980s is a second important trend (Atkinson 2015; Milanovic 2016; Piketty 2014). 
This shift has induced political polarization between those whose lives and eco-
nomic situations consistently improve and those who have been losing ground 
for decades in relative economic terms and often in absolute terms as well. The 
disfavored groups can be expected to shy away from policies that require national 
sacrifices to achieve climate change goals.
Third, world migration, induced in part by economic inequality and the op-
pression of social groups by autocratic regimes, is currently a major issue. If 
migrants arrive in countries that are already experiencing rising inequality and 
increasingly strict climate change policies, their arrival will further strengthen 
populist, nationalist, and autocratic trends.
There are other world problems that do not have the same universality but are 
also genuine world problems that are relevant in many countries and regions of 
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the world. These include religious fundamentalism, which breeds religious intol-
erance and enmity and motivates the persecution of religious minorities. This sit-
uation induces autocratic tendencies in countries that privilege a specific religion 
and then put at a disadvantage and exclude members of other religions. 
Yet another world problem is the cycle of drug uses, the rise of gangs and ter-
rorist groups whose economic success rests on drugs, and the strong tendency to-
ward physical violence among drug-related groups. Countries with society-wide 
drug problems experience one of two scenarios: 1) the rise of political regimes that 
are neither democratic nor autocratic but are better described as big gangs, – or 2) 
the emergence of law and order autocracies that derive their autocratic legitimacy 
from the fight against drugs, gangs, and drug related terrorist groups.
There are also some potentially benign social forces in present-day world soci-
ety that can contribute to a strengthening of democracies. We would like to point 
to three of them. First, there is the classical circumstance underlying the rise 
of democracies, namely economic growth. Even if inequality persists, econom-
ic growth allows for the improvement of the situation of even disfavored social 
groups. A second potentially benign force is the combined inf luence of education 
and technology. Technology encourages economic growth and, in the 20th cen-
tury, consistently produced ever-new occupational groups and sectors and thus 
offered the possibility of participating in occupational transformations and gain-
ing income from these new sectors. However, technology demands the incessant 
expansion of education (Goldin and Katz 2008). Otherwise people will not be able 
to participate actively in the technological transformation of society. The third be-
nign force is the potential worldwide rise of gender equality, especially the partic-
ipation of women. Gender equality can be a strong force towards democratization. 
At the same time, resistance to gender equality is often a strong factor in the rise 
of right-wing populism. Thus, these benign forces can be a source of sociological 
ambivalence (Merton 1976). The same sociological ambivalence affects education, 
which can and will contribute to political polarization and economic inequality if 
there are significant groups who do not participate in educational expansion.
These concluding remarks are far from an exhaustive analysis. But even they 
may already make visible how demanding political action in 21st century world 
society is. Political action has to deal with all these problems, and if democracies 
are preferred, there is no easy answer how to advance this agenda. But there is 
at least one answer obviously suggested by this incomplete list of problems and 
tendencies: One will have to work on all the world problems (from climate change 
to drugs) listed above and there are some benign, although ambivalent, forces and 
strategies of which one can make use, hoping that they may contribute to solving 
world problems and at the same time will make the survival and eff lorescence of 
democracy more probable.
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